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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff/Appellant
Case No. 960362-CA
940905590CN

vs.
JOHN WALL and
NANCY WALL, his wife,
Defendants/Appellees

JURISDICTION
This appeal is being brought pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which provides, in part, that an appeal may be taken from a
district court to the appellate court from all final orders and judgments. Appeal is
being brought pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
provide in part that the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the Clerk
of the trial Court within thirty days after the judgment or order appealed therefrom is
entered.
Jurisdiction is further based upon Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended §78-2-2 which grants this Court appellate jurisdiction over appeals from
judgments of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction

is further

pursuant to the

Utah Code of

Judicial

Administration, Rule 4-504, Written Orders, Judgments and Decrees, which provides
that upon entry of judgment notice of the judgment shall be served upon the opposing

party and proof of the service shall be filed w i t h the Court.

Proof of service was

provided on April 3, 1996.
The Order and Final Judgment of Judge Glenn Iwasaki was duly entered
by the District Court of the Third Judicial District, for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
on March 8, 1 9 9 6 , and the notice of appeal was filed by Bear River Mutual Insurance
Company (hereinafter "Bear River") as Appellant on the 3rd day of April, 1 9 9 6 .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The Appellant in this case is raising three issues:
ISSUE NO. I.
The District Court erred in determining that the general release of all
future claims, causes of action and damages executed by Bear River's
insureds, John and Nancy Wall, to their tortfeasor, Lana Waters, and the
tortfeasor's insurance carrier, 18 months after the accident did not
release Bear River from continuing to make payments pursuant to the
personal injury protection statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1 9 5 3 , as
amended §31a-22 306.
Standard of Appellate Review and Supporting Authority: This Court, in
the case of State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 9 3 2 , (Utah 1994), and the case of Landes v.
Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), ruled that pursuant to an order and
final judgment on a summary judgment proceeding, the standard is "correctness;"
meaning that the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer to
any degree to the trial court's determination of the law.

This is because the

Appellate's Court has traditionally been seen as the power and duty to say w h a t the
law is and to assure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction.
Citation to Record Showing Preservation of Issue: The Complaint of
Plaintiff, paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19. [Record on Appeal, ("ROA"), pgs.5-6];
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the prayer of the First Cause of Action, [ROA pg.9] Motion and Memorandum for
summary judgment [ROA pgs.80-103].
ISSUE NO. II.
The Court erred in determining that the general release of all Future
claims, causes of action and damages executed by Bear River's
Insureds, John and Nancy Wall, to their tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's
insurance carrier did not destroy Bear River's right in arbitration
proceedings between the insurance carriers for the respective parties for
reimbursement for their no-fault benefits paid pursuant to UCA §31 a-22307.
Standard of Appellate Review and Supporting Authority:

This Court

upheld [ROA pgs. ] that the case of State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 9 3 2 , (Utah 1994), and
the case of Landes v. Capital Citv Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), ruled that
pursuant to an order and final judgment on a summary judgment proceeding, the
standard is "correctness/' meaning that the appellate court decides the matter for
itself and does not defer to any degree to the trial court's determination of the law.
This is because the Appellate's Court has traditionally been seen as the power and
duty to say w h a t the law is and to assure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction.
Citation showing the preservation: Complaint of Plaintiff paragraphs 2 0 ,
2 1 , 2 2 , 2 3 , 2 4 , [ROA, pgs.6-8] and the prayer of the Second Cause of Action,
paragraph 3 [ROA pg.9]
ISSUE NO. III.
The Court erred in determining pursuant to Bear River's policy that the
Walls have not contractually waived or extinguished their right for future
personal injury protection benefits by executing their general release of
March 4 , 1994.
Standard of Appellate Review and Supporting Authority:

This Court

upheld [ROA pgs. ] that the case of State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 9 3 2 , (Utah 1994), and

the case of Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), ruled that
pursuant to an order and final judgment on a summary judgment proceeding, the
standard is "correctness;" meaning that the appellate court decides the matter for
itself and does not defer to any degree to the trial court's determination of the law.
This is because the Appellate's Court has traditionally been seen as the power and
duty to say w h a t the law is and to assure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction.
Citation showing the preservation: Complaint of Plaintiff paragraphs 5,
[ROA, p g . 3 ] .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES
The Appellant believes that the determinative statutes in resolving this
case are in Utah Code Annotated, as follows:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Code
Code
Rules
Rules

Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-306
Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-307
Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-308
Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-309
of Civil Procedure, Rule 56
of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(d)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of the Case:
This action was commenced by Bear River Mutual on August 3 1 , 1 9 9 4 ,

in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
for a declaratory judgment pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §783 3 - 1 , 1953, as amended, seeking a determination of the contractual rights of Bear
River pursuant to its insurance policy issued to John Wall and Nancy Wall, his w i f e ,
(hereinafter "the Walls"). Bear River asked the trial court to determine whether Bear
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River was under a duty to continue making personal injury protection benefit payments
to the Walls arising out of an accident on August 7, 1992, pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, §31A-22-306 through 3 0 9 , 1953, as amended, providing for personal
injury protection payments after an accident.
Some 18 months after the accident, after Bear River Mutual had paid PIP
benefits, on March 4, 1994, the Walls entered into a general release with the
tortfeasor, Lana Waters, and her insurance carrier, and releasing the tortfeasor from
all actions, claims and demands known, developed or undeveloped, arising out of the
accident of August 7, 1992.

Bear River has never claimed, and does not now claim,

that it is subrogated to any of the proceeds of the Walls' settlement.

There is no

question that the settlement was within the insurance policy limits of Lana Waters.
[ROA, pg.539]
The sole issue is whether Bear River is under a duty to continue making
PIP benefit payments after the Walls signed a general release with the tortfeasor and
her insurance carrier. Specifically, Bear River alleges as follows:
1.

On or about June 5, 1992, and continuing through June 5, 1993,

Plaintiff had issued its standard automobile Policy No. C 1 4 5 0 7 7 , to John Wall
and Nancy Wall, his wife. [ROA, pgs.11-32]
2.

On or about August 6, 1992, the Plaintiffs insured, Nancy Wall,

was driving her vehicle in Cortez, Colorado, was struck by a vehicle driven by
Lana D. Waters, who it is alleged, failed to yield the right-of-way at a stop sign.
As a direct, proximate result of the collision, Bear River's insured, Nancy Wall,

suffered personal injuries which required medical attention and medical
services,
3.

Bear River faithfully paid the medical benefits from August 6,

1 9 9 2 , the date of the accident, until it received notice on March 4 , 1 9 9 4 , some
18 months later, that the Walls had settled w i t h the tortfeasor, Lana Waters,
and her insurance company, and with the assistance of their attorney, they
issued a full general release without reservations for $ 1 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 for "any and
all actions, claims, and demands whatsoever
have, whether known or unknown,
or arising out of the accident,
the 7th day of August,
4.

which claimants now have or may

developed,

or undeveloped,

on account

of

casualty or event which happened on or about

1992."

It was Bear River's position that by John and Nancy Wall executing

a general release w i t h the tortfeasor's insurance carrier for all future actions,
claims and demands, were in lieu of any future PIP benefits required to be paid
by Bear River. The Walls demanded a continuation of PIP benefits. When the
issue arose Bear River asked the Court for a declaratory judgment for a
determination of its contractual rights pursuant to its policy and the provisions
of the Utah Insurance Code, Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-306 through 3 0 9 ,
1 9 5 3 , as amended. This was done pursuant to the general policy, as explained
by the Utah Supreme Court in Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Marchant,
615 P.2d 4 2 3 (Utah 1980):
"It would not comport with our ideas of either law or justice to
prevent any party who entertains bona fide questions about his
legal obligations from seeking adjudication thereon in the c o u r t s . "

5.

Bear River alleged that their statutory right of subrogation in

arbitration with the Lana Waters' insurance company, Hawkeye Insurance Co.,
had been extinguished by executing the general release. Utah Code Annotated,
§31A-22-309(6), 1953, as amended.
6.

Bear River alleges that by the Walls executing the general release,

waived and extinguished their right to receive future PIP benefit payments
pursuant to the terms and conditions of their insurance policy.
7.

The Walls filed an answer to the complaint denying that their

release had extinguished Bear River's right to statutory arbitration, or that they
had been paid in full pursuant to the release; and had chosen their right of
action. [ROA, pgs.59-74]
8.

The Walls thereafter filed a donnybrook of pleadings alleging bad

faith, and that Bear River did not have the right to seek a declaratory judgment
and a determination of their rights under the policy. [ROA, pgs.80-522]
9.

Bear River's motion for declaratory judgment for interpretation of

its contract was heard before Judge Glenn Iwasaki on the 24th day of August,
1995, who ruled that under the case of Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 120203 (Utah 1980), the issue of arbitration was mandatory between the insurance
carriers that Nancy Wall was entitled to continued payments for PIP benefits
after the signing of the full release. Judgment was signed on the 8th day of
March, 1996, [ROA, pgs.534] which provided:
a.
That the Defendants, John and Nancy Wall's Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiff is required to pay to John
and Nancy Wall, pursuant to the provisions of its policy, Part B, Personal
Injury Protection, those benefits since the time of the release signed by

Defendants on March 4 , 1994, pursuant to the terms and conditions of
the policy.
b.
That Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for
Summary Judgment is denied.
c.
That the counterclaim filed by Defendants, John Wall and
Nancy Wall, is hereby dismissed, and the Defendants' request to file an
amended counterclaim is denied.
10.

The Court ruled that Bear River's action was commenced in good

faith w i t h debatable issues and dismissed the myriad of pro-se motions,
counterclaims, proposed counterclaims, motions to file counterclaims, for bad
faith and breach of contract. [ROA, pg.434] No appeal has been taken from
that portion of the judgment by cross appeal pursuant to the provisions of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(d) by the Walls.
11.

Bear River then perfected its appeal from the final Order and

Judgment on April 3, 1996, and filed a cost bond on appeal on that same date,
alleging that the Trial Court was clearly in error in misinterpreting the Allstate
v. Ivie case and the previous authorities of Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co.,
559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977), Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 5 9 2 P.2d 609
(Utah 1979),
b.

Essential Course of Proceedings:
1.

Bear River filed a Complaint for declaratory judgment on August

3 1 , 1 9 9 4 , in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and commenced its action for a declaratory judgment,
as set forth in the issues, requesting for a declaratory judgment. [ROA p g s . 1 34]

Pan* ft

The Walls filed an Answer and Counterclaim on November 17, 1994,

denying the allegations of the Complaint alleging that Bear River had a duty to
continue to pay PIP benefits and pursuant to Allstate v. Ivie. that Bear River
was under an obligation to make payments. The Walls then asked the Court
to award them summary judgment pursuant to their counterclaim that Bear
River was under a duty to continue to make PIP benefit payments.

[ROA,

pgs.59-74]
2.

Thereafter, on February 16, 1994, Bear River filed a motion for

judgment on the pleadings or in lieu thereof, summary judgment.

[ROA,

pgs.82-83]
3.

On December 16, 1994, Bear River filed its memorandum in

support of the motion for summary judgment and memorandum in opposition.
[ROA, pgs.84-106]
4.

On December 13, 1994, the Defendants filed a pro se motion for

summary judgment [ROA pgs.75-79]; and on December 28, 1994, they filed
their memorandum in support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment
[ROA, pgs. 106-110]
5.

Thereafter the Defendants on December 3 0 , 1994, filed a Demand

for Exemplary and Punitive Damages in Addition to General Damages and
Restitution. [ROA, pgs. 111-112]
6.
Defendants'

On June

19,

Counterclaim

1995, Defendants filed a Motion to Amend
Pursuant to

Rule

15,

URCP Amended

and

Supplemental Pleadings, to include a complaint for prosecution, damages,
restitution, communications fraud. [ROA, pgs. 266-268]

7.

On August 2 4 , 1995, pursuant to an oral hearing between the

parties the Honorable Glenn Iwasaki presiding, the Court ruled that pursuant to
Allstate v. Ivie, that Bear River was required to continue to pay the PIP benefits
to John and Nancy Wall even though they had signed a release on March 4 ,
1 9 9 4 . [ROA, pg.406]
8.

The Defendants then filed numerous motions for reconsideration,

[ROA, p g s . 5 1 2 - 5 1 7 ] , motions for reconsideration of the reconsideration,
9.

On December 5, 1995, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss

Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Defendants Motion for
Reconsideration. [ROA, pgs.489-501]
The Court denied the respective motions of the Walls on January 10,
1 9 9 6 , [ROA, p g s . 5 2 4 - 5 2 6 ] . On March 8, 1996, the Order and Final Judgment was
entered by the above court. [ROA, pgs.529-535]
c.

Disposition by the Court:
The foregoing statement of the Course of the Proceedings outlines all of

the material procedures and judicial facts in this case. The Court entered its Order and
Judgment on March 8, 1996, which stated as follows:
1.
That the Defendants, John and Nancy Wall's Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiff is required to pay to John
and Nancy Wall, pursuant to the provisions of its policy, Part B, Personal
Injury Protection, those benefits since the time of the release signed by
Defendants on March 4 , 1994, pursuant to the terms and conditions of
the policy.
2.
That Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for
Summary Judgment is denied.
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3.
That the counterclaim filed by Defendants, John Wall and
Nancy Wall, is hereby dismissed, and the Defendants' request to file an
amended counterclaim is denied.
The Walls have not filed a cross appeal on the issue of the dismissal of
their Counterclaims pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Final Order and Judgment,
[ROA, pgs.529-535] as to the issue of Bear River's good faith in commencing
the declaratory action, and, therefore, this will not be addressed in this brief
because the matter is moot pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule
4(d) providing for the timely filing of cross claims on appeal.
d.

Statement of Relevant Facts:
1.

The Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, (hereinafter

"Bear River") is an insurance corporation engaged in the insurance business in
the state of Utah, is a non-profit corporation and is owned entirely by its
policyholders for the use and benefit of the policyholders, having its principal
place of business at 545 East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah. [ROA, pg.1]
2.

Defendants, John Wall and Nancy Wall, his wife, are residents of

Davis County, State of Utah, and reside at P.O. Box 5 4 0 1 1 8 , No. Salt Lake,
Utah 8 4 0 5 4 . [ROA, pg.1]
3.

Bear

River commenced

its action pursuant to

Utah

Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended §78-33-1, et.seq. seeking by determination the
rights under a policy issued by Plaintiff, Policy No. C 1 4 5 0 7 7 . [ROA, pgs. 1-3]
4.

On or about June 5, 1992, and continuing through June 5, 1993,

Plaintiff had issued its standard automobile Policy No. C 1 4 5 0 7 7 , to John Wall
and Nancy Wall, his wife. [ROA, pgs. 11-32]

5.

That the auto policy issued to Defendants, provides under PART

B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE, Insuring Agreement,

as

follows:
"The Company will pay personal injury protection benefits that are
reasonable and necessary to or on behalf of each eligible injured person
for:
(a)
medical expenses
(b)
work loss
(c)
funeral expenses
(d)
survivor loss and
(e)
special damages
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible insured person
caused by an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle as a motor
vehicle.
Medical Payments:
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall not exceed
$3,000.00; unless additional medical protection or payments are
provided for on the Declaration page, they must be incurred within three
years of the date of the accident to be payable.
6.

Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-308, 1953, as amended, provides

for payment of PIP benefits anywhere in the United States as follows:
"The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection
coverage:
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving
any motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in
this state, the United States, its territories or possessions, or
Canada, except where the injury is the result of the use or
operation of the named insured's o w n motor vehicle not actually
insured under the policy;"
7.

Bear River's policy provides under PART B - PERSONAL INJURY

PROTECTION COVERAGE, Insuring Agreement. [ROA, pg.20] as follows:
"Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other
Insurance Under our Personal Injury Protection
1. No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate benefits
for the same elements of loss under this or any similar insurance."
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8.

Under PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS, APPLYING TO ALL

COVERAGES, Subrogation, [ROA, pg.30] it provides:
"In the event of any payment to any person under all coverages:
1. The Company is subrogated to the rights of the person to whom or for
whose benefit such payments were made, to the extent of such
payments, and such person must execute and deliver instruments and
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. Such
person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.
a.
If the Insured proceeds or commences an action against a legally
responsible third party, the Company shall be entitled to the extent
of such payment to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment
that may result from the exercise of any rights of recovery of such
person against any person or organization legally responsible for
the bodily injury or property damage because of which such
payment is made and the Company shall have a lien to the extent
of such payment, notice of which may be given to the person or
organization causing such bodily injury, his agent, his insurer or a
court having jurisdiction in the matter; such person shall hold in
trust for the benefit of the Company all rights of recovery which
he shall have against such other person or organization because of
such bodily injury."
9.

On August 6, 1992, the Plaintiffs insured, Nancy Wall, was driving her

vehicle in the State of Colorado, when Lana D. Waters failed to yield the right-ofway at a stop sign and ran her vehicle into the vehicle being driven by Nancy
Wall. As a direct, proximate result of the collision, the Plaintiffs insured suffered
personal injuries which required medical attention and medical services.

Bear

River Mutual faithfully paid all of the medical expenses of Nancy Wall through
March 4, 1994. [ROA, pg.5]
10. On March 4, 1994, Nancy Wall, John Wall and their attorney, executed
a release to the tortfeasor, Lana Waters, and her insurance carrier of "any and all
actions, claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants now have or may
have, whether known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on account of or

arising out of the accident,
day of August

1992."

casualty or event which happened on or about the 7th

[ROA, pg.33]

1 1 . The sole issue is whether Bear River contractually, and pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-306, 1953, as amended, providing
for personal injury protection benefits is under a duty to continue to make PIP
payments to the Walls after the release on March 4, 1994.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Bear River will argue and support the following essential errors that they
believe were committed by the Trial Court in determining their pending action against
the Walls.
1.

The District Court erred in determining that the general release of all
future claims, causes of action and damages executed by Bear River's
insureds, John and Nancy Wall, to their tortfeasor, Lana Waters, and the
tortfeasor's insurance carrier, 18 months after the accident did not
release Bear River from continuing to make payments pursuant to the
personal injury protection statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1 9 5 3 , as
amended §31a-22-306.

2.

The Court erred in determining that the general release of all Future
claims, causes of action and damages executed by Bear River's Insureds,
John and Nancy Wall, to their tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's insurance
carrier did not destroy Bear River's right in arbitration proceedings
between the insurance carriers for the respective parties for
reimbursement for their no-fault benefits paid pursuant to UCA §31 a-22307.

3.

The Court erred in determining pursuant to Bear River's policy that the
Walls have not contractually waived or extinguished their right for future
personal injury protection benefits by executing their general release of
March 4 , 1994.
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ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE GENERAL
RELEASE OF ALL FUTURE CLAIMS, CAUSES OF ACTION AND
DAMAGES EXECUTED BY BEAR RIVER'S INSUREDS, JOHN AND
NANCY WALL, TO THEIR TORTFEASOR, LANA WATERS, AND THE
TORTFEASOR'S INSURANCE CARRIER, 18 MONTHS AFTER THE
ACCIDENT DID NOT RELEASE BEAR RIVER FROM CONTINUING TO
MAKE PAYMENTS PURSUANT TO THE PERSONAL
INJURY
PROTECTION STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1 9 5 3 , AS
AMENDED §31A-22 306.
So that the issue is clear, Bear River Mutual, from the time of the
accident on August 7, 1992, in Colorado, involving the Walls and Lana Waters, Bear
River paid PIP benefits to the Walls pursuant to the provisions of its insurance policy
[ROA, pgs. 10-32] and pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-306, 308 and 3 0 9 ,
1 9 5 3 , as amended.
Bear River Mutual is not attempting to recover or claim any interest in
Walls' settlement with Lana D. Waters and her insurance carrier and their settlement.
[ROA, pg.33] The settlement was within the insurance policy limits of the Waters'
insurance policy. [ROA, pg.533]
These are not issues in this appeal; neither were they issues in the trial
court.
Bear River's obligation to pay PIP benefits outside of the State of Utah
is governed by Utah Statutes, Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-308(1), 1953, as
amended, which provides as follows:
"The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection
coverage:
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving
any motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in

this state, the United States, its territories or possessions, or
Canada, except where the injury is the result of the use or
operation of the named insured's own motor vehicle not actually
insured under the policy;"
Therefore, the duty to pay PIP benefits to the Walls is governed by Utah Law and
pursuant to the Utah Statutes, even though the accident may have occurred in
Colorado. The Utah No-fault Act has now been in effect in Utah since 1973.

As

stated in the original enactment in Chapter 55, SLU 1973:
" . . . to effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of handling
the greater bulk of the personal injury claims that arise out of automobile
accidents . . ."
The Act (Utah Code Annotated, §31-41-2, 1953, as amended,) further
provided that the purpose of the Act was to stabilize not effect certain savings in the
rising costs of automobile insurance. Consistent with those particular provisions, is
now enacted in Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-307, 1953, as amended.

The

concept that there was not, at any time, to be a double payment, is reinforced by the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-306, 1953, as amended, and §31A-22309(3), provides that the benefits are reduced by workman's compensation, and
amounts received by the United States and its agencies.
The Walls now assert that the release that they entered into is not
binding, that they are seeking additional medical PIP benefits from Bear River Mutual
Insurance Company after the release of March 4, 1994. [ROA, pg.33] The Walls, on
the 4th day of March, 1994, with full representation by counsel, and with full
negotiation with the tort feasor, Lana Waters and David Waters dba D & L
Construction Co., and insurance carrier, solemnly entered into a release agreement

with the tort feasors for the sum of $16,000.00. [ROA, pgs.33] The release is clear,
unambiguous and does not provide for any reservations and provides as follows:
"John Wall and Nancy Wall . . . for and in consideration of the sum of
Sixteen Thousand and no/100s Dollars ($16,000.00) the receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged, do we hereby REMISE, RELEASE AND FOREVER
DISCHARGE David Waters d/b/a D & L Construction and Lana Waters, their
agents, and servants and all other persons, firms, and corporations
whomsoever of and from any and all actions, claims, and demands
whatsoever which claimants now have or may have, whether known or
unknown, developed or undeveloped, on account of or arising out of the
accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the 7th day of
August, 1992."
The release further provides:
"As a further consideration for said Sum Claimants warrant . . . are
relying solely upon their own judgment; that the above mentioned sum is
received by claimants in full settlement and satisfaction of all the aforesaid
claims and demands whatsoever; . . . and that before signing and sealing this
Release, Claimants have fully informed themselves of its contents and
meaning and have executed it with full knowledge thereof."(emphasis added)
The Walls in this matter not only executed a full release, from all claims
and demands which they now have, but also

"whether known or

unknown,

developed or undeveloped, on account of or arising out of the accident" and that they
fully understood the contents and meaning of the release before they signed it. There
is not a scintilla of any reservation in the release, other than a full and complete
release of all claims past, present and future, both for medical expenses, general
damages, pain and suffering and further that they have relied upon their own judgment
and in this case with the representation and assistance of counsel.
The Walls have asserted that (1) the plain language of the document is
not plain, (2) that the plain meaning is not what is states, and (3) the contents are not
what they say they are. They seek and desire an open-end medical expense fund

against Bear River Mutual Insurance Company arising out of this accident. Bear River
Mutual Insurance Company has paid for the medical expenses, loss of wages and all
expenses prior to the signing of the Walls' release on March 4 , 1 9 9 4 . What the Walls
are n o w attempting to do is to seek double recovery. They acknowledged payment
in full in the release they signed and now they seek to recover once again and
continue the matter against Bear River Mutual Insurance Company.
They plainly cannot do this. This conduct on the part of Defendants, and
the course of action taken by t h e m , is not novel or new, but has been handled in t w o
or three landmark cases from the Supreme Court of Utah.
Under the Utah PIP statute, in the case Jamison v. Utah Home Fire
Insurance Company, 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977) the parents of a 12-year old boy
brought action against a truck driver's insurer to recover on the basis of no-fault
insurance for the boy's loss of household chores at the rate of $12 per day as
provided in the PIP package, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
§31A-41 - 7 , in 1977. The Supreme Court said obviously a 12-year old boy would not
have incurred those types of expenses in any event as a result of an accident. The
court stated the general overall purpose of the Utah PIP statute, as follows:
"However much we may desire it to be otherwise, this fact might as well
be accepted as inescapable: that insurance is a business, not a philanthropy.
There can be no free gifts or benefactions. In the long run premiums must
pay for losses; and therefore, increases in premiums must and will be
correlated to the extent of the coverage. Otherwise, the business cannot
continue to operate. Someone has to pay the increased premiums. That
someone is the policyholders, i.e., the public. Accordingly, a seeming
generosity in broadening coverage in an individual situation, would be no favor
to policyholders generally, nor to the public.
. . . it becomes plain that the Act, both in its statement of general
purpose, and its specific provisions, was not intended to provide an automatic
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reward or a 'windfall/ for being involved in an accident by requiring payment
when there was no loss actually suffered, nor for any expense not reasonably
to be incurred, but should be construed in conformity with the fundamental
principle of insurance law, that the purpose of insurance is to indemnify for
losses or damages suffered, as contrasted to gambling for a munificent reward
if a loss occurs." (emphasis added)
The Jamison case stands for the proposition that the Utah PIP statute
was never intended to be for the purpose of a windfall or to give a person money that
they would not have otherwise received as a magnificent reward if a loss occurs.
The next case is Jones v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 5 9 2 P.2d
609 (Utah 1979), which is identical to the case that w e now have. In the Jones case,
as in this case, the Plaintiff, Elmer G. Jones, executed a general release w i t h o u t any
reservations.

After entering into the release, he then decided to go back to the

insurance company for additional PIP benefits. Chief Justice Hall stated:
" . . . The whole tenor of the Act is that an injured person will not be
permitted to recover from an insurance carrier (over and above what the
carrier has previously paid in benefits) once he has successfully recovered
from his tortfeasor for personal injuries. Any other interpretation would be to
permit double damage recovery, (emphasis added)
The Act mandates that every resident owner of a registered motor vehicle
maintain either insurance or other approved security thereon. It is designed
to totally eliminate claims for injuries of lesser consequence which fail to meet
a basic 'threshold' test set forth in the statute and provides for the payment
of benefits by one's own insurer without regard to fault.
No-fault benefits are also available to those who sustain greater injuries.
This is so even though they remain free to pursue a tort claim as well.
However, this does not entitle one to a double recovery for a single loss since
the statute specifically affords subrogation rights and arbitration between
insurers whenever no-fault benefits are paid.
A fortiori, the legislative intent specifically expressed in the Act itself to
'possibly stabilizer if not effectuate certain savings in, the rising costs of
automobile accident insurance and to effectuate a more efficient, equitable
method of handling the greater bulk of the personal injury claims that arise out
of automobile accidents' negatives the contention that double recovery is
permitted. Double recovery for a single item of loss was never contemplated

by the legislature and we will not permit any type of automatic reward of
'windfall' to an injured plaintiff.
. . . Indeed, the Act was never intended to give an injured plaintiff a
windfall or extra income as a benefit for having had an accident.
. . . This agreement expressly releases plaintiff's claim against the
tortfeasors for known and unknown personal injuries as well as for property
damage arising from the accident. As indicated supra, defendant insurer is
subrogated to the rights of plaintiff in asserting a claim against the tortfeasors 7
insurers in recovering benefits based upon liability. The rights to which the
subrogee succeeds can be no greater than those of the person for whom he
is substituted. By executing the release, plaintiff discharged the tortfeasors
of any and all liability, notwithstanding the attempted 'specific exclusion'
relating to no-fault benefits. By so doing, plaintiff has chosen his recovery
and cannot now successfully assert a claim against his insurer." (emphasis
added)
Based upon the Jones v. Transamerica case and the Jamison v. Utah
Home Fire case, the final nutshell of the matter is that the Defendants have chosen
their recovery and may not thereafter continue to receive PIP benefits.
Although the principles enunciated in the Jamison v. Utah Home Fire case
and the Jones v. Transamerica case were based upon subrogation by an insurer
against the tortfeasor, which was subsequently reviewed and changed in Allstate v.
Ivie, the principle involved on double recovery has never been changed.
The basis concept of no double recovery is drafted through the entire
tenure of the personal injury act, is drafted into every supreme court decision, to our
knowledge that has reviewed the matter.
The principle for the determination for subrogation may be different, but
the principle application of the Jamison v. Utah Home Fire case and the Jones v.
Transamerica case have not. The trial court plainly misinterpreted the Allstate v. Ivie
case which w e believe supports our position rather than detracting from it.

The Court in Allstate v. Ivie, at 1202-03, made the determination that the
right of action of an insurance company pursuant to subrogation for payments made
on behalf of its insured, could not subrogate against the tortfeasor individually, but
would be settled by binding arbitration with the tortfeasor's insurance carrier. This is
pursuant to provisions for mandatory arbitration as provided for in Utah Code
Annotated, §31 A-22-309(6), 1953, as amended.
The principle of double recovery has never been changed and has not
been overruled in any aspect. As Justice Stewart said in Allstate v. Ivie at pg.1203:
" . . . On the other hand, the tortfeasor's liability insurer, in fulfilling
its duty to respond to the claims of the injured party to the limits of its
policy, stands int he shoes of its insured and pays on the basis of its
insured's personal liability to the tort victim; this personal liability does not
include PIP payments. Thus, the tort victim's recovery from the liability
insurer cannot be reduced by the PIP payments. If the victim's recovery
be reduced by the amount of the PIP payments by granting his no-fault
insurer a right of subrogation, it is the no-fault insurer who receives double
recovery." (emphasis added)
The Allstate v. Ivie case stands for the proposition that PIP payments
remain the arbitration responsibility of the respective parties' insurance carriers based
upon their liability. It does not mean that if the Claimant or the insured settles with
the tortfeasor, he can then continue to receive benefits. This would mean double
recovery and a person could go on receiving benefits after a trial of the matter, which
would necessarily include future medical expenses, loss of wages and the same items
that are included in the PIP benefits, except loss of services.
To demonstrate the basic principle of double recovery and that Allstate
v. Ivie did not change the reasoning of Jamison v. Utah Home, or Jones v.
Transamerica, a review of the case of Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981),
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Justice Stewart's opinion, a f e w months after the Allstate v. Ivie case, supra, he
stated as follows:
"Several cases recently decided by this Court have dealt w i t h the
respective rights of an injured party, the tortfeasor, a no-fault insurer, and
the tortfeasor's insurer. Street v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, Utah 6 0 9 P.2d
1343 (1980); Allstate v. Ivie, Utah 606 P.2d 1197 (1980); Jones v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., Utah, 592 P.2d 609 (1979). These cases are
predicated upon the proposition that a basic principle of the No-Fault A c t is
to prevent double recovery by the no-fault insured."
All of the subsequent cases, Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d
4 1 7 (Utah 1981), Street v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 609 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1980), Laub
v. South Central Utah Telephone A s s ' n , 657 P.2d 1 3 0 4 (Utah 1982), Guaranty Nat.
Ins. Co. v. Morris, 611 P.2d 725 (Utah 1980), State v. Pena, 8 6 9 P.2d 9 3 2 (Utah
1994), Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), Madsen v. Borthick.
7 6 9 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), have affirmed the proposition that the insurance
settlement between the tortfeasor's insurance carrier and the claimant's insurance
company has no claim on its insured's recovery. We do not dispute that at all. In the
Wilde v. Mid-Century case, supra, the court again confirmed the principle that there
can be no double recovery but distinguished the Jones v. Transamerica case, supra,
upholding it, except for the claim for household services because they were not
included in the litigation judgment by Wilde.
In the Street v. Farmers case, supra, Justice Stewart stated:
" . . . The right of subrogation, as explained in Ivie, is a right to be
exercised in an arbitration proceeding between insurance companies of
the respective parties to that double recovery can be avoided,
unnecessary litigation made less likely, and the inherent conflicts
between the insured and the insurer avoided."
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Based upon the authority of the Street v. Farmers case, once the claimant
settles with the tortfeasor, there is no further right to be exercised because the
claimant's insurance company has no right to proceed against the tortfeasor's
insurance company.
POINT NO. II
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE GENERAL RELEASE OF
ALL FUTURE CLAIMS, CAUSES OF ACTION AND DAMAGES EXECUTED
BY BEAR RIVER'S INSUREDS, JOHN AND NANCY WALL, ON MARCH
4, 1994, TO THEIR TORTFEASOR AND THE TORTFEASOR'S
INSURANCE CARRIER DID NOT DESTROY BEAR RIVER'S RIGHT IN
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN THE INSURANCE CARRIERS
FOR THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR THEIR NOFAULT BENEFITS PAID PURSUANT TO UCA §31A-22-307.
The trial court basically failed to interpret the Allstate v. Ivie case, supra,
correctly. Justice Stewart's wrote that opinion. He then explained in the Street v.
Farmers case, supra, approximately one year later, the full parameters of what he was
saying in the Allstate v. Ivie case. In the Street v. Farmers case, he stated as follows:
''Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 (1980) is
dispositive. It holds that the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act does not
contemplate the granting of a right of subrogation to a no-fault insurer in
an action by the no-fault insured against a third-party tortfeasor. The right
of subrogation, as explained in Ivie. is a right to be exercised in an
arbitration proceeding between insurance companies of the respective
parties to that double recovery can be avoided, unnecessary litigation made
less likely, and the inherent conflicts between the insured and the insurer
avoided/' (emphasis added)
The rationale of the case was that there was still "subrogation arising out
of an automobile accident/' but the insurance carrier was not subrogated to the right
of its insured against the tortfeasor; but the insurance company who pays PIP benefits
is subrogated based upon the liability of its insured against the tortfeasor's insurance
company. Otherwise, there would be double recovery. An examination of the error

of the trial court can amply be demonstrated by an examination of Utah Code
Annotated, §31 A-22-309(6), 1953, as amended, which says:
"(6)
Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is
subject to the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be
held legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person
to w h o m benefits required under personal injury protection have
been paid by another insurer, including the Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the person w h o would
be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the
payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages
recoverable;"
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its
amount shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration
between the insurers."
A breakdown of the statute is quite simple. It says based upon

"liability"

the tortfeasor's insurance company shall reimburse the insured or the claimant's
insurance company for any payments made pursuant to the PIP statute. The bottom
line is liability.

If there is no liability by the tortfeasor's insurance company, either

because there is no liability based upon negligence arising out of an accident, or that
the tortfeasor's insurance company has paid the claimant and obtained a full release,
as w e have in this matter, there can be no arbitration award because no liability exists.
The Walls release provided for "Any and all actions, claims, and demands
which claimants
undeveloped,

now have or may have, whether known or unknown,

on account

of or arising out the accident,

happened on or about the 7th day of August,

casualty

whatsoever
developed

or event

or

which

1992." [ROA, pg.33] Therefore, once

the settlement is made, and liability extinguished, the claimant's insurance company
is under no duty to continue making PIP payments.
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This is the exact principle involved in the Jones v. Transamerica case,
supra, drafted by Justice Gordon Hall, and the language which is now applicable:
" . . . This agreement expressly releases plaintiffs claim against the
tortfeasors for known and unknown personal injuries as well as for
property damage arising from the accident. As indicated supra, defendant
insurer is subrogated to the rights of plaintiff in asserting a claim against
the tortfeasors' insurers in recovering benefits based upon liability. The
rights to which the subrogee succeeds can be no greater than those of the
person for whom he is substituted. By executing the release, plaintiff
discharged the tortfeasors of any and all liability, notwithstanding the
attempted 'specific exclusion' relating to no-fault benefits. By so doing,
plaintiff has chosen his recovery and cannot now successfully assert a
claim against his insurer." (emphasis added)
In this case the Walls have chosen their recovery and cannot now
successfully assert a claim against Bear River. The liability of Bear River is no greater
than that of the tortfeasor, Waters, and their insurance company. Waters and their
insurance company have no liability to make any future payments, and therefore, there
can be no compulsory arbitration for liability by Bear River for which none exists.
POINT NO. HI
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING PURSUANT TO BEAR RIVER'S
POLICY THAT THE WALLS HAVE NOT CONTRACTUALLY WAIVED OR
EXTINGUISHED THEIR RIGHT FOR FUTURE PERSONAL INJURY
PROTECTION BENEFITS BY EXECUTING THEIR GENERAL RELEASE OF
MARCH 4, 1994.
Bear River Mutual's insurance policy, PART B, PERSONAL INJURY
PROTECTION COVERAGE, provides the following language:
"Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other
Insurance Under our Personal Injury Protection
1. No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or any similar
insurance/'

D a n a OK.

Bear River's policy, therefore, is clear contractually that an "eligible"
person shall not be entitled to receive duplicate benefits. When Walls signed the
general release as herein set forth, without any reservation, and acknowledged
payment in full, they were not entitled under the policy issued by Bear River to a
continuation of the PIP benefits.
The following cases hold that an insurance policy is a contract between
the insured and the insurer and is to be construed by the same rules as applied to
ordinary contracts: Alf v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 850 P.2d 1272
(Utah 1993); and Gee v. Utah State Retirement Board, 842 P.2d 919 (Utah App.
1992).

CONCLUSION
1.

Bear River Mutual believes that they have amply demonstrated to

this Court that the trial court committed error in failing to construe the release of the
Walls which is plain and unambiguous as a release of all claims, that by doing so, the
Walls have chosen their recovery and cannot now successfully assert any claim
against the insurer.
2.

That the general release signed by the Walls on March 4, 1994,

has destroyed Bear River's right of subrogation against the Walls' tortfeasor and their
insurance carrier.
3.

That Bear River's insurance contract provides for no double

payment.
Since the time of the passage of the personal injury protection statute in
1973, and the first interpretation of the statute in the Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins.
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Co. case, in 1977, to our knowledge all of the insurance companies have been basing
their premiums and handling of claims in the same manner as Bear River has handled
this particular claim, in that once the insured signs a full and complete settlement
agreement with the tortfeasor and its insurance carrier, the insurance company is no
longer under any obligation to make personal injury protection benefit payments to the
insured. The basic premise from the commencement of the personal injury protection
statute to the present has been against double recovery. If the insured can continue
to receive personal injury protection benefits after a full release, then he in fact is
receiving double recovery.
This case should be remanded to the District Court for a judgment in
favor of the Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, and against the Walls
pursuant to the allegations of declaratory action.
Dated this

T

day of August, 1996.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB& JACKSON

u

/Thomas A. Duffin
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

]
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

vs.
JOHN WALL and
NANCY WALL, his wife,
Defendants.

i

Civil No. 940905590CN

i

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Comes now the Plaintiff and for a cause of action alleges as follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1.

The Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, (hereinafter

"Bear River") is an insurance corporation engaged in the insurance business in the
state of Utah, is a non-profit corporation and is owned entirely by its policyholders for
the use and benefit of the policyholders, having its prindpal place of business at 545
East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
2.

Defendants, John Wall and Nancy Wall, his wife, are residents of

Davis County, State of Utah, and reside at 802 Montague, Bountiful, Utah 84010.

•23.

This action is brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as

amended §78-33-1, et.seq. seeking by determination the rights of the parties hereto
under a policy issued by Plaintiff, Policy No, C 1 4 5 0 7 7 .
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
4.

On or about June 5, 1992, and continuing through June 5, 1993,

Plaintiff had issued its standard automobile Policy No- C145077, to John Wall and
Nancy Wall, his wife. A copy of the policy is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and a
copy of the declaration page is attached hereto as Exhibit "B.n
5.

That the auto policy, Exhibit "A," issued to Defendants, provides

under PART B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE, Insuring Agreement,
as follows:
T h e Company will pay personal injury protection benefits that are reasonable
and necessary to or on behalf of each eligible injured person for:
(a)
medical expenses
(b)
work loss
(c)
funeral expenses
(d)
survivor loss and
(e)
special damages
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible insured person caused by
an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.
Medical Payments:
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall not exceed
$3,000-00; unless additional medical protection or payments are provided for
on the Declaration page, they must be incurred within three years of the date
of the accident to be payable.
Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of Liability and Special Provisions
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period
in the United States and Canada, except if an auto accident to which this
policy applies occurs outside of Utah, (but is within the United States and
Canada), our limits of liability under your policy for that accident are as follows:
1.
If the state, (outside of Utah) or Canada, has:
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a personal injury protection or similar law specifying limits higher
than that in the declarations, your policy will provide the higher
specified limit;

Special Conditions if Law is Declared Invalid
Tne premium for the policy is based on rates which have been established in
reliance upon the limitations on the right to recover for damages imposed by
the provisions of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. In the event a
court of competent jurisdiction declares or enters a judgment, the effect of
which is to render the provisions of such act invalid or unenforceable in whole
or in part the Company shall have therightto recompute the premium payable
for the policy and the provisions of this endorsement shall be voidable or
subject to amendment at the option of the Company.

^

Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other
Insurance Under our Personal Injury Protection
1 . No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate benefits for the
same elements of loss under this or any similar insurance."
6.

Under PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS, APPLYING TO ALL

COVERAGES, Subrogation, it provides:
w

In the event of any payment to any person under all coverages:
1•
The Company is subrogated to the rights of the person to whom or for
whose benefit such payments were made, to the extent of such
payments, and such person must execute and deliver instruments and
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. Such
person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.
a.
If the Insured proceeds or commences an action against a legally
responsible third party, the Company shall be entitled to the
extent of such payment to the proceeds of any settlement or
judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights of
recovery of such person against any person or organization legally
responsible for the bodily injury or property damage because of
which such payment is made and the Company shall have a lien
to the extent of such payment, notice of which may be given to
the person or organization causing such bodily injury, his agent,
his insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the matter; such
person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the Company ail rights
of recovery which he shall have against such other person or
organization because of such bodily injury."
7.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-308 provides:

-4"The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection
coverage:
(1} the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any
motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state,
the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except
where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the named
insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under the policy;"
8.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended

§31A-22-309(6)

provides:
"(6)
Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is
subject to the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid by
another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah,
the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall
reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the
amount of damages recoverable;"
9.

On or about August 6, 1992, the Plaintiff's insured, Nancy Wall,

was driving her vehicle carefully and prudently on Colorado State Highway 666 at
Cortez, Colorado, at its intersection with County Road 5, when Lana D. Waters failed
to yield the right-of-way at a stop sign and ran her vehicle into the vehicle being driven
by Nancy Wall. As a direct, proximate result of the collision, the Plaintiff's insured
suffered personal injuries which required medical attention and medical services.
10.

On September 23, 1992, Bear River Mutual's agent, George

Sergakis, drafted a letter to Anthony Thurber, attorney for John & Nancy Wall, with
the provision that he was on notice as to Bear River Mutual's subrogation rights and
with the language: "/ am looking forward to working with you."

-511.

On July 8, 1993, Plaintiff's attorney sent to Defendant a copy of

the letter notifying him of the subrogation rights of Bear River Mutual Insurance
Company for the payment of medical benefits pursuant to the Utah Personal Injury
Protection statute as herein set forth, placing them on notice as to Bear River Mutuai's
subrogatable interest.
12.

On November 2,1993, Anthony Thurber drafted a letter to George

Sergakis and Bear River Mutual Insurance Company indicating that they were fully
apprised.
13.

On or about March 4, 1994, John Wail and Nancy Wall executed

a release of "any and all actions, claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants
now have or may have, whether known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on
account of or arising out of die accident, casualty or event which happened on or
about the 7th day of August, 1992.n A copy of the release is attached as Exhibit C.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(As to the Obligation of Bear River Mutual to pay
PIP benefits to Defendants)
14.

The Defendants, on March 4, 1994, Exhibit C, executed a full

release as to the tort feasor, Lana Waters, providing a release of nany and all actions,
claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants now have or may have, whether
known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on account of or arising out of the
accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the 7th day of August,
1992."

-615.

Bear River Mutuai's policy provides under PART B - Non-

Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other Insurance Under our
Personal Iniurv Protection:
"1.

No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or any similar
insurance."
16.

That the Defendants have accepted $16,000.00 from the tort

feasor as additional recovery in lieu of further insurance benefits, to which they may
have been entitled. The agreement expressly releases the tort feasors from all known
or unknown personal injuries, as well as for property damage arising out of the
accident. The Defendants have discharged the tort feasor from all liability related to
no-fault benefits. By doing so the Wails have chosen their recovery and cannot now
successfully assert a claim against their insurer,
17.

That the said release, Exhibit C, is clear, concise and unambiguous.

18.

Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law or appropriate means,

other than an action for declaratory judgment, to determine its rights and obligations,
if any, as to the Defendants for future personal injury protection benefits.
19.

If it is proved that the release does not release personal injury

benefits, then the Plaintiff would be liable to pay those and liable for the expenses and
attorney fees as provided for in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22309.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(As to Subrogation of the Plaintiff to the Settlement of Defendants)

-720.

Plaintiff adopts and by this reference incorporates herein

paragraphs 1 through 13 of the Identification of parties, Jurisdiction and General
Allegations, and paragraphs 14 through 19 of the First Cause of Action as though the
allegations contained therein were fully and completely set forth herein,
21.

That on or about the 4th day of March, 1994, the Defendants

executed a full release as to the tort feasor, Lana Waters, providing a release of nany
and ail actions, claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants now have or may
have, whether known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on account of or
arising out of the accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the 7th day
of August, 1992."
22.

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company's insurance contract

provides under PART B - Non-Duolication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions
of Other Insurance Under our Personal Iniurv Protection as follows:
"1.

No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or any similar
insurance."
23.

That the said action on the part of the Defendants has deprived

this Plaintiff of its right to reimbursement from Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. of the
expenses paid to its insureds, as more fully set forth in Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended §31A-22-308, which provides as follows:
"The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection
coverage:
(1) the named insured, when injured In an accident involving any
motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state,
the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except

-8where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the named
insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under the policy;"
and Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-309(6) which states:
"(6)
Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is
subject to the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid by
another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the
insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the
other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of
damages recoverable;
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the
insurers."
24.

The Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law or appropriate means,

other than an action for declaratory judgment, to determine its rights and obligations,
if any, as to the Defendants for future personal injury protection benefits and requests
that the above-entitled Court determine whether the release by John & Nancy Wall of
March 4 , 1994, has destroyed Bear River Mutual Insurance Company's right of
subrogation in the matter and whether Bear River Mutual Insurance Company is
entitled to an equitable lien upon the proceeds of the funds received by the
Defendants.

-9WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants as
follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(As to the Obligation of Bear River Mutual to pay
PIP benefits to Defendants)
1.

For an order determining the rights and obligations of the parties

under insurance Policy No, C145077.
2.

For an order determining that the Release, Exhibit C, given by the

Defendants to Lana D. Waters and Hawkeye Security Insurance Co- was a full and
complete release of ail claims, demands and causes of action for any obligation of Bear
River Mutual Insurance Company to pay personal injury protection benefits to the
Defendants from the date of the release of March 4, 1994.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(As to Subrogation of the Plaintiff to the Settlement of Defendants)
3.

For an order determining that the Release, Exhibit A, given by the

Defendants to Lana D. Waters and Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. release by John
& Nancy Wall of March 4, 1994, has destroyed Bear River Mutual Insurance
Company's right of subrogation in the matter and whether Bear River Mutual Insurance
Company is entitled to an equitable lien upon the proceeds of the funds received by
the Defendants.

-10Dated this

3J

day of August, 1994.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON

'Thomas A. Duffin
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address:
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company
545 East Third South
P. 0 . Box 11869
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
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BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Non-Assessable Motor Vehicle and Auto Policy

UTAH

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company is the oldest, non-profit mutual insurance company incorporated in the State of Utah.
Please read your policy to make certain you understand the coverage that it provides. You may call the company to help and
assist you in any questions that you have.

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company
545 East Third South
P.O. Box 11869
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

The contractual obligations of this policy are assumed by insured and by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company named in die
Declarations and Policy.
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WARRANTIES AND DECLARATIONS
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY agrees
to insure you according to the terms of this policy based:
1. on your payment of premium for the coverages you
chose; and
2. in reliance on your statements in these declarations.
You agree and farther warrant, by acceptance of this policy
that:
1. the statements in these declarations are your
statements and are true; and
2. we insure you on the basis your statements are true;
and
3. this policy contains all of the agreements between you
and us or any of our agents; and
4. that this is a non-alcohol drinkers' policy, and
5. that this policy is for those who do not use illegal
drugs.
Unless otherwise stated in the exceptions space on the
declarations page, your statements are:

1. Ownership. You are the sole owner of your car.
2. Insurance and License History. Neither you nor
any member of your household in the past 3 years has
had:
a. vehicle Insurance canceled by an insurer, unless
it is revealed and appears in die application for
insurance; or
b. a license to drive or vehicle registration
suspeaded, revoked or refused.
3. Alcohol and Drugs. That neither you, nor any
member of your household, within the past three
years, has used or consumed any alcohol or alcoholic
beverages or has used or consumed any illegal drugs
or has used or consumed any illegal substances.
4. Application. That the statements in your application,
declarations or renewal for insurance are true.

AGREEMENT
In return for payment of the premium and subject to all the terms of this policy, we agree with you as follows:

DEFINITIONS
The following words and phrases are defined throughout die
policy as follows:
1. Auto Business, means a business or job where the
purpose is to sell, lease, repair, service, transport store
or park land motor vehicles or trailers.
2. Bodily Injury: means bodily injury and/or death to
a person which occurs during the policy period as a
result of the injury.
3. Business: means one engaged in any commercial
activity for gain or livelihood including employees of
their employer, executives and traveling salespersons.
4. Declarations: means the Declaration Page.
5. Family Member means a person related to you by
blood, marriage, guardianship or adopdon who is a
resident of your household. This includes a ward, a
foster child, or an unmarried son or daughter while
away at school
6. Insured: means the person, persons or organization
defined as insured in the specific coverage, including
you, the named insured shown in the Declarations.

7. Motor Vehicle Auto or Car means a private
passenger auto, or a pickup track, panel truck or van
which is a land motor vehicle with four or more
wheels, which is designed for use mainly on public
roads. It does not include:
a. any anto or motor vehicle while being used other
than on a temporary basis as a residence;
b. a track-tractor designed to pull a trailer or
semitrailer; or
c an anto or vehicle used in any business to haul
marrrials to or from job sites, deliver goods or
merchandise or for use in construction* or
manufacturing and during any continuous and
regular business use;
d. any motor vehicle used to carry persons for
compensation;
e. any Tehicle or auto used in die auto business;
f. any recreational vehicle, motorcycle, all-terrain
vehicle, motor home or similar vehicle whether it
hasfourwheels or not, which is not described on
the &claration page of die policy.

cont'd.
8.

9.

Non-Owned Vehicle: means a vehicle not:
a. owned by;
b. registered in the name oft or
c. furnished or available forfrequentuse of: you or
a person living in your household or any family
members;
d. used for the business purposes.
The use has to be within the scope of consent of the
owner or person in lawful possession of it
Occupying: means being in or on a motor vehicle as
a passenger or operator, or being engaged in the
immediate acts of entering, boarding, or alighting
from a motor vehicle.

10. Owned if Leased: for purposes of this policy, a
private passenger type vehicle shall be deemed to be
owned by a person if leased:
a. under a written agreement to that person; and
b. for a continuous period of at least 6 months.
11. Person: means human being.
12. Private Passenger Auto: means an auto:
a. with four wheels that simultaneously touch die
ground; and
b. of die private passenger or station wagon type;
and
c. designed solely to cany persons and their
luggage.
13. Reasonable: the word "reasonable" when used in
connection with costs, services, rentals and towing,
means that they are usual and customary charges and
when used in connection with repairs, it means that
they are necessary, usual and customary charges due
to the loss.
14. Spouse: means your husband or wife while living
with you.
15. Temporary Substitute Auto: means an auto not
owned by you or your spouse, if it replaces your auto
for a short time. Its use has to be with the consent of
the owner. Your auto has to be out of use due to its
breakdown, repair* servicing^ damage or loss. A
temporary, substitute auto is not considered a nonowned anto.
16. Trailer: means a vehicle designed to be pulled by a:
a. private passenger "auto; or
b. pickup truck, panel truck, or vanIt also means a farm wagon or farm implement while
towed by a vehicle listed in a. or b. above.

17. Utility Vehicle: means a motor vehicle with:
a. a pickup truck, panel or van body; and
b. a Gross Vehicle Weight of 10,000 pounds or less
plus its maximum load capacity.
18. Van: means a four-wheeled land motor vehicle with
a load capacity of not more than 2,000 pounds or
Gross Vehicle Weight of not mote than 10,000
pounds. Gross Vehicle Weight is the weight of the
vehicle plus its maximum load capacity.
19. -We", "Us" and "Our" or "Company" refer to
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company.
20. "You" or "Your" means die named insured shown
on the declaration page.
21. Your Covered Vehicle: means:
a. any motor vehicle shown in the Declarations for
w'mch a specific premium has been paid for
coverage;
b. any newly acquired motor vehicle that you
acquire during the policy period provided it is a
private passenger vehicle and we insure all other
private motor vehicles owned by you on the date
of delivery to you or your spouse. This coverage
cads 30 days after you acquire the vehicle, unless
within the 30 days you ask us and we agree to
insure it and you pay any additional premium that
may be due:
(1) If the newly acquired motor vehicle replaces
one shown in the declarations, it will have
the same coverage as the vehicle it replaces;
(2) If die newly acquired motor vehicle is an
additional vehicle, it will have die broadest
coverage we now provide for any motor,
vehicle shown in the declarations. If you
have more than one auto policy with us, you
must tell us which one applies;
c any trailer you own as to liability and no-fault
coverage, but only those trailers shown on the
Declarations Page for which a specific premium
has been paid for Coverage for Damage to Your
Anto;
d. any auto or trailer you do not own while used as
a temporary substitute for any other auto or
vehicle described in tins definition which is out
of normal use because of its:
(1) breakdown;
© repair;
(3> servicing;
(4) loss; or
(5) destruction

your Covered Vehicle doc .ot include a motor
vehicle that has been sold or is subject to a
concrac: co sell oral or written, to a non-family
member or other business entity, provided that

the pure
r is in possession of the'motor
vehicle. This exclusion applies whether tide has
been transferred or die purchase price has been
paid by the purchaser.

PART A - LIABILITY COVERAGE
Insuring Agreement
We will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for
which any covered person becomes legally responsible
because of an auto accident We will setde or defend, as we
consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for these
damages. We have no duty to defend any suit or setde any
claim for "bodily injury" or "property damage" not covered
under this policy.
In addition to our limits of liability, we pay for all defense
costs for attorneys retained and paid by us. Our duty to defend
in any litigation ends when die applicable limits of liability
have been paid as provided for in the policy for the accident
which is the basis of the lawsuit
COVERED PERSON as used in diis part means:
1. You or any family member for the ownership,
maintenance or use of any covered motor vehicle or
trailer;
1

3.

4.

Any other person using your covered motor vehicle
if the use is within the scope of consent of you or
your spouse.
For your covered motor vehicle, any person or
organization but only with respect to legal
responsibility for acts or omissions of a person for
whom coverage is afforded under this part;
For any motor vehicle or trailer, odier than your
covered motor vehicle, any person or organization
but only with respect to legal responsibility for acts or
omissions of you or any family member for whom
coverage is afforded under this part This provision
applies only if the person or organization does not
own or hire the auto or trailer.

Supplementary Payments
In addition to our limit of liability,, we will pay on behalf of a
covered person:
1. Up to $250.00 for the cost of bail bonds required
because of an accident, however, we do not pay for
traffic tickets, violations or citations. The accident
must result in bodily injury or property damage
covered under this policy.

2.

Premiums on appeal bonds and bonds to release
attachments in any suit we defend.

3.

Interest accruing after a judgment is entered in any
suit we defend. Our duty to pay interest ends when
we tender into court to pay that part of the judgment
which does not exceed our limit of liability for this
coverage.

4.

Up to 535.00 a day for loss of earnings, but not other
income, because of attendance at hearings or trials at
our request.

Exclusions to Part A
Insuring Agreement

Liability Coverage,

WE DO NOT PROVIDE LIABILITY COVERAGE FOR
ANY PERSON:
1. For property damage and bodily injury which may be
reasonably expected to result from the intentional or
criminal acts of the insured or which, in fact, is
intended by the insured person;
2.

For damage to any property owned by, rented to, in
charge of or transported by an insured; but coverage
applies to a rented residence or private rented garage
damaged by a car we insure.

3.

For any BODILY INJURY to:
a. A Mow employee, while on the job and arising
from the maintenance or use of a vehicle by
another employee- in die employer's business.
You and your spouse are covered for such injury
to a fellow employee.
b. Any employee of a COVERED PERSON
ARISING OUT OF HIS OR HER
EMPLOYMENT. This does not apply to a
household employee who is not covered or
reqaired to be covered under any Worker's
Compensation Insurance,
c. ANY COVERED PERSON or any member of
a covered person's family residing in the covered
person's household in excess of die Utah Motor
Vehicle Liability Policy Minimum Limits as more
fully set forth in Utah Code- Annotated, 1953,
§3L\-22-304; providing for minimum limits for
motor vehicle liability coverage.

4.

For any damages for whic,- -e United States, or its
employees or any of its agencies, including their
employees, might be liaPie for the COVERED
PERSON'S use of any ve^de.

5. For any obligation of a C O ^ R E D PERSON or his
or her insurer, under any^ type of worker's
compensation or disability or similar law.
6.

For liability assumed by the covered person under any
contract or agreement.

7. For ftabuiq arising out of die ownership or operation
of a vehicle while it is beitfg used to cany persons or
property for any fee or a charge. This exclusion does
not apply to a share-the-expense car pool.
8. While employed or otherwise engaged in the business
or occupation of:
a. selling,
b. repairing,
c. servicing,
<L storing,
e. parking
vehicles designed for use nJainly on public highways.
This includes road testing and delivery. This
exclusion does not appty to the ownership,
maintenance or use of YOUR COVERED AUTO
by:
a. you;
b. any family member; 0*
c. any partner, agent or employee of you or any
family member.
9. Maintaining or using any vehicle while that person is
employed or otherwise engaged in any business or
occupation not described in Exclusion 8. This
exclusion does not apply P &e maintenance or use
of:
a. a private passenger au*o;
b. a pickup truck, panel truck or van that you own;
or
c. a trailer used with a vehicle described in a. or b.
above.
\ $ . \3s\ng a veincie:
a. without the consent of you or your spouse;
b. with permission but consent or the permission or
its use is beyond the scope and consent of you or
your spouse0
IL For bodily injury or property damage for which that
person:
a. is an insured under £ nuclear energy liability
policy; or
b. would be an insured under a nuclear energy
liability policy but for its termination upon
exhaustion of its limit of liability.
A nuclear energy liability policy is a policy issued by

any of ±t
.owing or their successors:
a. Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association:
b. Mutual Atomic Enetg) Liability Underwriters; or
c. Nuciear Insurance Association of Canada.
12. Maintaining or using any non-owned or rented vehicle
by an insured in his employment, occupation,
profession, or in any commercial activity engaged in
for gain or livelihood, including employees of their
employer, executives and traveling salespersons who
rent or use vehicles in connection with their work or
livelihood.
13. WE DO NOT PROVIDE LIABILITY COVERAGE
FOR THE OWNERSHIP, maintenance or use of:
a. Any motorized vehicle having less than four
wheels;
b. Any vehicle, other than your covered vehicle,
which is:
1. owned by you; or
2. furnished or available for your regular or
frequent use;
c. Any vehicle, odier than your covered auto,
which is:
1. owned by any family member; or
2. furnished or available for the regular or
frequent use of any family member;
however, this exclusion does not apply to your
maintenance or use of any vehicle which is:
1. owned by a family member; or
2. furnished for or availableforthe regular use
of a family member,
d. To a motor vehicle that has been sold or is
subject to a contract to sell, oral or written, to a
non-family member or other business entity,
provided that the purchaser is in possession of the
motor vehicle. This exclusion applies whether
tide has been transferred or the purchase price
has been paid by purchaser.

Limit of Liability
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each
person" for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of
liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one
person in any one auto accident Subject to this limit for "each
person1*, the limit of liability shown in the Declarations for
"each accident" for Bodily Injury Liability h our maximum
limit of liabiliiy for all damages for bodily injury resulting
from any one auto accident The limit of liability shown in the
Declarations for "each accident" for Property Damage Liability
is our maximum limit of liability for all damages to all
property resulting from any one auto accident This is the
most we will pay for any auto accident regardless of the
number of:
1. covered persons;

2. claims made;
3. vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
4. vehicles involved in the auto accident.
We will apply the limit of liability to provide any separate
limits required by law for bodily injury and property damage
liability. However, this provision will not change our total
limit of liability. A motor vehicle and trailer are considered
one unit for the limit of liability

Financial Responsibility Required
When certified usder any law as proof of future financial
responsibility, and while required during the policy period, this
policy shall comply with such law to die extent required.

Other Insurance
Other Limits of Liability
We do not provide motor vehicle liability coverage for.
1. bodily injury caused by an insured for any person
using your covered vehicle who is not a family
member to the extent or in excess of the limits of
liability which this coverage exceeds the minimum
liability required by the Utah Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Law. (Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
§3lA-22-304 Motor Vehicle liability Policy
Minimum Limits).
2.

For bodily injury to any person who is a family
member or related to an Insured by blood, marriage
or adoption for whom claim is made to the extent of
any limits of liability of this coverage which exceed
the limits of liability required by the Utah Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, (Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, §31A-22-304 Motor Vehicle
Liability Policy Minimum limits).

If there is other applicable liability insurance we will pay only
our share of the loss. Our share under this policy is (he
amount computed under the applicable paragraph below.
However, any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not
own shall be excess over other collectible insurance.
IF THERE IS OTHER LIABILITY COVERAGE:
1.

2.

3.

Temporary Substitute Auto, Non-Owned Auto,
Trailer or Rental Auto:
If a temporary substitute auto, a non-owned
auto or trailer or rental auto designed for use with
a private passenger auto or utility vehicle has other
liability coverage which applies in whole or in part as
primary, excess or contingent coverage, then this
coverage is excess over other liability coverage. We
do not contribute under this policy to any loss where:
a. the motor vehicle or trailer is owned by any
person or organization in the auto business; and
b. a non-owned or rental vehicle maintained or used
in any business or business pursuits or business
activity, including salesman, employees who are
using or who have rented a car in connection
with their livelihood.

4.

Newiy-Acquired Vehicle:
This coverage does not apply if there is other
vehicle liability coverage on a newly-acquired
vehicle.

Out of State Coverage
If an auto accident to which diis policy applies occurs in any
state or Canada other than the one in which your covered
vehicle is principally garaged, we will interpret your policy for
that accident as follows:
If the state or Canada has:
1. a financial responsibility or similar law specifying
limits of liability for bodily injury or property damage
higher than the limit shown in the Declarations, your
policy will provide the higher specified limit;
2.

a compulsory insurance or similar law requiring a
nonresident to maintain insurance whenever the
nonresident uses a vehicle in that state or Canada,
your policy will provide at least the required
minimum amounts and types of coverage.

No one will be entided to a duplication of payments for the
same elements of loss.

Policies Issued by us to yon:
If two or more vehicle liability policies
issued by us to you apply to the same accident,
the total limits of liability under all such policies
shall not exceed that of the policy with the
highest Ionic of liabflicy.
Other overage Available from Other Sources:
If other liability coverage applies, we are liable
only for our share of the damages. Our share is the
percent that the limit of liability of this policy bears
to the total of all liability coverage applicable to the
accident.

PART B - PE^ONAL INJURY PROTECTwN COVERAGE
Insuring A g r e e m e n t

a.

The Company will pay personal injury protection benefits
that are reasonable and necessary to or on beha2f of each
eligible injured person for
(a) medical expenses
(b) work loss
(c) funeral expenses
(d) survivor loss and
(e) special damages
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible
insured person caused by an accident involving the use of
a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.

Exclusions
This coverage does not apply:
1. for any injury sustained by the Insured while
occupying another motor vehicle owned by the
Insured and not insured under the policy;
2.

4.

for any injury sustained by any person arising out of
the use of any motor vehicle while located for use as
a residence or premises;

5.

for any injury due to war, whether or not declared,
civil war, insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to
any act or condition incident to any of die foregoing;
or

6.

for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic,
explosive, or other hazardous properties of nuclear
materials.

Definitions
When used in reference to this coverage:
1. Bodily Injury: means bodily injury to a person and/or
death which occurs during the.policy period as a
result of the injury.
2.

guzraiansmp WHO are residents or tne insured s
hcaseho}4 including those who usua&y make
their home in the same household but temporarily
live elsewhere, when injured in an accident
involving any motor vehicle; and
b. any other natural person whose injuries arise out
of an automobile accident occurring while the
person occupies a motor vehicle described in the
policy with the express or implied consent of the
named insured or while a pedestrian if he is
injured in an accident involving the described
motor vehicle.
3.

Funeral Expenses: means funeral, burial or cremation
expenses incurred;

4.

Insured Motor Vehicle: a motor vehicle with respect
to which:
a. die bodily injury liability insurance of die policy
applies and for which a specific premium is
charged; and
b. die named insured is required to maintain security
under the provisions of the Utah Automobile NoFault Insurance Act; Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Tide 41, Chapter 12a, Financial Responsibility of
Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act

5.

Medical Expenses: die reasonable value of all
expenses for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray,
dental, rehabilitation (which includes prosthetic
devices), ambulance, hospital and nursing services;

6.

Motor Vehicle: means every self-propelled vehicle
which is designed for use upon a highway, including
trailers and semitrailers designed for use with such
vehicles, except traction engines, road rollers, farmtractors, tractor cranes, power shovels, and well
drillers, and every vehicle which is propelled by
electric power obtained from overhead wires but not
operated upon rails and excluding motorcycles;

7.

Named Insured: the person or organization in die
declarations;

8.

Occupying: being in or on a motor vehicle as a
passenger or operator or engaged in the immediate act
of entering, boarding or alighting from % motor
vehicle;

9.

Pedestrian: means, any person not occupying or
riding upon a^motor vehicle. "Any person riding,
occupying or upon a motorcycle is not a pedestrian;

for a&y injury sustained by any person winie
operating the insured motor vehicle without the
express or implied consent of the insured or while not
in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle; or

3. -to any injured person, if the person's conduct
contributed to his injury:
(a) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(b) while committing a felony;

Covered and Insured Persons entitled to Personal
Injury Protection:

&- named insured and persons related to the
insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or

10. Survivor Loss: compensation on account of the death
of the eligible injured person;
11. Work Loss: any loss of gross income and loss of
earning capacity per person from inability to work,
for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the
loss, except that this benefit need not be paid for the
first three days of disability, unless the disability
continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after
the date of injury;

auto accident to which this policy applies occurs outside of
Utah, (but is within the United States and Canada), our limits
of liability under your policy for that accident are as follows:
1.

If the sure, (outside of Utah) or Canada, has:
a. a personal injury protection or similar law
specifying limits higher than that in the
declarations, your policy will provide the higher
specified limit;
b. compulsory personal injury protection insurance
or similar law requiring a non-resident to
maintain personal injury protection insurance,
whenever the non-resident uses a vehicle in that
stare or Canada, your policy will provide at least
the required minimum amounts and types of
coverage;
C. no compulsory personal injury protection
insurance or similar law requiring a non-resident
to maintain insurance, whenever the insured uses
a vehicle in that state or Canada, your policy
does not provide for any benefits under Part B,
Personal Injury Coverage, to non-residents of the
State of Utah, except for medical expenses under
this section, not to exceed 33,000.00;
d. no compulsory personal injury protection
insurance or similar law requiring a non-resident
to maintain insurance in that state or Canada,
your policy does not provide benefits under this
section to residents of the State of Utah who are
not family members in any amount in excess of
the minimum limits as provided for this type of
coverage in the State of Utah.

2.

Any amount payable by the Company under the terms
of this coverage shall be reduced by die amount paid,
payable, or required to be provided on account of
such bodily injury:
a. under any worker's compensation plan or any
similar statutory plan;
b. which that person receives or is entitled to
receive from the United States or any of its
agencies because he is on active duty in the
military service.

3.

That where a Covered Person under this policy is or
would be held legally liable for the personal injuries
sustained by any person to whom benefits required
under personal injury protection provisions of this
policy have been paid by die injured party's insurance
carrier; including the Workers' Compensation Fund of
Utah, the Company if it would be legally held liable
shall reimburse the insurance company of theother
party for the payments as provided herein, but not in
excess of die amount of damages recoverable; that the
issue of liability for that reimbursement in its amount
shall be mandatory binding arbitration between the
two insurance companies providing for insurance
covera£e as herein set forth.

12. Special Damage: an allowance for a marirrjum of
365 days, for services actually rendered or expenses
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the
injury, the injured person would have performed for
his household, except that this benefit need not be
paid for the first three days after the date of injury
unless the person's inability to perform these services
continues for more than two consecutive weeks.

Personal Injury Payments and Limits of Liability
Regardless of the number of persons insured, policies or bonds
applicable, claims made, or insured motor vehicles to which
this coverage applies, the Company's liability for personal
injury protection benefits with respect to bodily injury
sustained by any one eligible injured person in any one motor
vehicle accident, is limited except or unless additional
protection is purchased or provided for by statute as follows:
Medical Payments:
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall
not exceed 53,000.00; unless additional medical protection
or payments are provided for on the Declaration page,
they must be incurred within three years of die date of the
accident to be payable;
Work Loss:
The maximum amount payable for work loss is eighty-five
percent of any loss of gross income and earning capacity,
not to exceed the total of $250.00 per week;
Special Damage:
A special damage allowance not exceeding $20.00 per day
for inability to perform services for his household;
Funeral Expenses:
The maximum amount payable for funeral expenses shall
not exceed $1,500.00;
Survivor Loss:
The amount payable for survivor loss is $3,000.00 and is
payable only to natural persons who are die eligible
injured person's heirs.

Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of
Liability and Special Provisions
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the
policy period in the United States and Canada, except if an

4.

5.

If the C o vered Person inc ^ .nedical expenses which
are unreasonable or unnecessary, we may refuse to
pay for those medical expenses and contest theme
Unreasonable medical expenses are fees for medical
services which are higher than the usual and
customary charges for those services; unnecessary
medical expenses are fees for medical services which
are not usually and customarily performed for
treatment of the injury, including fees for an
excessive number, amount, or duration of medical
services.

this or aiN
2.

If the Insured sustains bodily injury while occupying
a vehicle not owned by you, your spouse or any
family member, this coverage applies:
a. as excess to any personal injury protection
coverage which applies to the use of the vehicle
as primary coverage, but only in an amount
which it exceeds the primary coverage,
If coverage under more than one policy applies as
excess:
a. the total maximum recovery, liability or benefit
payable shall not exceed the difference between
the limit of liability that applies as primary
insurance, and the maximum recovery, liability or
benefit that applies from any one of the
coverages that apply as excess; and
b. we are liable only for our share of the loss or
damage. Our share is die proportion of damages,
loss, or benefits that the limits of this bear to the
tocal applicable to all personal injury protection
coverage as excess to die accident We will pay
oar share of the loss, damages or benefits.

3.

Except as provided for in the preceding paragraphs, 1
and 2, if the Insured sustains bodily injury as a
pedesirian or sustains bodily injury while occupying
your covered vehicle, and if two or more insurers are
liable to pay no-fault or personal injury coverage
benefits or provide similar coverage involving die use
of an automobile:
a. the total limits of liability or benefits under an
such coverages shall not exceed the coverage or
benefits of the policy with the highest limit of
liability; and
b . . we are liable only for our share of the loss or
damage. Our share is that percent of the
damages that the limit of liability of this coverage
bears to the total of all personal injury benefits
coverage applicable to the accident

If the Covered Person is sued by a medical services
provider because we refuse to pay contested medical
expenses, we will pay all defense costs and any
resulting judgment against the Covered Person. We
have the right to choose the counsel. The Covered
Person must cooperate with us in the defense of any
claim, demand or lawsuit If the Covered Person is
required to attend any trials or hearings and wages or
salaries are lost as a result, we will pay up to $35.00
per day.

Special Conditions if Law is Declared Invalid

milar insurance.

The premium for the policy is based on rafies which have
been established in reliance upon the limitations on the
right to recover for damages imposed by the provisions of
the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act In the
event a court of competent jurisdiction declares or enters
a judgment, the effect of which is to render the provisions
of such act invalid or unenforceable in whole or in part,
the Company shall have the right to recompute the
premium payable for the policy and the provisions of this
endorsement shall be voidable or subject to amendment at
the option of the Company.

Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability
and Conditions of Other Insurance Under our
Personal Injury Protection
No eligible injured person shall recover or receive
duplicate benefits for the same elements of loss under

PART CI - UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE
Insuring Agreement
We will pay for bodily injury for damages which a covered
person, as defined in this section are legally entitled to recover
from the owner or operator of a motor vehicle:
1. sustained by you and your covered vehicle; and
2. caused by an accident
the owner's or operator's liability for these damages must arise
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured
motor vehicle.

Any judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought
without our written consent is not binding on us.
"Uninsured Motor Vehicle" Means a Land Motor Vehicle
or Trailer of any Type:
1. To which no bodily injury liability bond or policy
applies at the time of die accident
2.

To winch a bodily injury liability bond or policy
applies at the time of die accident In this case its
limit rbr bodily injury liability must be less than the

minimum limit for bodily injury liability specified by
the financial responsibility law of the state in which
your covered vehicle is principally garaged.
3.

Which is a hit and run vehicle whose operator or
owner cannot be identified and which hits:
a. you or any family member;
b. a vehicle which you or any family member are
occupying; or
c. your covered vehicle.

4.

In accordance with Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22305, the policy is expanded so that uninsured motorist
also includes any motor vehicle whose operator or
owner cannot be identified which causes an accident,
but does not make physical contact with your covered
vehicle- The existence of this vehicle and motorist
must be demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence other than the testimony of the covered
person or persons.

5.

To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy
applies at the time of the accident but the bonding or
insuring company:
a. denies coverage; or
b. is or becomes insolvent

However, "Uninsured Motor Vehicle" Does Not Include
Any Vehicle or Equipment
1.

Owned by or furnished or available for the regular
use of you or any family member;

2.

Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any
applicable motor vehicle law;

. 3,

Owned by any governmental unit or agency,

4.

Operated on rails or crawler treads;

5.

Designed mainly for use off public roads while not on
public roads;

6.

While located for use as a residence or premises.

Definitions
The following phrase and words are defined in this Section as
follows:
1.

As used in this section "covered persons" includes:
a. the named insured;
b. persons related to the named insured by blood,
marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are
residents of the named insured's household,
including those who usually make their home in

c.

the same household, but temporarily live
elsewhere;
any person occupying a covered motor vehicle
refer^d to in the policy;

All other definiticas apply.

Exclusions
A. We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for
bodily injury sustained by any person:
1. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor
vehicle owned by you or any family member which
is not insured for this coverage under this policy.
This incudes a trailer-of any type used with that
vehicle.
2. For any Covered Person who, without written consent
from the Company, settles with any person or
organization who may be liable for bodfly injury.
3. While occupying your covered vehicle when it is
being used to cany persons or property for a fee.
This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense
carpooL
4. Using a vehicle without permission or a reasonable
belief that the person is entitled to do so or its use is
beyond 4e consent of you or your spouse.
B. This coverage shall not apply directly or indirectly to
benefit any insurer or self-insurer under any of the
following or similar law:
1. workers' compensation law
2. disability benefits law
3. any government body or agency, including political
subdivisions

Limits of Liability
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each
person" for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum
limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by
any one person in any one accident Subject to this limit for
"each person", tie limit of liability shown in the Declarations
for "each aeddeaf for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our
mflYiTnirm limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury
resulting from any one accident."This is the most we win pay
regardless of die number of:
a. covered persons
b.

efcirna Trraifc

c.
d.

vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations
vehicles involved in the accident

Any amounts otherwise payable fo. -amages under this
coverage shall be reduced by all sums paid or payable because
of the bodily injur/ under any of the following or similar law:
a. workers' compensation law; or
b. disability benefits law.

Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability
and Conditions of Other Insurance Under Our
Uninsured Motorist Coverage
1.

If the Insured sustains bodily injury while occupying
a vehicle not owned by you, your spouse or any
family member, this coverage applies:
a. as excess to any uninsured motor vehicle
coverage which applies to the vehicle as primary
coverage and only in an amount by which it
exceeds the primary coverage.
If coverage under more than one policy applies as
excess:
a. the total maximum recovery, liability or benefit
payable shall not exceed the difference between
the limit of liability diat applies as primary
insurance, and the maximum recovery, liability or
benefit that applies from any of the coverages
that apply as excess; and
b. we are liable for our share of the loss or damage.
Our share is the proportion of damages that die
limit of liability of this coverage bears to die total
applicable uninsured motorist coverage as excess
to the accident

2.

3.

Except as provided for in the previous paragraph 1, if
the Insured sustains bodily injury as a pedestrian or
sustains bodily injury while occupying your covered
vehicle, and if two or more insurers are liable to pay
uninsured motorist protection as provided by this
coverage:
a. die total limits of liability under all such
coverages shall not exceed that of the coverage
with die highest limit of liability; and
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is
that percent of the damages that the limit of
liability of this coverage bears to die total of all
uninsured motor vehicle coverage applicable to
the accident
Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2. under this part,
Non-duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and
Conditions of Other Insurance Under Our Uninsured
Motorist Coverage, if uninsured motorist coverage is
available to a covered; injured person, under more
than one insurance policy, the covered injured person
may elect die policy under which he desires to collect
the uninsured motorist benefits.
However, in no event will the limit of liability for

uninsured TL 1st coverage for two or more motor
vehicles be added togedier or stacked to determine the
limit of coverage available to a covered injured
person for any one accident.
No Insured person can recover duplicate benefits from
the same elements of loss under diis, or other similar
insurance.

Medical Reports; Proof of Claim
As soon as practicable the eligible covered person or someone
on his behalf shall give to die Company written proof of
claim, under oath if required, including full particulars of die
nature and extent of the injuries and treatment received and
contemplated, and such other information as may assist the
Company in desrxnining the amount due and payable. The
eligible covered person shall submit to physical and mental
examinations by physicians selected by the Company when and
as often as die Company may reasonably require.

Arbitration
If we and a covered person do not agree:
1. whether that person is legally entided to recover
damages under this part; or
2. as to the amount of damages;
either party may make a written demand for the matters to be
settled by arbitration. Any matter in dispute between you and
us will be made pursuant to arbitration as provided for in the
arbitration rules of die Arbitration Forums, Inc., a copy of
which is available on request from the Company, which shall
be binding on both you and the Company. The arbitration
award may include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and
may be entered as a judgment in any court of proper
jurisdiction. Such arbitration shall be in compliance with the
"Utah Arbitration Act" (Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code
Annotated) or the applicable arbitration provisions in force and
effect in Utah at the time.

Additional Duties for Uninsured Motorists
Coverage
A person seeking Uninsured Motorists Coverage must also:
1.

promptly notify die police if a hit and run driver is
involved;

2,

prompdy send us copies of the legal papers if a suit
is brought.

PART C2 - UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE
Insuring Agreement
We will pay for bodily injury for damages which a covered
person, as defined in this pan is legally entitled to recover
from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle
because of bodily injury, sickness, disease or death:
1. sustained by you and your covered vehicle; and
2. caused by an accident.
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must
arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the
underinsured motor vehicle.
Any judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought
without our written consent is not binding on us.
"Underinsured Motor Vehicle" means a Land Motor
Vehicle or Trailer of any Type:
1. The ownership, maintenance or use of which is
insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at die
time of the accident; but
a. whose limits of liability for bodily injury liability
are insufficient to compensate fully the insured
for all special and general damages;
b. have been reduced by payments to persons other
than the insured to less than die amount of the
insured's damages.
However, "Underinsured Motor Vehicle" Does Not Include
any Vehicle or Equipment
1. Owned by, furnished or available for die regular use
of the insured, a resident spouse or resident relative of
the insured, unless the motor vehicle is described in
the Declarations and for which a specific premium
has been paid, or if the motor vehicle is a newly
acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the
terms of the policy;
2. Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any
applicable motor vehicle law;
3. Owned by any governmental unit, political
subdivision or agency;
4. Operated on rails or crawler treads;
5. Designed mainly for use off public roads while not on
public roads;
6. While located for use as a residence or premises;
7. Defined as more fully set forth in Part CI, Uninsured
Motorist Coverage in your policy;
8. To which a bodily: injury liability bond or policy
applies at the time of the accident but its limit for
bodily injury liability is less than die minimum limit
for bodily injury liability specified by the Utah Safety
Responsibility Act;
9. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy
applies at the time of the accident but the bonding or
insuring company:

a.
b.

denies coverage: or
is or becomes insolvent.

Definitions
As used in this section "covered persons" includes:
a. the named insured;
b. persons related to the named insured by blood,
marriage; adoption, or guardianship, who are residents
of the named insured's household, including those
who usually make their home in the same household
but temporarily live elsewhere;
c
any person occupying a covered motor vehicle
referred to in the policy,
All other definition apply.

Exclusions
A. We do not provide Underinsured Motorists Coverage for
bodily inysry sustained by any person:
1. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor
vehicle owned by you or any family member which
is not insured for this coverage under this policy.
This includes a trailer of any type used with diat
vehicle.
2.

For any Covered Person who, without written consent
from the Company, settles with any person or
organization who may be liable for bodily injury.

3.

While occupying your covered vehicle when it is
being used to cany persons or property for a fee.
This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense
car pool

4.

Use of a vehicle without permission, or the use with
permission is beyond die consent of you or your
spouse.

B. There is no coverage until me limits of liability of all
.bodily injury liability bonds and policies that apply have
been used up by payment of judgments or settlements to
other persons.

Limits of Liability
The limit of liability shown in die Declarations for "each
person" for Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum
limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by
any one person in any one accident Subject to this limit for
"each person", the limit of liability shown in the Declarations

for, "each accident" for Underinsurea
~ts Coverage is our
maximum limit of liability for all dam^-i for bodily injury
resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay
regardless of the number of:
a. covered Persons
b. claims mace
c. vehicles or premiums shown on the Declarations
d. vehicles involved in the accident

payaL s
iy one vehicle under the policy with
the tighe* _ jssible dollar limit;
b. subject to paragraph a, above, any insurance we
provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own
shall be excess over any other collectible
insunnce;
c. we will pay our share of the loss. Our share is
the proportion of damages that the limit of
liability of this coverage bears to the total
applicable underinsured motorist limits.

Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this
coverage shall be reduced by all sums paid or payable because
of the bodily injury under any of the following or similar law:
a. workers' compensation law; or
b. disability benefits law.

Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability
and Conditions of Other Insurance Under Our
Underinsured Motorist Coverage
1. A covered person injured in a vehicle described in an
insurance policy that includes underinsured motorist
benefits may not elect to collect underinsured motorist
coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle
insurance policy under which he is a named insured
except:
a. if a named insured is injured as a pedestrian or
while occupying a vehicle not described in this
part, (C2, Underinsured Motorist Coverage) and
is covered by more than one policy including
undennsured motorist coverage, the injured
person may elect die policy under which he
collects underinsured motorist benefits.
2.

The limits of liability for underinsured motorist
coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be
added together, combined, or stacked to determine die
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured
person for any one accident

3.

If there is other applicable or similar insurance under
more than one insurance policy or provision of
coverage:
a. the TnaTinnim recovery under all policies
combined will not exceed the maximum amount

Pagel2

No eligible injured person shall recover duplicate
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or
any similar insurance.

Fault, Amount and Arbitration
The following two questions for the coverage under
underinsured motorist protection must be decided by agreement
pursuant to the provisions of the policy as follows:
1. is the insured legally entitled to collect for bodily
injury fcr damages from die owner or driver of an
underinsured motor vehicle; and
2. if so, in what amount?
If we and a covered person do not agree:
1. whether that person is legally entided to recover
damages under this part; or
2.

as to die amount of damages;

either patty may make a written demand for the matters to be
* settled by arbitration. Any matter in dispute between you and
us will be made pursuant to arbitration as provided for in die
arbitration rules of die Arbitration Forums, Inc., a copy of
which is available on request from the Company, which shall
be binding on both you and the Company. The arbitration
award may include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and
may be entered as a judgment in any court of proper
jurisdiction. Sudi arbitration shall be in compliance with the
"Utah Arbitration Acf (Tide 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code
Annotated) or die applicable arbitration provisions in force and
effect in Utah at the time.

PART D - COVERAGE FOR DAMAGE TO YOUR VEHICLE
Insuring Agreement

a.

We will pay as follows:
1. for any direct and accidental loss or damage to your
covered vehicle,
a. for which a premium is charged for each
coverage, including its equipment,
b. provided it is common to your vehicle,
minus any deductiblefs] and subject to the limits of
liability or as s^t forth on the Declaration page under
Dl and D2;

b.

2.

for the perils and coverage under D3 and D4 for
which a premium is charged for each coverage, minus
any deducnble[s], subject to the limits of liability as
set forth on the Declaration page under D3 and D4
because of a loss;

The amounts payable under D2 are subject to the
deductible and limits of liability as set forth in the
Declaration page.
D3. TOWING AMD EMERGENCY ROAD SERVICE:
We will pay the reasonable costs you incur for your
covered vehicle due to loss:
1. For a mechanic and the reasonable cost for his
services at the place of breakdown, not to exceed one
hour.
2.

Dl. COLLISION COVERAGE:
"Collision" means the upset, or collision with another
object by your covered or non-owned vehicle. However,
loss caused by the following are not considered
"collision":
1. Missiles or falling objects;
2. Hre;
3. Theft or larceny;
4. Explosion or earthquake:
5- Windstorm;
6. Hail, water or flood;
7. Malicious mischief or vandalism;
8. Riot or civil commotion;
9. Contact with bird or animal; or
10. Breakage of glass, except if part of a collision.
The amounts payable under D l are subject to the
deductible and limits of liability as set forth on the
Declaration page.

D2. COMPREHENSIVE COVERAGE:
"Comprehensive" means loss arising from any cause other
than collision, including the breakage of glass, or loss
caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft, larceny,
explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water, flood,
malicious mischief, or vandalism, riot or civil commotion,
and contact with a bird or an amnwi is payable under this
coverage.
If your covered vehicle is stolen, we will pay your
incurred transportation costs at the rate of up to $14.00 per
day, with a maximum amount of $420.00 for each loss.
This coverage begins 48 hours after you notify the police
and us of the theft and ends when:

your covered vehicle is returned to you if it is
driveable or in a repaired condition; or
we offer to pay you the actual cash value of the
vehicle.

3.

4.

The reasonable cost of towing your vehicle to a
necessary place where repairs can be made if the
vehicle will not run.
The reasonable cost of towing your covered vehicle if
it is stuck.
The reasonable cost of delivery for gas, oil or a
battery and change of a die, but we do not pay for
the cost of these items.

The amounts payable under D3 are subject to die
deducttbie[s] and limits of liability as set forth in die
Declaration page.

D4. EXPENSE FOR CAR RENTAL:
We win pay you, not to exceed, $14.00 per day for rental
expenses incurred for a covered loss:
1. if you rent a vehicle from a car rental agency or
garage because your covered vehicle will not run due
to a loss;
2. when your covered vehicle runs and when you leave
it at a repair establishment for agreed and necessary
repairs pursuant to a written contract or agreement for
repairs;
Ending when
1. die repairs have been made or completed;
2. when we offer to pay for the loss; or
3. the repair costs exceed the fair market value of die
vehicle and we offer to pay for the loss; or
4. die rentaltimehas exceeded 30 days,
whichever comes first
Any rent payable under coverage D4 is reduced by any
amount payable under the comprehensive.
We win not pay rental time:
1. while your covered vehicle is being repaired,

2.

3.

serviced, or being used ^ ;
' person while that
person is working in any car ousiness;
while used in any other business or occupation. This
does not apply to a private passenger car driven or
occupied by the insured, his spouse or family
member,
for any covered vehicle while subject to any lien,
rental or sales agreement not shown in the
Declarations.

The amounts payable under D 4 are subject to the
deductible and limits of liability as set forth in the
Declaration page.

e. racai c
*ors;
f. compac. _*sc players;
g. stereos; or
h. televisions.
This exclusion does not apply if the equipment is
permanently installed in the opening normally used by
the auto manufacturer for the installation of this
equipment, however, w e do not pay in excess of
S500.00 unless an extra premium has been charged
for each item.
5.

Loss to tapes, records or other devices for use with
equipment designed for the reproduction of sound.

6.

L o s s to a camper body or trailer not shown in the
Declarations. This exclusion does not apply to a
camper body or trailer that you:
a. acquire during the policy period; and
b. ask us to insure within 30 days after you become
the owner.

7.

Loss to:
a. T V antennas;
b. awnings or cabanas; or
c. equipment designed to create additional living
facilities.

8.

L o s s to any custom furnishings or equipment in or
upon any motor vehicle. Custom furnishings or
equipment include but are not limited to:
a. special carpeting and insulation, furniture, bars or
television receivers;
b. facilities for cooking and sleeping;
c height-extending roofs;
d. custom murals, paintings or other decals or
graphics;
e. radar and telephones.

9.

W e do not pay for loss to motor homes, campers,
trailers and recreational vehicles owned or non-owned
for which coverage is not purchased;

Duplication of Benefits
There is no duplication of benefits under D l , D 2 , D 3 and D 4
for the same elements of loss under this, or any similar
insurance.

Exclusions
We will not pay f o n
1. Loss to your covered vehicle or non-owned vehicle
which occurs while it is used to c a n y persons or
property for a fee. This exclusion does not apply to
a share-the-expense car pooL
2.

D a m a g e 6n& and confined to:
a. w e a r and tear;
b. freezing;
c. mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure; or
cL road damage to tires.
This exclusion does not apply if the damage results
from the total theft of your covered vehicle.

3.

Loss due to or as a consequence of:
a. radioactive contamination;
b. discharge of any nuclear weapon (even if
accidental);
c. war, declared or undeclared, civil war,
insurrection, rebellion or revolution;
d. taking by any governmental authority or political
subdivision;
e. embezzlement, conversion, repossession by any
person who has the vehicle.due to any lien, rental
or sales agreement

4.

Pagel4

Loss to equipment designed for the reproduction of
sound, including, but not limited to loss to any of the
following or their accessories:
a. citizens band radio;
b. t w o - w a y mobile radio;
c. telephone;
d. scanning monitor receiver;

10. Separate coverage may be purchased waiving
paragraph 4 for accessories and customized
furnishings, paragraph 8, if a separate premium is
paid, but said waiver o f customized furnishings shall
n o t include custom murals, paintings or other decals
or graphics.
11. W e do not pay for any loss or damage to your
covered or non-owned . vehicle because o f
embezzlement, conversion or repossession by any
person who has taken possession of the vehicle due to
any lien* rental or sales agreement
12. We dq^not pay for any Joss or damage on a covered
vehicle if it is newly acquired and there is similar
coverage on your newly acquired vehicle.

13. We do noc pay for any loss or damage on a covered
or non-owned vehicle for tires unless they are
damaged by fire, vandalism or they are stolen, unless
they are covered by other provisions of this section.

computed under ce applicable paragraph below.
However, any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do noc
own shall be excess over other collectible insurance.
IF THERE IS OTHER LIABILITY COVERAGE:

Limit of Liability under
Comprehensive Coverages

Collision

and

Our limit of liability for loss will be the lesser of the:
1. actual cash value of the stolen or damaged property;
or
2. amount necessary to repair or replace the property.
Cash value of damaged or stolen property is the fair market
value of the property, taking into consideration its age,
condition as of the date of the loss. Fair market value does
not include any value for antique or sentimental value. The
deductible will then be subtracted from the amount of the
determined loss.

Payment of Loss under
Comprehensive Coverages

Collision

1. Policies Issued by Us to You:
If two or more vehicle liability policies issued by us
to you apply to the same accident, the total limits of
liability under all such policies shall not exceed that of the
policy with Ae highest limit of liability.
2.

Other Liability Coverage Available from Other
Sources:
If other liability coverage applies, we are liable only
for our share of the damages. Our share is the percent
that the limit of liability of this policy bears to the total of
all liability coverage applicable to the accident.

3.

Temporary Substitute Auto, Non-Owned Auto, Trailer
or Rental Auto:
If a temporary substitute auto, a non-owned auto
or trailer or rental auto designed for use with a private
passenger auto or utility vehicle has other liability
coverage which applies in whole or in part as primary,
excess or contingent coverage, then our coverage is excess
over other liability coverage. We do not contribute under
this policy to any loss where:
a. the motor vehicle or trailer is owned by any person or
organization in the auto business; and
b. a non-owned or rental vehicle maintained or used in
any business or business pursuits or business activity,
including salespersons, employees who are using or
who have lotted a car in connection with their
livelihood;

4.

Newly-Acquired Vehicle:
Our coverage does not apply if there is other vehicle
liability coverage on a newly-acquired vehicle.

and

We have the option to pay you for a loss of the property in
one of the following manners:
1. we may pay you for the fair market value of the
property in money; or
2.

we may repair or replace the damaged or stolen
property; if the repair or replacement results in an
improvement to the condition, kind or quality, you
must pay for the amount of the improvement

3.

we may, at our expense, return any stolen property to:
a. you; or
b. the address shown in this policy
but you cannot abandon the property to us.

4.

if we return stolen property, we will pay for any
damage resulting from the theft; or we may keep all
or part of die property at an agreed or appraised
value.

No Benefit to Bailee
This insurance shall not directly or indirectly benefit any
carrier or other bailee for hire.

Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability
and Conditions of Other Insurance
If there is other applicable liability we will pay only our share
of the loss. Our share under this policy is the amount

Appraisal and Arbitratioii
If we and a covered person do not agree:
1.

whether that person is legally entitled to recover
damages under this pact; or

2.

as to the amount of damages;

the parties may agree in writing to have the loss
determined by competent appraisals, as set forth in
paragraph A.
If you or we do not desire to proceed with the appraisal
process, as sax. forth in paragraph A, either party may

demand arbitration, as sec forth u

agraph B.

A. APPRAISAL: If we and you do not agree on the
amount of the loss, in this event each party will select
a competent appraiser. The two appraisers will select
an umpire. The appraisers will state separately the
actual cash value and the amount of loss. If they fail
to agree, they will submit their differences to the
umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will be
binding. Each party will:
1. pay its chosen appraiser; and
2. bear the expenses of the appraisal and umpire
equally.
We do not waive any of our rights under this policy
by agreeing to an appraisal
B. ARBITRATION: If we and the covered person do
not agree to settle the matter by appraisal, or in the
event that you do not desire to proceed by selecting
competent appraisers, either party may make a written
demand for arbitration. Any matter in dispute
between you and us will be made pursuant to
arbitration as provided for in the arbitration rules of

the Arbitral
Forums, Inc., a copy of v/hich is
available on request from the Company, which shall
be binding on both you and the Company. The
arbitration award may include attorney's fees if
allowed by state law and may be entered as a
judgment in any court of proper jurisdiction. Such
arbitration shall be in compliance with the "Utah
Arbitradon Act" (Tide 78, Chapter 31a. Utah Code
Annotated) or the applicable arbitration provisions in
force and effect in Utah at the time.

Additional Duties for Coverage for Damage to
Your Covered Vehicle
A person seeking Coverage for Damage to Your Covered
Vehicle must also:
1. Take reasonable steps after loss to protect your
covered vehicle and its equipment from farther loss.
We will pay reasonable expenses incurred to do this.
2. Prompdy notify the police if your covered vehicle is
stolen or damaged.
3. Permit as to inspect and appraise the damaged
property before its repair or disposal

PART E - SPECIAL CONDITIONS APPLYING TO ALL COVERAGES
Section I - General Conditions
jL Action Against Company. No action shall lie
against the Company unless as a condition precedent
thereto, there shall have been full compliance with all
the terms of this coverage.
B. Notice. In the event of an accident, notice containing
particulars sufficient to identify the eligible covered
person* and also reasonably obtainable Information
respecting die time, place and circumstances of the
accident shaE be given by or on behalf of each
eligible covered person to the Company at the home
office as soon as practicable. If any eligible covered
person, his legal representative or his survivors shall
institute legal action to recover damages for bodily
injury against a person or organization who is or may
be liable in tort therefor, a copy of the summons and
complaint or otfier process served in connection with
such legal action shall be forwarded as soon as
practicable to the Company by such eligible person,
his legal representative, or his survivors.

Section II - Prohibited Use of Alcohol and Drags
for All Coverages
You understand and agree as follows:
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A. That we do not issue policies to persons who
consume any alcohol or alcoholic beverages or who
use or consume any illegal drugs or who use or
consume illegal substances, or who will operate any
motor vehicle after having consumed alcoholic
beverages of any kind or in any amount whatsoever
or who allow the insured vehicle to be operated by
anyone who consumes any alcohol or alcoholic
beverages or who uses or consumes any illegal drugs
or illegal substances or who operate the insured
vehicle after consuming alcohol or alcoholic
beverages of any kind or in any amount, or after
using or consuming any illegal drugs or illegal
substances.
B. The ngmed insured further understands that the
premiums charged for coverage under this policy
reflect the reduced risk present with insured who do
not consume any alcohol or alcoholic beverages, or
who do not use or consume any illegal drugs or
illegal substances, or operate a motor vehicle after
having consumed alcohol or alcoholic beverages of
any Vrrrf or in any amount, or who have used or
consumed any illegal drugs or illegal substances; and
who do not allow the insured motor vehicles to be
operated by anyone who consumes alcohol or
alcohoEc beverages or has consumed an alcoholic
beverage of any kind or in any amount, or who has
used or consumed any illegal drugs or illegal

substances, and that the company would not issue a
policy to the named insured except upon this
representation and agreement.

vehicle, if w,/, applicable in the state in which the
vehicle is being operated and not the amount stated in
the declarations if greater.

For any loss incurred under this policy when the
insured motor vehicle is being operated by someone
who has consumed any alcohol or alcoholic beverages
of any kind or in any amount whatsoever, or who has
used or consumed any illegal drugs or illegal
substances of any kind or in any amount whatsoever
then the coverage under Pan iC Part B, Part CI, Part
CI and Pan D of this policy shall apply only for the
minimum limits of motor vehicle liability coverage as
provided for in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, including §31A-22-304, §31A-22-305 and
§31A-22-307 providing for bodily injury and property
damage, personal injury protection, uninsured motorist
coverage and underinsured motorist coverage and
damage to your vehicle because of injury or
destruction of property not the amounts set forth in
the Declaration, if greater. If the motor vehicle is
being operated by an Insured as applied in this
section, outside of the state of Utah, then this policy
only provides the minimum limits of bodily injury
and property damage, personal injury protection,
uninsured motorist coverage and underinsured
motorist coverage and damage to your

D. This provision providing for minimum limits of motor
vehicle liability coverage for bodily injury and
proper^ damage as applied in this section applies to
all motor vehicles, whether owned or non-owned and
to all coverages.

Section m - Special Conditions Applying to All
Coverages, Except A, Arbitration
The Company and any Insured or Covered Person agree that
on any matter in dispute between die Insured or Covered
Person and the Company, that any of the above have the right
to make a written demand for all matters to be settled by
arbitration. Any matter in dispute between You and Us will be
made pursuant to arbitration as provided for in the arbitration
rules of the Arbitration Forums, fiux, a copy of which is
available on requestfromdie Company, which shall be binding
on both You and the Company. The arbitration award may
include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and may be
entered as a judgment in any court of proper jurisdiction. Such
arbitration shall be in compliance with the "Utah Arbitration
Act" (Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code Annotated) or die
applicable arbitration provisions in force and effect in Utah at
the time.

PART F - DUTIES AFTER AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS FOR ALL
COVERAGES
General Duties

4.

We must be notified prompdy of how, when and where the
accident or loss happened Notice should also include the
names and addresses of any injured persons and of any
witnesses.

Authorize as to obtain:
a. medical reports; and
b. other pertinent records.

5.

Furnish us with a proof of claim in particularity as to
any damages or loss under oath and properly verified
if requested by us for damage to your covered or nonowned vehicle, medical expenses, medical treatment,
and all losses and damages in any form which you
claim you are entitled to under the policy and such
other and further information that may assist the
company in determining the amount due because of
die loss.

6.

Submit to examinations under oath as reasonably
required by us.

A covered person seeking any coverage must
1. Cooperate with us in the investigation, settlement or
defense of any claim or suit.
2.

3.

Prompdy send us copies of any notices or legal
papers received in connection with the accident or
loss.
Submit, as often as we reasonably require, to physical
exams by physicians we select We will pay for these
exams.

PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS, APPLYING i j ALL COVERAGES
Bankruptcy

after loss to prejudice such rights.
If the Insured proceeds or commences an
action against a legally responsible third party,
the Company shall be entitled to the extent of
such payment to the proceeds of any settlement
or judgment that may result from the exercise of
anyrightsof recovery of such person against any
person or organization legally responsible for the
bodily injury or property damage because of
which such payment is made and the Company
shall have a lien to the extent of such payment,
nonce of which may be given to the person or
organization causing such bodily injury, his agent,
his insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the
matter, such person shall hold in trust for the
benefit of the Company all rights of recovery
which he shall have against such other person or
organization because of such bodily injury.
b. If the Company proceeds or commences an
action against a legally responsible third party,
the Company may, at its option, and has the right
to proceed or commence against any third party,
which may be liable for damages to die Insured
for bodily injury, medical expenses, property
damages or other payments. The Insured agrees
in consideration of the payments made under this
policy to subrogate the said Company to all rights
and causes of action the Insured has against any
persons or corporations whomsoever, arising out
of or incident to the bodily injury, medical
expenses or property damage or other payments,
authorizes the Company to sue and commence an
action in die name of the Insured, but at the
expense of the Company against any third party
pledging full cooperation in the action for his
deductible. The Ensured assigas his deductible, if
any, to the Company and authorizes the Company
to sue in the name of the Insured as part of the ~
overall cause of action. In the event of any
reimbursement, collection or payment by a third
party, from the payment or proceeds the
Company will be paid and reimbursed first for
any costs of litigation and reasonable attorney
fees necessarily incurred.
The remaining
payments or proceeds will be distributed in direct
proportion to each interest (the amount of the
Insured's deductible) in proportion to- the
Company's payments pursuant to the provisions
of this policy for which it has a subrogatable
interest.

a.
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the covered person shall not
relieve us of any obligations under this policy.

Fraud
We do not provide coverage for any "Insured" who has made
fraudulent statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct in
connection with any accident or loss for which coverage is
sought under this policy.

All Agreements Between You and Us
This policy contains all the agreements between you and us.
Its terms may not be changed or waived except by
endorsement issued by us. If a change requires a premium
adjustment, we will adjust the premium as of the effective date
of change.
We may revise this policy form to provide more coverage
without additional premium charge. If we do this your policy
will automatically provide the additional coverage as of the
date the revision is effective in Utah.

Legal Action Against Us
No legal action may be brought against us until there has been
full compliance with all the terms of this policy. In addition,
under Pan A, no legal action may be brought against us until:
1. we agree in writing that the covered person has an
obligation to pay; or
2„ die amount of that obligation has been determined by
arbitration or judgment after a trial, as applicable
under the various coverages of this policy.
No person or organization has any right under this policy to
bring us into any action to detennine the liability of a covered
person.

Subrogation
In the event of any payment to any person under all coverages:
1. The Company is subrogated to the rights of the
person to whom or for whose benefit such payments
were made, to the extent of such payments, and such
person must execute and deliver instruments and
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure
such rights. Such person shall do nothing
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The benefits and provisions of subrogation, as herein provided,
are subject to the provisions of Utah Code

Annotated, 1953. §3lA-22-3Q9, * -its. Exclusions and
Conditions to Personal Injury Protection and providing for
mandatory binding arbitration between insurers; and the
provision for that reimbursement and the amount decided by
mandatory binding arbitration between the insurers is not pan
of the subrogation rights as provided herein.

a.

if
.e has been material misrepresentation
of fact which if known to us would have
caused us not to issue the policy; or
b. if theriskhas changed substanrially since the
policy was issued;
c. if there have been substantia! breaches of
contractual duties, conditions and warranties;
d. if there has been a revocation or suspension
of the driver's license of the named insured,
or any other person who customarily drives
the car.
Tins can be done by letting you know at least 30
days before the date cancellation takes effect.

Policy Period and Territory
1.

This policy applies only to accidents and losses which
occur during the policy period as shown in the
Declarations and within the policy territory. The
policy territory is the United States of America, its
territories or possessions, Puerto Rico or Canada.
This policy also applies to loss to, or accidents
involving, your covered vehicle while being
transported between their ports.

2.

The policy term is shown on the Declaration page and
is for successive periods of time if renewed for which
you pay a renewal premium.

3.

The policy begins and ends at 12:01 ajn. standard
time at the address shown on the Declaration page.

4. Waen this policy is written for a period of more
than one year, we may cancel for any reason at
anniversary by letting you know at least 30 days
before die date cancellation takes effect:
a. when this policy is canceled, the premium
for the period from die date of cancellation
to the expiration date will be refunded pro
rata;
b. if the return premium is not refunded with
the notice of cancellation or when tins policy
is returned to us, we will refund it within a
reasonable time after the date cancellation
takes effect.

Termination Cancellation, Non-renewal by You
and Us

5. If your policy is canceled or not renewed you
have the right by First Class Mail to request the
reasons for the cancellation and non-renewal of
your policy. This will be sent to you within tea
woriring days after written request

A. Cancellation by You.
You may cancel this policy during any policy period
by returning it to us or by letting us know in writing
of the date cancellation is to take effect, but the date
of cancellation must be prospectively after the date
that you let us know you intend to cancel

6. Any cancellation, termination or non-renewal
nonces asrequiredherein, under the provisions of
tins paragraph and the provisions of Part G,
Termination - Cancellation, Non-renewal by Us*
paragraphs 1 through 5, may be delivered to you
or mailed to you at your mailing address shown
in the declarations and proof of mailing will be
sufficient proof of notice.

B. Cancellation by Us.
We may cancel this policy only for the reasons stated
below by letting you know in writing of the date
cancellation takes effect in the following manner
1. When you have not paid the premium, we may
cancel at any time by letting you know at least 10
days before the date cancellation takes effect
2. When this policy has been in effect for less than
60 days and is not a renewal with us, we may
cancel for any reason by letting you know at least
10 days before* the date of the cancellation. If the
notice of cancellation is by mail, it will be sent
first class, postage prepaid and the 10 days takes
effect three days after the date of mailing.
3. When this policy has been in effect for 60 days
or more, or at any time if it is a renewal with us,
we may cancel:

C

Automatic Termination.
If we offer to renew or continue your policy and you
or your representative do not accept, this policy will
automatically terminate at the end of the anient
policy period. Failure to'pay the requiredrenewalor
continuation premium when due shall mean that you
have not accepted our offer.
If you obtain other insurance on your covered vehicle,
any similar insurance provided by this policy will
terminate as to the covered date on the effective date
of die odier insurance.

SB IT REMEM8EREDThat

Address

John Wall and Nancv Wall

1269 West California. Salt Lake Citv, Utah 8410*

(hereinafter referred to as the Claimant

s

J for and in consideration of the sum of S i x t e e n Thousand and no/lOOs
Dollarsg

the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do

we

)

hereby REMISS, RELEASE AND FOREVER DISCHARGE

David W a t e r s d/V/a D & L C o n s t r u c t i o n and Lana Waters

TTft—rt H«-t ruu N*mm ol P*r%oc%u Qoroonuom or ^%rxnmru\tox To B«

Their

16.000.00

fttwww)

***r*t* and «»«wits arsf el! <y&sr person, firms, and orporstans *-hcmscsvsr of end from sny 2nd ai! scsons,

(His, HOT. j n o t r , its)

daims, and demands whatsoever which daimant s

now have

or may have, whether known or unknown, developed or un-

developed, on account*of or arising out of the accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the

As a further consideration for said Sum Claimant s
been made to Claimant s

day of

7 th

that no promise or agreement not herein expressed has

warrant

; that in executing this Release Claimant s

a r e not relying upon any statement or representation
(IV A***

made by the party or parties hereby released or said party's or parties' agents, servants or physicians concerning the nature,
extent, or duration of the injuries and/or damages, or concerning any other thing or natter, but
their

own judgment; that the above mentioned sum is received by Claimants

(Wtt, « « i , Tftoif, US)

of all the aforesaid daims and demands whasoever; that Oaimantc
fore signing and sealing this Release, Claimant c

Savn

and

have

relying

solely

upon

in full settlement and satisfaction

------

a r » legally competent to execute this Release: and that beds. Ami

fully informed

(Has, MSV«)

are

^a-^oiyag

of its contents and meaning

(Hunsait, nortttt, Tnomsoms)

executed it with full knowledge thereof. It is further understood and agreed that the payment of said amount is

not to be construed as an admission of liability, but is a compromise of a disputed daon.

HAVE READ T H E FOREGOING RELEASE AND FULLTUNOERSTANirir^
Signed, sealed and delivered this
at

>^S

_

^ s h s ~lC£UsA-

^

_

tiav of

«4 3s**Z>L~f

In the presence of

"l/IOjCiJ^^

»__/.

-^jLj^JX^
(Claimants sign below)
(Seal)

Witness:
Witness:

(/NOTARY PUBUC

Witness:

2«*7 Hawthorne Or.
layton, UT 8AOU

77

(Seal)
(Seal)

*

...

-*

TfUiO JliviiCtei 0 « s i n c t

THOMAS A. DUFFIN (0927)
DANIEL 0 . DUFFIN (6530)
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-6600
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,

SA.T >_AK£ COUNTY

By..,^^ffV,-\,iuI
OeputyC&ck

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

]
]I

ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT

]I

Civil No. 940905590CN

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN WALL and
NANCY WALL, his wife,
Defendants.

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing before the
above-entitled Court on the 24th day of August, 1995, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding, Thomas A. Duffin appearing for and on behalf
of Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, and John and Nancy Wall
appearing per se, whereupon the Court heard the respective argument of the parties,
pursuant to Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in lieu thereof, Motion
for Summary Judgment, and Defendants' counter Motion for Summary Judgment, and
pursuant to the pleadings, the following facts are not in dispute:
1.

The Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, (hereinafter

"Bear River") is an insurance corporation engaged in the insurance business in the
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state of Utah, is a non-profit corporation and is owned entirely by its policyholders for
the use and benefit of the policyholders, having its principal place of business at 778
Winchester, Murray, Utah. Bear River Mutual only issues insurance policies in the
state of Utah.
2.

Defendants, John Wall and Nancy Wall, his w i f e , are residents of

Davis County, State of Utah, and reside at 8 0 2 Montague, Bountiful, Utah
3.

84010.

This action is brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1 9 5 3 , as

amended § 7 8 - 3 3 - 1 , et.seq. seeking by determination the rights of the parties hereto
under a policy issued by Plaintiff, Policy No. C 1 4 5 0 7 7 .
4.

On or about June 5, 1992, and continuing through June 5, 1993,

Plaintiff had issued its standard automobile Policy No. C 1 4 5 0 7 7 , to John Wall and
Nancy Wall, his w i f e . A copy of the policy is attached as Exhibit " A " and a copy of
the declaration page is attached as Exhibit " B " to Plaintiffs Complaint.
5.

That the auto policy issued to Defendants, provides under PART

B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE, Insuring Agreement, as follows:
"The Company will pay personal injury protection benefits that are reasonable
and necessary to or on behalf of each eligible injured person for:
(a)
medical expenses
(b)
work loss
(c)
funeral expenses
(d)
survivor loss and
(e)
special damages
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible insured person caused by
an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.
Medical Payments:
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall not exceed
$3,000.00; unless additional medical protection or payments are provided for

-3on the Declaration page, they must be incurred within three years of the date
of the accident to be payable.
Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of Liability and Special Provisions
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period in
the United States and Canada, except if an auto accident to which this policy
applies occurs outside of Utah, (but is within the United States and Canada),
our limits of liability under your policy for that accident are as follows:
1.
If the state, (outside of Utah) or Canada, has:
a.
a personal injury protection or similar law specifying limits higher
than that in the declarations, your policy will provide the higher
specified limit;
Special Conditions if Law is Declared Invalid
The premium for the policy is based on rates which have been established in
reliance upon the limitations on the right to recover for damages imposed by the
provisions of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. In the event a court
of competent jurisdiction declares or enters a judgment, the effect of which is
to render the provisions of such act invalid or unenforceable in whole or in part,
the Company shall have the right to recompute the premium payable for the
policy and the provisions of this endorsement shall be voidable or subject to
amendment at the option of the Company.
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other
Insurance Under our Personal Injury Protection
1. No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate benefits for the
same elements of loss under this or any similar insurance."
6.

Under PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS, APPLYING TO ALL

COVERAGES, Subrogation, it provides:
"In the event of any payment to any person under all coverages:
1.
The Company is subrogated to the rights of the person to whom or for
whose benefit such payments were made, to the extent of such
payments, and such person must execute and deliver instruments and
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. Such
person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.
a.
If the Insured proceeds or commences an action against a legally
responsible third party, the Company shall be entitled to the
extent of such payment to the proceeds of any settlement or
judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights of
recovery of such person against any person or organization
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legally responsible for the bodily injury or property damage
because of which such payment is made and the Company shall
have a lien to the extent of such payment, notice of which may
be given to the person or organization causing such bodily injury,
his agent, his insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the matter;
such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the Company all
rights of recovery which he shall have against such other person
or organization because of such bodily injury."
7.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-308 provides:

"The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection
coverage:
(1) the named insured, when injured in an acciaent involving any
motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state,
the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except
where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the named
insured's o w n motor vehicle not actually insured under the policy;"
8.

Utah Code Annotated,

1953, as amended

§31 A - 2 2 - 3 0 9 ( 6 )

provides:
"(6)
Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is
subject to the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to w h o m
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid by
another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of U t a h ,
the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall
reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of t h e
amount of damages recoverable;"
9.

On or about August 6, 1992, the Plaintiffs insured, Nancy Wall,

while a resident of Utah, was involved in an automobile accident on Colorado State
Highway 666 at Cortez, Colorado,
10.

That on or about March 4 , 1 9 9 4 , John Wall and Nancy Wall

executed a release of nany and all actions, claims, and demands whatsoever
claimants

now

have or may have,

whether

known

or unknown,

which

developed,

or

-5undeveloped, on account of or arising out of the accident, casualty or event which
happened on or about the 7th day of August, 1992." A copy of the release to the tort
feasors, David & Lana Waters, is attached as Exhibit C to Plaintiffs Complaint, and
the release was less than the insurance limits of the tort feasors.
11.

Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment for the interpretation

of its policy provisions and whether Plaintiff is under an obligation pursuant to Utah
law to make further personal injury protection benefit payments as provided for in Part
B of its policy providing for personal injury protection benefits to Defendants was filed
promptly and commenced in good faith by Plaintiff after receiving knowledge of the
general release of the tort feasors by Defendants, jointly and severally. There were
legal, debatable, questions of law and there exists a reasonable question as to the
issues of law for denial of the claim of Defendants by Plaintiff.
12.

The Court examined the briefs of the Plaintiff and Defendants and

the cases and authorities cited by both, and finds that that the Plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings or for summary judgment, should be denied, and that
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted and that Plaintiff should
be required to pay further personal injury protection claims to Defendants, John Wall
and Nancy Wall, pursuant to Part B of its policy under the personal injury protection
benefits.
13.

The Court hereby dismisses the Counterclaim of the Defendants

on the basis that it attempts to include a criminal action with a civil action and,
therefore, is an improper counterclaim; the Court further denies the Defendants'

-6Motion to amend their Counterclaim based upon the settlement of the issues herein
set forth.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED:
1.

That the Defendants, John and Nancy Wall's Motion for Summary

Judgment is granted and Plaintiff is required to pay to John and Nancy Wall, pursuant
to the provisions of its policy, Part B, Personal Injury Protection, those benefits since
the time of the release signed by Defendants on March 4, 1994, pursuant to the terms
and conditions of the policy.
2.

That Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for

Summary Judgment is denied.
3.

That the counterclaim filed by Defendants, John Wall and Nancy

Wall, is hereby dismissed, and the Defendants' request to file an amended
counterclaim is denied.
Dated this &

y^fyf
day of March, 1996.
BY THE CO

-7-

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Judgment to
the following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
John Wall and
Nancy Wall
P.O. Box 540118
No. Salt Lake, Utah 84054
postage prepaid, this

/^

day of March, 1996.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR

X

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

IIOTICE OF flPPEBL
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
JOHN WALL and
NANCY WALL, his wife,

Civil No. 940905590CN

Defendants/Appellees.

JUDGE CLC::V.:.!WASAK1

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, by and through their attorney,
Thomas A. Duffin, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, from
the judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
entered in this matter on the 8th day of March, 1996, as attached. The parties to the
judgment appealed from and the names and addresses of their respective attorneys
are as follows:
flame

Address

John and Nancy Wall
Defendants

P.O. Box 540118
No. Salt Lake, UT 84054

-2This Notice is filed pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Dated this 3

day of April, 1996.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON

\J J°^

^iPfiomas A. Duffin
Attorney for Plaintiff
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P.O. Box 540118
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postage prepaid, this 3

day of April, 1996.
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I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Notice of
Appeal to the following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
Nancy Wall
P.O. Box 540118
No. Salt Lake, Utah 84054
postage prepaid, this

^

day of April, 1996.
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(a) the occurrence causing the property damage involves actual physical contact between the covered motor vehicle and an uninsured motor
vehicle;
(b) the owner, operator, or license plate number of the uninsured motor
vehicle is identified; and
(c) the insured or someone on his behalf reports the occurrence within
ten days to the insurer or his agent.
(4) The coverage provided under this section shall be subject to a $250
deductible and shall be excess to any other insurance covering property
damage to the motor vehicle described in the policy.
(5) The insurer providing coverage under this section may make available
additional deductibles at appropriate premium rates.
(6) No rating surcharge may be applied to any policy of motor vehicle
insurance issued in this state as a result of payment of a claim made under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-305.5, enacted
by L. 1990, ch. 321, § 1.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 321, § 2
makes the act effective on October 1,1990.

31A-22-306. Personal injury protection.
Personal injury protection under Subsection 31A-22-302(2) provides the
coverages and benefits described under Section 31A-22-307 to persons described under Section 31A-22-308, but is subject to the limitations, exclusions,
and conditions set forth in Section 31A-22-309.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-306, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 158.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AXJL — Combining or "stacking" of "no
fault* or personal injury protection (PD?) cover-

ages in automobile liability policy or policies, 29
A.L.R-4th 12.

3XA-22-307. Personal injury protection coverages and
benefits.
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include:
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical,
X-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance,
hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person;
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income and
loss of earning capacity per person from inability to work, for a
maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss, except that this
benefit need not be paid for the first three days of disability, unless the
disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the
date of injury; and
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a
maximum of 365 days, for services actually rendered or expenses
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the injured
person would have performed for his household, except that this
benefit need not be paid for the first three days after the date of injury
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unless the person's inability to perform these services continues for
more than two consecutive weeks;
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of $1,500
per person; and
(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his heirs,
in the total of $3,000.
(2) (a) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided
for in Subsection (1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e), the commissioner shall conduct a relative value study of services and accommodations
for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or rehabilitation of an injured person in
the most populous county in the state to assign a unit value and determine
the 75th percentile charge for each type of service and accommodation.
The study shall be updated every other year. In conducting the study, the
department may consult or contract with appropriate public and private
medical and health agencies or other technical experts. The costs and
expenses incurred in conducting, maintaining, and administering the
relative value study shall be funded by the tax created under Section
59-9-105. Upon completion of the study, the department shall prepare and
publish a relative value study which sets forth the unit value and the 75th
percentile charge assigned to each type of service and accommodation.
(b) The reasonable value of any service or accommodation is determined
by applying the unit value and the 75th percentile charge assigned to the
service or accommodation under the relative value study. If a service or
accommodation is not assigned a unit value or the 75th percentile charge
under the relative value study, the value of the service or accommodation
shall equal the reasonable cost of the same or similar service or accommodation in the most populous county of this state.
(c) This subsection does not preclude the department from adopting a
schedule already established or a schedule prepared by persons outside
the department, if it meets the requirements of this subsection.
(d) Every insurer shall report to the Commissioner of Insurance any
patterns of overcharging, excessive treatment, or other improper actions
by a health provider within 30 days after such insurer has knowledge of
such pattern.
(e) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the motion of
either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than
three licensed physicians to examine the claimant and testify on the issue
of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical services or expenses.
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection (l)(a) and in Subsection
31A-22-309(l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care and
treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of
healing.
(4) The insured may waive for the named insured and the named insured's
spouse only the loss of gross income benefits of Subsection (l)(b)(i) if the
insured states in writing that:
(a) within 31 days of applying for coverage, neither the insured nor the
insured's spouse received any earned income from regular employment;
and
(b) for at least 180 days from the date of the writing and during the
period of insurance, neither the insured nor the insured's spouse will
receive earned income from regular employment.
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(5) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance
providing coverages greater than the minimum coverage required under this
chapter nor does it require the segregation of those minimum coverages from
other coverages in the same policy.
(6) Deductibles are not permitted with respect to the insurance coverages
required under this section
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 159;
1989, ch. 261, § 13; 1990, ch. 327, § 8; 1991,
ch. 74, § 7; 1994, ch. 71, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, divided former
Subsection (2) into present Subsections (2)(a) to
(2)(d) and substituted "Deductibles are not permitted" for "An insurer may not offer policies
that require deductibles" in Subsection (5).
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,

1991, inserted "maintaining, and administering* in the next-to-last sentence in Subsection
(2)(a), added present Subsection (2)(d) and redesignated former Subsection (2)(d) as present
Subsection (2)(e) and made minor stylistic
changes in Subsection (l)(a) and in the second
sentence in Subsection (2)(a).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994,
added Subsection (4), renumbering former Subsections (4) and (5) as Subsections (5) and (6).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
If a person is not "disabled" for purposes of
loss of earnings benefits, neither is he "disabled" for purposes of household services benefits. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d
609 (Utah 1979).
The legislature intended to establish the
mandatory household services benefit as an
aggregate maximum of $20 per day of disability, up to a maximum of 365 days of disability,
and not as an individual maximum of $20 on
each day services are actually rendered. Tanner
v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).

ANALYSIS

Allowable benefits.
—Household services.
—Loss of earnings.
Arbitration panel.
Dismissal of claim.
Time computation.
Tort claims,
—Availability of insurance benefits.
—Motorist's liability.
Allowable benefits.
—Household services.
The phrase "and regardless of whether any of
these expenses are actually incurred* in former
version of this section was included to eliminate the necessity of proving such expenses and
to prevent the insurerfromclaiming the benefit
of services rendered gratuitously by friends or
relatives which otherwise would have to be
paid for; it did not require that reimbursement
be made any time a family lost the services of
one of its members regardless of the character
of those services. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire
Ins. Co., 559 R2d 958 (Utah 1977).
Former provisions did not require insurer to
pay the family of a twelve-year-old boy injured
in an automobile accident $12 per day during
the period of the boy's disablement as reimbursement for the value of lost services, which
would have consisted of doing dishes, carrying
out the garbage, washing the family car, and
other similar chores because it was not reasonable to assume that the family would in fact
have incurred expenses to perform the boy's
chores, and so they were not entitled to reimbursement. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins.
Co., 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977).

—Loss of earnings.
"Disability* refers to the inability to work;
injured party who was able to work during the
period for which disability benefits were sought
and who earned more than $150 per week
during the entire time for which benefits were
sought was not entitled to disability benefits for
loss of earnings. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,
592 PJ2d 609 (Utah 1979).
A claimant who was unemployed at the time
of his or her accident can collect disability
benefits for lost wages from prospective employment only if the claimant establishes that a
job was available for which the claimant was
qualified and that the claimant would have
taken that job. The legislature did not intend to
provide compensation for "loss of earning capacity* unless a claimant has suffered a direct
and specific monetary loss. Versluis v. Guaranty Natl Cos., 842 R2d 865 (Utah 1992).
Arbitration panel.
Failure to arbitrate a claim before a panel
was not a ground for dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct App. 1993).
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Dismissal of claim.
This statute provides no basis on which to
dismiss a claim., Burns Chiropractic Clinic v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 851 R2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).

injured person is not entitled to a double recoveryfromthe tort-feasor and under no-fault for a
single loss. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592
P.2d 609 (Utah 1979).
Where insured brought action against his
no-fault insurer seeking additional no-fault
benefits after receiving benefits from the nofault insurer and obtaining a judgment against
a third-party tort-feasor, insured was collaterally estopped from recovering additional nofault benefits in the form of lost wages but was
not collaterally estopped from recovering for
household expenses. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins.
Co., 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981).

Time computation.
The 52 consecutive week period in Subsection
(IXbXi) runs from the loss of gross income and
loss of earning capacity, notfromthe date of the
accident. Plaintiff who did not begin to suffer
loss of income and loss of earning capacity until
six months after an accident and continued to
suffer that loss for a period exceeding the
maximum benefit of 52 weeks was improperly
denied coverage when the trial court only pro- —Motorist's liability.
vided for coverage for 52 weeks following the
A party having the security required under
date of the accident. Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., this section is granted partial tort immunity
217 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Ct App. 1993).
and is not personally liable for the benefits
provided hereunder; he remains liable for cusTort claims.
tomary tort claims, such as general damages
—Availability of insurance benefits.
and economic losses not compensated by the
No-fault benefits are available to those who benefits paid hereunder, if the threshold provisustain serious injury even though they remain sions of § 31A-22-309 are met Allstate Ins. Co.
free to pursue a tort claim as well; however, the v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C JT.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 113.
AXJEL — Validity and construction of "nofault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d
229.
Validity of state statute prohibiting health

providersfromthe practice of waiving patients'
obligation to pay health insurance deductibles
or copayments, or advertising such practice, 8
Ai.R.5th 855.
Key Numbers. —Automobiles «• 43.

31A-22-308. Persons covered by personal injury protection.
The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection coverage:
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any motor
vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state, the United
States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except where the injury is
the result of the use or operation of the named insured's own motor vehicle
not actually insured under the policy;
(2) persons related to the insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or
guardianship who are residents of the insured's household, including
those who usually make their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere under the circumstances described in Section (1), except
where the person is injured as a result of the use or operation of his own
motor vehicle not insured under the policy; and
(3) any other natural person whose injuries arise out of an automobile
accident occurring while the person occupies a motor vehicle described in
the policy with the express or implied consent of the named insured or
while a pedestrian if he is injured in an accident occurring in Utah
involving the described motor vehicle.

330

CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-308, enacted by
L, 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1990, ch. 327, § 9.
Amendment Notes, — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, divided the formerly undivided language in Subsection (1)
into present Subsections (1) and (2); redesignated former Subsection (2) as present Subsection (3); substituted "when injured in an accident involving any motor vehicle, regardless of
whether the accident occurs in this state, the
United States, its territories or possessions, or
Canada, except when the injury is a result of

31A-22-309

the use or operation of the named insured's own
motor vehicle not actually insured under the
policy* for "and" in Subsection (1) and "under
the circumstances described in Section (1), except where the person is injured as a result of
the use or operation of his own motor vehicle
not insured under the policy; and" for "when
injured in an accident in Utah involving any
motor vehicle" in Subsection (2); and, in Sub*
section (3), deleted "in Utah" after the first
instance of "occurring" and inserted "occurring
in Utah" near the end of the subsection.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Named-driver exclusionary endorsement.
Insurance policies used as security must inLimitation of policy covering driver.
clude minimum omnibus coverage including
Motorcycle driven by insured.
persons operating the vehicle with the express
Named-driver exclusionary endorsement.
or
implied permission of the owner-insurer, and
Out-of-state incidents.
include the statutory minimum liability limits;
a named-driver exclusionary endorsement to
Limitation of policy covering driver.
Passenger in an automobile driven by an insurance policy presented as security is
insured's son but owned by another person was void in relation to the statutory minimum level
not entitled to personal iujury protection (PIP) of coverage, but is enforceable as to coverage
coverage under a policy covering the driver. provided above the mandatory minimum limMcCaffery v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. its. Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. &
1990).
Guar. Co., 619 R2d 329 (Utah 1980) (decided
before 1985 repeal of Chapter 12 of Title 41).
Motorcycle driven by insured.
The coverages described in § 31A-22-307 Out-of-state incidents.
were applicable to an insured killed while ridIn light of language limiting application of
ing a motorcycle involved in an accident in this
these
provisions to accidents in this state, instate with a motor vehicle; there is no requiresurance
commissioner's regulation making noment that the insured must be operating or
fault
insurance
coverage applicable to incidents
occupying the motor vehicle to be subject to
coverage, but only that he be in an accident occurring outside the state was in error. IML
involving a motor vehicle. Coates v. American Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah
1975).
Economy Ins. Co., 627 P2d 92 (Utah 1981).
ANALYSIS

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — What constitutes "entering" or
"alighting from" vehicle within meaning of in-

surance policy, or statute mandating insurance
coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149.

31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to
personal injury protection*
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of
action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been
caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained one
or more of the following:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
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(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured
or a resident family member of the insured and not insured under the
policy;
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle;
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his
injury:
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(B) while committing a felony;
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war,
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition
incident to any of the foregoing; or
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive,
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials,
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which
may be contained in other types of coverage.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are
reduced by:
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation
or similar statutory plan; and
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its agencies because that person is on
active duty in the military service.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy,
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by
the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident.
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred.
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30
days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of
expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as
to the entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue
if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any
part or all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by
reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof
is received by the insurer.
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses
shall bear interest at the rate of 1 Yz% per month after the due date.
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract
to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is
required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to
the following:
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(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another
insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages
recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160;
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74,
§ 8; 1992, ch. 230, § 9; 1994, ch. 4, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, made minor
stylistic changes in Subsection (1) and rewrote
Subsection (2)(a)(i), which read: "for any injuries sustained by the injured while occupying
another motor vehicle owned by the insured

and not insured under the policy."
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, inserted "or is required to have* near the
beginning of Subsection (1).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994,
added "or permanent impairment based upon
objective findings* to the end of Subsection
(D(c); made a stylistic change in Subsection
(3Xb); and added letter designations in Subsection (5).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
appeai in order to be entitled to attorney's fees
incurred on appeal in defending his judgment
for benefits. Coates v. American Economy Ins.
Co, 627 R2d 92 (Utah 1981).

ANALYSIS

Acceptance of monthly payment.
—Effect on insurer's obligation.
Accrual of cause of action.
Attorney's fees.
—Appeal.
Claims against federal government.
Household exclusion clause.
Personal injury protection requirements.
Reimbursement.
—Recovery from insured and his insurer.
Release given by iiyured party to tort-feasor.
Tort claims.
—Liability of insured.
—Pleading and instructions.
Workers' compensation.

Claims against federal government.
Even if the federal government could be characterized as an insurer because it provided
financial security for its employees in regard to
vehicle operation claims, it could not be subjected to mandatory arbitration under Subsection (6), since this would conflict with the
administrative arrangement established in the
Federal Tort Claims Act. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 651 (D.
Utah 1989).

Acceptance of monthly payment.
—Effect on insurer's obligation.
The acceptance of a monthly payment by an
insured from a no-fault insurer does not terminate the contractual obligation of the insurer to
make additional payments for subsequently
accrued claims. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.,
635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981).
Accrual of cause of action.
A cause of action against the state accrues at
the time of the subject accident rather than
when the plaintiff satisfies the threshhold requirements under this section. Jepson v. State,
846 R2d 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Attorney's fees.
—AppeaL
Plaintiff was not required to file a cross-

Household exclusion clause.
A household or family exclusion clause in an
automobile insurance policy is contrary to public policy and to the statutory requirements
found in the No-Fault Insurance Act as to the
minimum benefits provided by statute. Farmerslns. Exch. v. Call 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985).
If an insurer fails to disclose material exclusions in an automobile insurance policy and the
Purchaser is not informed of them in writing,
those exclusions are invalid. Without disclosure, the household exclusion clause fails to
honor the reasonable expectations of the purchaser, rendering the exclusion clause invalid
as to the entire policy limits. Farmers Ins.
Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985).
Household or family exclusions are valid in
this state as to insurance provided by an autoniobile policy in excess of the statutorily mandated amounts and benefits. State Farm Mut.

333

958

Utah

559 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Donald J. JAMISON, Sr., et aL, Plaintiffs
and Respondents,
•.

UTAH HOME FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant
No. 14523.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan, 20, 1977.
Parents, whose 12-year-old son was involved in collision with pickup truck while
son was riding bicycle, brought action
against truck driver's insurer to recover on
basis of No-Fault Insurance Act • The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., J., awarded parents
disability benefits of $12 per day for loss of
son's household services and awarded parents $475 in attorney fees, and insurer appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J.,
held that son's household chores were not
chores for which his family would "reasonably have incurred" expenses within meaning of No-Fault Insurance Act provision,
but that award of attorney fees would not
be disturbed.
Reversed in part and affirmed in part
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opinion in which Ellett, J., concurred.
1. Statutes e=>184
Background and purpose of a statute
may be looked to for purpose of ascertaining its meaning and proper application in
particular circumstances.
2. Insurance <s==> 467.61
Provisions of No-Fault Insurance Act
should be construed in conformity with
principle that purpose of insurance is to
indemnify for losses or damages suffered,
as contrasted to gambling for a munificent
reward if a loss occurs. U.C.A.1953, 3141-1 et seq.
3. Damages <s=>184

such an award must be supported by proof
on which reasonable minds acting fairly
thereon could believe that it is more probable, than not, that damage was actually
suffered.
4. Insurance <s=> 513.4
Twelve-year-old boy's household chores,
which allegedly consisted of taking out the
garbage, washing dishes, vacuuming carpet,
helping carry in groceries and washing car
during summer, were not chores for which
his family would "reasonably have incurred" expenses within meaning of NoFault Insurance Act provision which in effect provides for an allowance of $12 per
day "in lieu of reimbursement for expenses
which would have been reasonably incurred
for services that, but for the injury, the
injured person would have performed for
his household and regardless of whether
any of these expenses are actually incurred." U.C.A.1953, 31^1-1 et seq., 3141-6, 31-41-6(l)(b)(ii).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
5. Insurance <£=>675
Award of attorney fees of $475 to
plaintiffs in action in which recovery was
sought against an insurer on basis of NoFaolt Insurance Act would not be disturbed
on appeal, in view of fact that exhibit,
which showed details and time of certain
payments made by insurer, was not included in record on appeal and in light of fact
that there was evidence as to reasonableness of the attorney fee. U.C.A.1953, 3141—1 et seq.

L. L. Summerhays, of Strong & Hanni,
Salt Lake City, for defendant-appellant.
Gaylen S. Young, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs-respondents.
CROCKETT, Justice:
The issue involved herein is plaintiffs'
asserted right to recover from the defend-
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son as coming within the meaning of Section ai-41-6(lXbXtt)i U.CJL195S, which is
quoted below. From a determination on
that issue in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding disability benefits at $12 a day for 112
days, totaling $1,344, and attorney fees totaling $475 and costs, the defendant appeals.
Inasmuch as the recovery sought is based
on the No-Fault Insurance Act, the exact
details as to how the accident occurred are
not material to the issue involved. There is
no dispute about the fact that while Donald
was riding his bicycle on Highland Drive
about 3700 South in Salt Lake County on
November 19, 1974, he was involved in a
collision with a pickup truck driven by Boyd
D. Lemon, who was insured by the defendant, nor that Donaid suffered bruises and
contusions, injuries to his hip and a broken
nose. He was hospitalized for a week, then
remained at home until after the Christmas
holidays when he was permitted to attend
school, but was not given an outright release by his doctor until March 11, 1975.
This totals the 112 days during which plaintiff says he was not able to perform the
household services hereinafter listed.
The parties reached an agreement and
the court approved a settlement as to other
aspects of the case for Donald's injury,
medical and hospital expenses. But, they
were unable to agree upon, and therefore
stipulated to reserve for determination by
the court, the issue as to plaintiffs rights to
any further damages as disability benefits
under the No-Fault Insurance Act, and as
to attorney's fees.
The statute of concern here, Section 3 1 41-6(l)(b)(ii), states:
. in lieu of reimbursement for
expenses which would have been reasonably incurred for services that, but for
the injury, the injured person would have
performed for his household and regardless of whether any of these expenses are
actually incurred, an allowance of $12 per
day commencing not later than three

days after the date of the injury and
totvtimimg for z. maximum of $65 days
thereafter, . . . . [Emphasis added.]
[1] The view of this statute advocated
by the plaintiff is that it mandates an automatic award of $12 per day for injury to
any member of a household who would have
performed services of any nature, however
much or minimal, and whether their value
is great or small. As it is but natural to
expect, the defendant takes a differing
view and argues that the statute is not
susceptible to any such interpretation. We
have no hesitancy in agreeing that the interpretation and application of the law
should be a process of reason, as contrasted
to a mere reading of tables or schedules,
nor that when controversies arise it is both
permissible and desirable to look to the
background and purpose of a statute to
ascertain its meaning and proper application in particular circumstances.
Since the advent of the automobile near
the turn of this century there has been a
constant and accelerating increase, both in
the number of automobiles and the speed at
which they travel, and a corresponding increase in injuries and damages resulting
from their use. This has resulted in ever
increasing insurance coverage and insurance costs, including various methods of
compelling insurance coverage. Consequent to this, due to the controversies and
litigation over who was at fault in such
accidents, with the attendant delays, uncertainties and expenses, the concept of NoFault Insurance arose. In enacting it, our
legislature determined as a matter of public
policy that some specified primary damages
as to necessary medical, hospital, and loss of
wages should be paid without undue delay.1
>

This objective is plainly stated in Sec.
31-41-2:
to effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of handling the
greater bulk of the personal injury claims
that arise out of automobile accidents
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Another equally important and desirable
objective of the act, to be achieved in correlation with the foregoing, is coping with
the ever increasing costs of the insurance.
This is also clearly expressed in the language of the same section, stating that a
purpose of the act is to possibly stabilize, if
not effectuate certain savings in the rising
costs of automobile accident insurance.
Consistent with the general purposes just
stated, Sec. 31-41-7 provides a formula to
arrive at what the actual losses are; and
also provides that any benefits shall be reduced by other coverages, workmen's compensation or military benefits, which the
injured person receives. This idea finds
further support in Section 31-41-8, which
states that payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31-41-6 shall be made on
a monthly basis as expenses are incurred;
and that benefits are overdue if not paid
within 35 days after the insurer receives
"reasonable proof of the fact and amount of
expenses incurred"
To test the validity of plaintiff's contentions and how they coordinate with the
above stated objectives and provisions of
the statutes, such problems as this should
be considered: assume, e. g., a family where
there are eight or ten children, each of
whom does his assigned share of the family
chores. The family car has a collision and
all are injured. Does the insurer pay the
$12 per day X 10 = $120 per day? Or,
does the rule of reason apply?
However much we may desire it to be
otherwise, this fact might as well be accepted as inescapable: that insurance is a business, not a philanthropy. There can be no
free gifts or benefactions. In the long run
premiums must pay for losses; and therefore, increases in premiums must and will
be correlated to the extent of the coverage.
2.

3.

Farmers Insurance Co. v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 13
Wash.App. 836, 537 P.2d 839 (1975); Oregon
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Salzberg, 85
Wash.2d 372, 535 P.2d 816 (1975).
No bad faith is imputed in this case.

Otherwise, the business cannot continue to
operate. Someone has to pay the increased
premiums. That someone is the policyholders, i. e.f the public Accordingly, a seeming
generosity in broadening coverage in an
individual situation, would be no favor to
policyholders generally, nor to the public.
The principle which best serves the objective to be desired is to give both parties the
benefit of a sensible, even-handed and practical application of the statute, under the
assumption that all of its language was
used advisedly and in harmony with its
purposes.2 If the Act had intended reimbursement for any and all duties performed
by members of households, it could have
plainly so stated. But it does not do so.
Only by keeping the awards within reason,
and excepting therefrom claims that might
be unrealistic, fanciful, or perhaps even
fraudulent,3 can the stated objective, "to
effectuate . . . savings in the rising
costs of automobile accident insurance
. . ." be accomplished. Otherwise it is
obvious that necessary increases in premiums would defeatr rather than promote, the
purposes of the Act
[2] When the provisions of the sections
of the Act as quoted herein are considered
together in the light of that purpose, particularly the key statement in Section 31-416, wherein it speaks in terms of reimburse-'
ment "for expenses which would have been
reasonably incurred " it becomes plain that
the Act, both in its statement of general
purpose, and its specific provisions, was not
intended to provide an automatic reward or
a "windfall," for being involved in an accident by requiring payment when there was
no loss actually suffered, nor for any expense not reasonably to be incurred,4 but
should be construed in conformity with the
v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 203 A.2d 421
(D.C.Ct.App.1964); Barmeier v. Oregon Physicians Service, 194 Or. 659, 243 P.2d 1053 (Ore.
1952); Fire Assn. of Philadelphia v. Strayhorn,
211 S.W. 447 (Texas 1919); Whitney Estate Co.
v. Northern Assur. Co., 155 Cal. 521, 101 P. 911
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fundamental principle of
ot insurance law,
that the purpose of insurance is to indemnify isr ta»fe& w fortftagss ^wii^t^d, *s> w a trasted to gambling for a munificent regard if a loss occurs.5
The clause of the statute, "and regardless
of whether any of these expenses are actually incurred . . .," was undoubtedly
included to eliminate the necessity of proof
and to prevent an insurance company from
claiming the benefit of services rendered
gratuitously by friends or relatives,6 which
otherwise would have to be paid for. But it
i^ still speaking of "expenses which would
have been reasonably incurred."

b r i g h t in extra money by going out tendingTQ. You say they didn't do the dishes
al<jng with your son?

It seems commendable indeed that Donald assumed and discharged considerable
responsibility in the household. Particularly in view of the fact that tie had two older
sisters, one 13 and one 14, and his parents,
all of whom were able to help. Donald's
contributions are summarized, with the
time for each, thus:

A- Oh, definitely. That's why we
moved out We had a lot of complaints
with him.

Took out the garbage daily (five minutes); washed dishes two or three times a
v?eek (fifteen to twenty minutes); vacuumed carpet three or four times a week
(fifteen to twenty minutes); helped mother
carry in groceries from car each Friday (no
time given); and washed the car in the
summer once every week or two (no time
given).
In response to a question as to whether
the sisters and others helped with those
chores Mrs. Jamison testified:
Q. And they shared the household duties
around the house, did they with your son?
A. A little. My oldest one worked, and
ixiy other one was mainly out tending. She
5, U.C.A., Sec. 31-1-7 defines insurance as "a
contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify
another or pay or allow a specified or ascertainable amount or benefit upon determinable risk contingencies."
g.

See Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261,
409 P.2d 121 (1965).

7. The dissent poses questions which are quite

A- A little, yes. They helped around
th£ house, but Don did most of the chores
around the house because the girls were not
hoflie that much.
Q. Did the manager of the apartment
ha v « your walks cleaned for you?
A- I will say, sometimes.
Q. Did you ever complain to him about
not doing it?

Whatever view ma*y he taken cxt the fategoing, for the purpose of dealing with the
issue presented in this case, we accept the
validity of the plaintiffs averment that,
"but for the injury, the insured (Donald)
would have performed his household duties
as recited herein." But, in accordance with
our understanding of the statute as hereinabove discussed, there remains the other
critical question: Is it reasonable to suppose
th£t the plaintiffs family would have hired
sotneone else and paid out money to do the
chores he lists.7
[3] In this connection, it is also pertinent to observe that the general rule is that
an award of damages cannot properly be
there must be a firmer foundation. That is,
any such award must be supported by proof
upon which reasonable minds acting fairly
thereon could believe that it is more probaing, we respond: It would seem that in both
examples there would be reimbursement. In
the first because they are the type of services
for which the family would reasonably incur
expenses; and the second because there would
&e actual expenditures for that type of service.
Whereas here, we have concluded that the minor tasks done by Donald were not things for
vvhich the family would have "reasonably inestmastmA
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ble than not, that damage was actually
suffered.8
[4] Upon our consideration of the problem in the light of what has been said
herein, it is our opinion that reasonable
minds would not believe that the chores
done by Donald were something for which
the family would "reasonably have incurred" expenses, i. e., would have hired
someone else to do them and thus have
made a cash outlay. That being so, reimbursement for such services is not covered
by the statute.
[5] Concerning the award of $475 to the
plaintiffs as attorney's fees,* the problem is
quite different and the record is somewhat
confused. This is undoubtedly due to the
fact that concern was focused upon the
main problem in the case, which we have
discussed above. There is concededly some
indication that the matter of attorney's fees
was tied to that problem. But, there are
also indications otherwise. In his summation the trial court included the following:
The insurance company knew then
what the nature of the claim was and
declined to make any payment within 35
days thereafter. And I suppose the counterargument is we were in litigation.
But I suppose the answer to that is we
were in litigation when medical expenses
were paid, and that took those out of this
present action.
So the court finds that the reasonable
sufficient proof of claim was given at one
or the other of those dates, and that the
amounts which the Court has heretofore
adjudged to be due as benefits under the
Act were not paid within 35 days. The
Court finds, therefore, that a reasonable
attorney's fee is provided for under the
Act under this circumstance, and further
finds that the sum of $475 is a reasonable
attorney's fee under all the circumstances. This is not taking into account there
8. As to the degree of certainty required to
prove loss or damage incurred, see Robinson v.
Hreinson, footnote 5 above.

were other claims in this lawsuit, and it is
really difficult to separate out time; and
looking at what generally, reasonably
would have been required to pursue just
this claim, I find that $475 would be a
reasonable attorney's fee for that
amount.
The exhibit showing the details and time
of other payments made by the defendant
insurance company was not included in the
record brought here. In order to overturn
the judgment, it is the appellant's burden to
affirmatively show that the trial court was
in error. In the absence of that record, and
because there is evidence as to the reasonableness of the attorney's fee, that portion of
the judgment should remain undisturbed.
But the award of $12 per day benefit is
reversed. The parties to bear their own
costs. (All emphasis in this opinion is added.)
HENRIOD, C. J., and WILKINS, J., concur.
NOTE: The majority of the court had
acted in this case prior to the retirement of
Chief Justice HENRIOD. Its release was
delayed pending preparation of the dissent.
MAUGHAN, Justice (Dissenting).
We should affirm the trial court. All
references are to U.C.A.1953, as enacted
L.1973.
The majority opinion is premised on the
assumption that 31-41-6(l)(b)(ii) is ambiguous and that it is essential to apply the
rules of construction to determine the underlying legislative intention in order to
construe its provisions.
The language of the section is clear, precise, specific and unambiguous and it is the
duty of this court to interpret as the legislature has expressed it.
that in an action to recover those expenses, the
insurer is required to pay reasonable attorney's
fees.
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(ii) in lieu of reimbursement for expenses which would have been reasonably
incurred for services that, but for the
injury, the injured person would have
performed for his household and regardless of whether any of these expenses are
actually incurred, an allowance of $12 per
day . .
The clear meaning of this statute is that
if the injured person would have performed
household services, but for the injury, he is
granted a flat allowance. The injured party in the instant case, washed dishes, took
out garbage, vacuumed carpets, assisted his
mother in carrying groceries, and washed
the car. The statute provides an allowance
for this labor, whether any expense was
actually incurred. The flat rate avoids the
necessity of proving the reasonable value of
each service performed. The effect of the
majority opinion is to engraft a valuation
requirement in contradiction of the express
terms of the statute, viz., whether the value
of the services is sufficient to merit the
employment of another to perform them.
Through judicial legerdemain the majority
opinion has amended the statute to conform
with the Massachusetts Act, Mass.Genrl.
Laws, Chapt. 90, Sec. 34A, Amended by
St.1970, C. 670, Sec. 1, which provides:
and for payments in fact
made to others, not members of the injured person's household and reasonably
incurred in obtaining from those others
ordinary and necessary services in lieu of
those that, had he not been injured, the
injured person would have performed not
for income but for the benefit of himself
and/or members of his household
. . . . [Emphasis supplied.]
Since Utah Act, Chapt. 41, Title 31, was
basically patterned after the Massachusetts
Act, the determination of the legislature to
depart from the benefit provisions has
great significance. The majority has it, to
be entitled to the statutory benefits, the
injured party must prove actual damages,
viz.; he must prove the household services
were of such a value to his family, that
4.1

~..~i.

:_J.

-».-•

B

_

the family is compelled to hire someone
else, and make a cash outlay.
The phrase "regardless of whether any of
these expenses are actually incurred" has
been restricted to those instances where the
injured person fortuitously locates a good
Samaritan, who administers to his brother's
needs gratuitously. If a member of the
household performs the injured party's
household duty, no benefit need be paid is
the underlying philosophy of the majority,
which, in fact, coincides with the Massachusetts statute. In that statute the services
must be rendered by one who is not a
member of the injured party's household.
How would the majority apply its ruling
to the following fact situation: The mother
of five young children is injured. Her husband takes his annual vacation and performs the mother's regular household
duties. As father and husband, he is equally responsible for the care of his family.
Should the mother recover the statutory
allowance? What if the family has three
healthy teen-age daughters, who suffer
from a terminal case of laziness? The
mother is injured, and the family employs
someone to clean the house and cook the
meals. Should the statutory allowance be
denied because the daughters should have
performed these household services?
The legislative design of the statute was
to eliminate any valuation proof, e. g., were
the household services of minimal or great
value, and to set a flat rate. The sole issue
under this statute is whether the party
would have performed household services,
but for the injury. If he would have, he is
entitled to the statutory benefit.
The selective citations of the Act to buttress the peculiar construction of the majority merits attention.
31-41-2, provides:
The purpose of this act is to require the
payment of certain prescribed benefits in
respect to motor vehicle accidents
through either insurance or other approved security but on the basis of no
fault, preserving, however, the right of
an injured person to pursue the custom-
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type of injuries occur. The intention of
the legislature is hereby to possibly stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings in,
the rising costs of automobile accident
insurance and to effectuate a more efficient method of handling the greater bulk
of the personal injury claims that arise
out of automobile accidents, these being
those not involving great amounts of
damages. This act is not designed to
have any effect on property damage
claims.
The majority opinion states the public
policy set forth is to provide the payment
for 'some specified, primary damages without undue delay. I construe this section^as
decIaringTWatniT^l^
personal injury claims do not involve great
amounts of damages, the injured party is
deprived of his common law tort action. In
substitution thereof certain prescribed benefits will be paid. The Act further states
the intention of the legislature to stabilize,
if not effectuate certain savings in, the cost
of automobile insurance. The flat rate of
$12 per day in Section 6(l)(bXii), in substitution of value, is a specific application of
this policy. - .

ture; it alone may determine the coverage,
viz., the payment of certain prescribed benefits m lieu of the common law tort action.
The application of insurance law in this
matter is inappropriate. This is not an
insurance act, per se, but a scheme analogous to the Workmen's Compensation Act,
wherein the legislature has determined that
common law actions and principles are inadequate to deal with the social problem. In
response to social conditions, the legislature
has created an entirely new basis to compensate injured persons; the Act should be
so interpreted without reliance on the concepts of traditional tort law.
ELLETT, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of MAUGHAN, J.

[ O g KEYNUMBERSrSTEM>

Archie Clarence PACE, Plaintiff
The majority further cites Sec". 8 of the
and Respondent,
"Act, wherein it is provided in regard to the
-" v various ""benefits'set forth Jri Sec. 6, that
Larry C/PACE et at, Defendants
they' shall be paid on a monthly- basis as
and Appellant
expenses are incurred and that benefits are
overdue if not paid within 35 days after the
'ljNo.14542.;'
insurer receives * "reasonable proof of the
Supreme Court of Utah.
fact and amount of expenses ' incurred"
e
* Since these are general provisions in di.Jan.* 21^1977.
rect conflict with'the specific provision'of
Sec. 6(l)(b)(ii) providing u regardless' of
whether any of these expenses are actually
Mortgagee* brought> foreclosure ^suit
-incurred/',-the majority's interpretation is against mortgagor ^and second mortgagee.
perplexing,
Second mortgagee,filed.a counterclaim on
„ The majority expresses, the.view\that to an-open account to .which the. mortgagee
grant the benefit in the instant case would asserted a defense of accord and satisfacbe a* windfall and against public policy, by tion--.The Third District Court, Salt Lake
broadening coverage, to the detriment of County, Marcellus K. Snow, J., rendered
the public through-J increased insurance summary judgment for the mortgagee on
costs. Basic policy is a legislative determi- the counterclaim and second mortgagee apnation. The selection of a flat rate in place pealed. . The Supreme Court, .Wilkins, J.,
of an individual valuation is a matter spe- held that an issue of material fact existed
cifically within the province of the legisla- aS t o w h e t h e r tViPrp w a c nawmant *~ +1*~
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of the institution to carry on its operations
in secret. Accordingly, the judgment that
the plaintiff and other members of the public are entitled to it is affirmed.12 No costs
awarded.
MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur.
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur in
result.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Louise IVTE and Travelers Insurance
Companies, Defendant and
Appellant
No. 15983.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 7, 1980.
Passenger who sustained severe personal injuries in motor vehicle accident appealed decision of the Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, David K. Winder, J., granting
summary judgment in favor of no-fault insurance carrier for car in which passenger
wasridingin the amount of personal injury
protection benefits paid by it to passenger.
The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that
No-Fault Insurance Act does not confer on
no-fault insurer right of subrogation to
funds received by its insured for personal
injuries in subsequent legal action, but
rather grants the io-fault insurer a limited,
equitable right to seek reimbursement in
arbitration proceeding.against the liability
insurer.
12. We so decide this case on the record as
presented to the district court, and on the basis
of our statutory law. We have taken judicial
notice of the subsequently enacted Chap. 113,
S.L.U.1979, Sec. 5 of which provides that per-

Cause rsessaded.
Ste-rcc. J- filed concurring opinion.
Hall, J- tHed dissenting opinion, in
which Crocket- C. J., concurred.
Crocked C. J-, filed dissenting opinion
in which Hall J- concurred.
L Automobiles «=»251.11
No-Fault Insurance Act confers two
privileges on party who has either insurance
or other accrued security: first, he is granted partial tort immunity, and second, he is
not personally liable for no-fault insurance
benefits paid by insurer; he does, however,
remain liable for customary tort claims not
compensated by such benefits. U.CA.1953,
31-41-5, 31-41-6.
2. Automobiles *=»251.U
Where tort-feasor has complied with
security provisions of No-Fault Insurance
Act, injured party, if entitled to maintain
claim for personal injuries, should plead
only for those damages for which he has not
received reparation under his first-party insurance benefits. U.OA.1953, 31-41-5, 3141-6, 31-41-9(1).
3. Automobiles «=»25L11
Under No-Fault Insurance Act, tortfeasor has partial immunity for general
damages until threshold provisions of injured party's damages are met and no personal liability for payment of the benefits
provided by no-faulfinsurance company, if
he has complied with security requirements
of the Act. U.C.A.1953, 31-41-6, 31-419(2).
4. Insurance <«=» 601.25
No-Fault Insurance Act does not confer
on no-faolt insurer right of subrogation to
funds received by its insured for personal
injuries in subsequent legal action, but
rather grarrt* no-fault insurer a limited,
equitable rfgfct to seek reimbursement in
sonaifcr xsesaofiable salary data of employees of
insan&x*
of higher education is "private informzzfacr « i d subject to disclosure only to
the ttffl provided by the Utah Information
Prac=cas >*3~
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of $7,394.00. Thereafter, Ivie filed an action for damages against James Salisbury,
the driver of the other motor vehicle in5. Subrogation <s=>l
volved in the accident. Salisbury's liability
Subrogation is creature of equity, pur- insurer was Travelers Insurance Company.
pose of which is to work out equitable ad- Allstate declined to join *n or participate in
justment between parties by securing ulti- the lawsuit, although it ksserted it had submate discharge of debt by person who,~ in rogation rights to the extent of the PIP
equity and in good conscience, ought to pay benefits it had paid.
it
The trial of the negligence action was set
6. Insurance <s»512J(l)
for April 11, 1978. In March 1978, TravelIn action for damages against tort-fea-_ ers offered to settle for $44,000. Travelers'
sor brought by claimant who has collected liability was limited to $50,000 under the
benefits from its no-fault insurer, tort-fea- policy. Ivie's counsel was employed tinder a
sor's liability insurer, in fulfilling its duty to contingency fee arrangement, viz., twentyrespond to claims of the injured party to five percent prior to actual trial preparation
limits of its policy, stands in shoes of its and one third if the case were settled immeinsured and pays on the basis of its in- diately before or during the trial, or went
sured's personal liability to injured party, to judgment Additionally, Ivie was reand such personal liability does not include sponsible for all costs and expenses incurred
personal injury protection benefits paid un- in the prosecution of her claim. After reder no fault insurance; therefore, tort vic- viewing the deposition of tort-feasor Salistim's recovery from the liability insurer bury, and further investigation, Ivie detercannot be reduced by personal injury pro- mined there would be a limited opportunity
tection benefits. U.OA.1953, 31-41-6,* 31- to collect a judgment in excess of the liability policy limit of $50,000, although Ivie
41-9(1, 2).
claimed $150,000 in damages. Under these
circumstances, Ivie accepted a settlement of
L. Rich Humpherys of Christensen, Gard- $44,000; thus she limited her attorney's
iner, Jensen & Evans, Salt Lake City, for fees to twenty-five percent Travelers isdefendant and appellant
sued two drafts: one was made payable
jointly
to Allstate and Ivie in the sum* of
L. E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for plain$7,394.00; the other was for the balance" of"
tiff and respondent
the $44,000 settlement Ivie refused to deliver the check for $7,39400 to Allstate, and
MAUGHAN, Justice:
-s-^
Before us is a matter involving our "no- the present action was filed.
fault" insurance act It was resolved, by
In its complaint, Allstate pleaded in the'
summary judgment, in favor of plaintiff alternative that it was entitled to subrogaAllstate Insurance Company. We reverse tion under the contractual terms of the*
and remand. Costs awarded to defendant policy issued on the vehicle in which Ivie*
Ivie.
was a passenger to the extent it had paid
Defendant, hereinafter "Ivie," sustained the PIP benefits, or it was entitled to reim-~
severe personal injuries in a motor vehicle bursement under Section .31-41-11, U.CA.'
accident Allstate Insurance Company, the 1953, enacted in 1973. ^Allstate further
plaintiff herein, was the "no-fault" insur- pleaded for a declaration of its rights"in
ance carrier for the vehicle in which Ivie regard to Ivie's recovery as a result of the*
was a passenger. In compliance with the settlement of her tort action. Allstate
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance "Act, moved for summary Judgment
Section 41, Title 31, U.C.A.1953, as enacted
Ivie opposed the summary judgment on
1973, Allstate paid Ivie PIP (personal injury the ground there were triable issues of fact.
Drotection) benefits amounting to the sum Ivie urged equitable principles apply to subarbitration proceeding against the liability
insurer,
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rogation, and the insured is entitled to be
made whole before the insurer is entitled to
any portion of the recovery from the tortfeasor. Ivie argued she sustained severe
injuries and was compelled to settle for a
sum totally inadequate to compensate her
for the total damages sustained. According
to her argument, to prevail Allstate must
prove it has a greater equity than Ivie,
which, in effect, would require proof Ivie
had received double payment for her medical expenses.1
Ivie further urged, if Allstate were entitled to its subrogation claim, it should contribute to the costs and attorney's fees incurred by Ivie in collecting the claim. Ivie
cites the principle that in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary as set forth by
the terms in a policy of insurance, the insured, who is successful in the recovery of
funds which include money payable by the
.^ „ .- ^ i ^
insuredJ to
an insurance company, ...
is entitled
to deduct attorney fees and other expenses
reasonably and necessarily incurred in making such a recovery from the amount payable to the insurance company.2
The trial court granted AUstate's motion
for summary judgment Specifically, the
court granted Allstate judgment against
Ivie and Travelers jointly and severally in
the sum of $7,394.00. The court declared
Travelers was bound by the provisions of
Section 31-41-11, and Ivie was not entitled
\o an attorney's fee from Allstate.
To resolve the issues between the parties,
it is essential to construe Section 31-41-11;
however, this section cannot be construed in
isolation, but must be correlated with other
pertinent provisions in Chapter 41 of Title
31, Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance
Act. As an aid to the proper construction
of this act, reference to an article by Robert
E. Keeton in the 1973 Utah Law Review is
beneficial, Compensation Systems and
Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 ULR 383.
Therein, it is explained that twenty-one
states have enacted "no-fault" legislation.

These laws are of two typos: fi«t m
add-on statutes; and second the ' •
Ia
*—•• exemption
*-'-- -*-*••*—
tort
statutes. -•
The add-on atat
utes merely add to the notfigence system of
reparations with some kind of no-fault ben
efits to an injured person, without regard to"
fault All tort claims uro preserved under
these statutes, although some provide for
subrogation or offset to avoid double rocov
ery for an item of loss. These add-on laws"
are not regarded as true "no-fault" legiala
taon,
The true "no-fault" inaurance is a typo of
compensation system which couples the
payment of benefits on a no-fault basis
with the partial elimination of fault-b
tort actions for both oconomic loss** *A
pain and suffering. This system jrencr 11
continues to permit fault-based claim f ^
W
pain and suffering in tho more serious
and for economic losses above no-fault be68

1. Transamerica Insurance Company v. Barnes,
29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972); Lyon v.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 25
Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971).

2. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins
Company v. Clinton, 267 Or. 653, 518 ? 2 d ^
M
W5
(1974).
'
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tion at all is not a "no-fault" insurance"
The Utah no-fault statute is a compulsory'
partial tort exemption law coupling ncfault insurance benefits, Section 6, with a
partial elimination of tort claims for bodily
y
injury.
Section 2 of the aci provides:
The purpose of this act is to require the
payment of certain proscribed benefits in
respect to motor vehicle accidents
through either insurance or other ai>-'
proved security, but on the basis of no
fault, preserving, howover, the right of
an, injured person to pursue the customary tort claims where the most serious
type of injuries occur ,
(1) No person for whom direct bene
fit coverage is provided for in this'act
shall be allowed to maintain a cause of
action for general damages arising out
of personal injuries alleged to have
been caused by an automobile accident
except where there has been caused by
this accident any one or more of the
following:
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(a) Death;
(b) Dismemberment or fracture;
(c) Permanent disability;
(d) Permanent disfigurement; or
(e) Medical expenses to a person in excess of $500.
(2) The owner of a motor vehicle
with respect to which security is required by this act who fails to have
such security in effect at the time of an
accident shall have no immunity from
tort liability and shall be personally
liable for the payment of the benefits
provided for under Section 3I-4I-6L
[Emphasis supplied].
[1] Under this statutory plan, first party PIP benefits up to the amounts provided
in Section 6 are paid to an injured person
without regard to fault. Furthermore, the
injured party is precluded from maintaining
an action to recover general damages (all
damages other than those awarded for economic losses),3 except where the threshold
requirements of Section 9(1) are met Under Section 9(2), there are two consequences
to the owner of a motor vehicle who fails to
have the security required by Section^ 5:
first, he has no immunity from tort liability; second, he is personally liable for the
benefits provided under Section 6. "The
only logical inference is that if a party has
the security required under Section 5/the
no-fault insurance act confers two privileges: first, he is granted partial tort immunity; second, he is not personally liable'for
the benefits provided under Section 6.%_He
does, however, remain liable for customary
tort claims, viz., general damages and economic losses not compensated by the benefits paid under Section 6, where the threshold provisions of Section 9(1) are met
[2] There is no provision in the statutory scheme to indicate the tort-feasor who
has complied with the security provisions of
the act, becomes personally liable for the
PIP benefits provided in Section 6, when
the injured party is entitled under the
threshold provisions of Section 9(1) to maintain a claim'for personal injuries. In such a

situation, the injured party should plead
only for those damages for which he has not
received reparation under his first party
insurance benefits. In order to present a
completely factual picture to th* jury, the
injured party may wish to present%evidence
of all his medical bills or other economic
losses. The court, by an appropriate instruction, could explain to the jury that
these economic losses have not been included in the prayer for damages, because the
injured party has previously received reparation under his own no-fault insurance
coverage.
The foregoing interpretation is the only
one consistent with the provisions in Section
9(2). The obvious legislative intent was to
encourage compliance with the security provisions of the act The design to compel
compliance included not only partial toft
exemption, but immunity from personal liability for payment of the benefits provided
for under Section 6.
When Section 9(2) is construed in conjunction with Section 9(1), the legislative
intent emerges.
No person for whom direct benefit coverage is provided for in this act shall be
allowed to maintain a cause of action for
general damages . . . except where
Until the threshold requirements are met;
the injured party is limited to his direct
benefit coverage. If his injuries meet the
threshold requirements, then he may main*
tain a claim for general damages. Tire
term "general damages" is explained as follows:
Another interesting feature of the
Utah law is its distinctive phrasing of the
tort exemption provision, which declares:.
"No person for whom direct benefit cov£
erage is provided for in this act shall be
allowed to maintain a cause of action for
general damages unless one of the threshold requirements is met" -The term
"general damages" is not defined in .the
statute. The tort exemption provisions
of other statutes, rather than referring, to

3. 1973 ULR 383, 392.
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"general damages" have used phrases
such as "pain and suffering" or "pain,
suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience," or have used especially defined
term such as noneconomic detriment.
The terpi "general damages" was often
used, in public discussion of no-fault proposals, as a comprehensive term for elements of tort damages other than economic losses, which were often referred
to as "specials." In view of that usage, it
would seem that "general damages" as
used in the Utah statute includes damages for pain and sufferingo It may reasonably be argued that "general damages" refers more broadly to all damages
other than those awarded for economic
losses and that preclusion of "general
damages" precludes also any award for
disability as such (including for example*
disability to -play golf), as distinguished
from an award reimbursing economic
losses resulting from the disability.4
[3] Thus, under Section 9(1) and (2), the
tort-feasor has partial immunity for general
damages until the threshold provisions are
met and no personal liability for the payment of the benefits provided under Section
6, if he has complied with the security requirements of the act
Section 11 must be construed in connection with the other relevant provisions.
Section 31-41-11 provides:
(1) Every insurer authorized to write
the insurance required by this act shall
agree as a condition to being allowed to
continue to write insurance in the State
of Utah;
(a) That where its insured is or
would be legally liable for the personal
injuries sustained by any person to
whom benefits required under this act
have been paid by another insurer, including the state insurance fund, it will
reimburse such other insurer for the
payment of such benefits, but not in
excess of the amount of damages so
recoverable, and

(b) That the issue of liability for
such reimbursement and the amount of
same shall be decided by mandatory,
binding arbitration between the insurers.
Section 11 is not a model of clarity. A
degree of confusion has been generated by
the subtitle to this section supplied by the
publisher of the Utah Code Annotated, The
Allen Smith Company. The subtitle reads:
"Subrogation rights and arbitration between insurers." In contrast, the subtitle
in the session laws, Laws of Utah, 1973,
Regular Session, Chapter 55, reads: "Conditions insurers to abide by."
In reference to Section 11, Keeton
states: 5
The Utah law preserves subrogationlike rights of reimbursement among nofault insurers. That is, after an insurer
pays no-fault benefits, it is entitled to
reimbursement from the insurer of a negligent driver who would have been liable
in tort to the injured person but for the
partial tort exemption. These claims for
reimbursement are declared to be subject
to mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. This would appear to
be an undesirable preservation of fault
based claims among insurers. It may
happen, however, that the provision will
fall into disuse in practice. For example,
two insurers with a large volume of
claims against each other may agree to
square accounts periodically on an actuarial basis, or even to forego these reimbursement claims against each other altogether, because it would be cheaper for
both'to do so.
The state of Oregon has a provision similar to Section 11, viz., ORS 743.825. It
should be emphasized that Oregon has an
add-on statute with no partial tort exemption.6 Oregon further requires the injured
person to include in his claim or legal action
the benefits furnished by the insurer, ORS
743.828{3)(b). By a separate statute, there
is a provision in Oregon for subrogation.
ORS 743.830 provides:

4. Id. p. 392.

6. Id. p. 386.

5. Id. at pp. 392-393.
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If a motor vehicle liability insurer has
furnished personal injury protection benefits . . .
(1) The insurer is entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that
may result from the exercise of any
rights of recovery of the injured person
against any person legally responsible for
the accident, to the extent of such benefits furnished by the insurer less the'Jnsurer's share of expenses, costs and attorney fees incurred by the injured person in
connection with such recovery.
(2) The injured person shall hold. in
trust for the benefit of the insurer, all
such rights of recovery which he has, but
only to the extent of such benefits furnished.
(3) The injured person shall do whatever is proper to secure, and shall do nothing after loss to prejudice, such rights.
(4) If requested in writing by the,insurer, the injured person shall .take,
through any representative not in conflict
in interest with him designated by the
insurer, such action as may be necessary
or appropriate to recover such benefits
furnished as damages from such responsible person, such action to be taken in the
name of the injured person, but only to
the extent of the benefits furnished~by
the insurer. In the event of a recovery,
the insurer shall also be'reimbursedTout
.of such recovery for the injured person's
share of expenses, costs and attorney fees
incurred.by the insurer in connection
with the recovery.
(5) In calculating respective shares of
expenses, costs and attorney fees unSer
this section, the basis of allocation shall
be the respective proportions borne to the
total recovery by:
(a) Such benefits furnished by tfce insurer; and
(b) The total recovery less (a).
(6) The injured person shall execute
and deliver to the insurer such instruments and papers as may be appropriate
to secure the rights and obligations of the
insurer and him as established by this
section.

(7) Any provisions in a motor vehicle
liability insurance policy or health insurance policy giving rights to the insurer
relating to subrogation or the subject
matter of this section shall be construed
and applied in accordance withtfhe provisions of this section.
[4] This latter section would be a redundancy if Section 743.825 of the Oregon code
provided for subrogation by the no-fault
insurer to its insured, when such insured
received a settlement or judgment for personal injuries. Similarly, Section 11 in the
Utah No-Fault Insurance Act cannot be
interpreted as conferring on the no-fault
insurer a right of subrogation to the funds
received byits insured for personal injuries.
Section 11 grants the no-fault insurer a
limited, equitable right to seek reimbursement in arbitration proceeding against the
liability insurer. Section 11 cannot be
deemed as conferring subrogation rights on
the no-fault insurer, vis-a-vis its insured as
to his recovery in a settlement or legal
action.
[5] The nature and purpose of subrogation should be reviewed. Subrogation is a
creature of equity, its purpose is to work
out an equitable adjustment between the
parties by securing the ultimate discharge
of a debt by the person who, in equity and
in good conscience, ought to pay it Subrogation has a dual basis—". . . when
the insurer has made payment for the loss
caused by a third party, it is only equitable
and just that the insurer should be reimbursed for his payment to the insured, because otherwise either the insured would be
unjustly enriched by virtue of a recovery
from both the insurer "and the third party,
or in the absence of such double recovery by
the insured, the third party would go free
notwithstanding the fact that he has a legal
obligation in connection with the damage.7"
[6] Under the Utah No-Fault Insurance
Act, the tort-feasor who has the required
security, is not personally liable to the in-
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jured person for payment of Section 6 benefits, Section 9(2); therefore, the tort-feasor
has no personal legal obligation to reimburse the injured party's insurer. On the
other h&hd, the tort-feasor's liability insurer, in fulfilling its duty to respond to the
claims of the injured party to the limits of
its policy, stands in the shoes of its insured
and pays on the basis of its insured's personal liability to the tort victim; this personal liability does not include PIP payments. Thus, the tort victim's recovery
from the liability insurer cannot be reduced
by the PIP payments. If the victim's recovery be reduced by the amount of the
PIP payments by granting his no-fault insurer a right of subrogation, it is the nofault insurer who receives double recovery.
This is so because the insurer receives a
premium for the benefits, and then receives
full reimbursement, while the liability insurance available to recompense the victim
is depleted by payments for which the liability insurer is not responsible to the victim.
In the instant action, Allstate has no
right of subrogation to the recovery of Ivie,
and the trial court erred in its ruling. The
cause is remanded with an order to enter
judgment in favor of Ivie in the amount of
$7,394.00, the sum representing the PIP
payments. However, Allstate is not precluded from claiming reimbursement from
Travelers in an arbitration proceeding.
WILKINS, J., concurs.
STEWART, Justice (concurring):
I concur in the opinion of Justice Maughan and add the following comments in
explanation of my position.
The Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, § 31-41-1, et seg., U.C.A. (1953),
as amended, is neither clear nor specific
with respect to the relative rights of a
no-fault insurer in an insured's recovery
from a third-party tortfeasor. Accordingly,
it is our obligation to construe the Act to
effectuate the purposes set out in §
31-41-2. That provision, in part, provides:
The intention of the legislature is hereby
to possibly stabilize, if not effectuate cer-

tain savings in, the rising costs of automobile accident insurance and to effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of
handling the greater bulk of the personal
injury claims that arise out of automobile
accidents, these being those not involving
great amounts of damages.
Contrary to the view of the dissenting
opinion in this case, the result reached by a
majority of the Court will not result in
double recovery to an injured person. It
will, on the other hand, result in greater
efficiency, accuracy and fairness in determining the relative rights of the interested
parties. Also, it will have the beneficial
effect of reducing the possibilities for controversy and litigation between no-fault insurers and their insureds.
Pursuant to the majority opinion, a nofault insured in an action against a tortfeasor may not recover from the tortfeasor
any sums already paid by the nofault insurer. Thus, double recovery by an insured
is in fact barred. The no-fault insurer, by
being subrogated to the rights of the insured as provided by § 31-41—11, has a
right to collect directly from the tortfeasor's insurer (whether or not the insured
party has filed a tort claim) by way of
arbitration pursuant to § 31-41—11. If the
injured party files an action against the
third-party tortfeasor which results in a
judgment for the insured, the judgment
would be given dispositive effect on the
issue of fault and the relative liabilities of
the insurance companies in the arbitration
proceedings, for it is in the arbitration proceedings that the no-fault insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured. Because
the insurance company stands in privity
with its insured, principles of res judicata
and collateral estoppel dictate as much. In
cases which do not go to judgment because
of a settlement, the no-fault insurer and the
tortfeasor's insurer may be able to use the
settlement agreement and amount as a
guide in settling liability for the no-fault
payments. If no voluntary settlement is
recorded, the arbitration apparatus may be
used to settle the dispute. No doubt the
insurance companies will be able in most
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cases to settle the accounts between them- reached is often unascertainable. The probselves without resort to formal proceedings. lem is even more difficult when dealing
This procedure comports with the language with a general verdict because it is impossible to determine what damage factors are
and intent of § 31-41-11.
On the other hand, a construction of the included in a general verdict Because of
Act which subrogates the insurer to .the the failure to segregate and identify damrights of the insured in a judicial proceed- age items, subrogation may not be an effecing would render meaningless the arbitra- tive remedy to prevent double recovery on
the one hand, and to insure the victim the
tion provisions of the Act, lead to insuperafull value of his lawsuit on the other.
ble practical difficulties in making an equiThese difficulties are avoided if the pertable allocation between the insurance company and its insured, and "increased litiga- sonal injury protection payments made to
the insured are not a recoverable damage
tion and its attendant costs..
item in an action by the insured against the
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Barnes,
tortfeasor—whether the action results in a
29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972), this settlement or a judgment
Court held that an insurer's claim under a
The interpretation of the Act adopted by
right of subrogation to a portion of the
a
majority of the Court has the further
proceeds from a settlement made by the
insured with a third-party tortfeasor was a merit of avoiding serious problems with rematter which had to be proyed on a record spect to legal representation of the insured
with evidence showing that the. item .of and the insurance company. If the same
damage sought to be recovered was in fact counsel represents both parties in settleincluded in the settlement sum. The court ment negotiations, conflicts of interest may
well arise in determining, for example,
stated that the insurer must:
whether or not to settle a lawsuit or to
present proof which establishes press for a larger recovery by way of a jury
that the damages covered by defendant's verdict and, of course, run the risk of no
settlement were the same or cover those recovery at all. On the other hand, if both
for which defendant has already received the insurance company and the insured are
indemnity from [insurer]; otherwise, the to be represented by independent counsel in
receipt of payment from the tort-feasor pressing the claim against the third-party
does not entitle the [insurer] to the,,re- tortfeasor, conflict in many cases is.likely.
turn of the payments made by it:,[29
In sum, the most effective and least costUtah 2d at 10&-O7, 505 P.2d at.,787J
ly way of dealing with the relative rights of
It the no-fault insurer were accorded a the insured and the no-fault insurer in a
right of subrogation in amounts recovered recovery from a third party is to require
in its insured's tort action against a third- each party to pursue its own remedy. The
party tortfeasor, insuperable problems insured may sue for all damages less the
would arise. The most conspicuous problem amount paid by the no-fault insurer. The
would arise with respect to the settlements no-fault insurer has a right to protect its
of an action T>y an insured against the tort- interests in an arbitration proceeding if
feasor and the allocation of the settlement that be necessary. To prevent double reamong the insured and his no-fault insurer. covery, the no-fault amounts are not recovSettlements are almost always compromis- erable by the victim either in a settlement
es, and they are often negotiated on a or in a litigated judgment This approach
lump-sum basis without particular damage will have the effect of reducing litigation^
items being dealt with individually. Refer- attorney's fees, and the cost of automobile
ence to particular damage items may not be accident insurance.
made in the course of settlement discusHALL, Justice (dissenting):
sions, and if each particular damage item is
discussed, the value, if any, accorded a parThere is nothing about this case that warticular damage item in the ultimate sum rants a denarture from T/in<T.^cfokKoVi^
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principles of subrogation. In adopting a
contrary view, the majority not only ignores the language of the Utah Automobile
No-Fault Act l which specifically preserves
subrogation rights, but also ignores the
recent unanimous ruling of this Court in
Jones v. Transamerica Insurance Co.*
wherein we specifically recognized that the
Act 3 preserved subrogation rights between
insurers whenever no-fault benefits are
paid.
The pure and simple facts of this case are
wholly supportive of the summary judgment appealed from. Ivie chose to compromise her claim against the tortfeasor by
accepting the sum of $44,000 in full settlement thereof. Prior to the settlement,
Travelers duly advised Ivie of its intention
to include Allstate on its settlement draft
and thereby satisfy its statutory obligation
to reimburse Allstate for its advance of
$7,394 in PIP payments. Indeed, at the
time of settlement, it issued a separate
draft for the exact sum of said PIP payments ($7,394), payable jointly to Ivie and
Allstate.
Travelers is not a party to this appeal and
Ivie makes no further claim against it, conceding that the only matter in dispute is her
entitlement to the said $7,394. Hence, for
this Court to award said sum to her and
then to cavalierly suggest that Travelers is
obligated to pay over an additional sum of
$7,394 to Allstate by way of reimbursement,
constitutes a grave injustice., Such a result
was not sought, nor even contemplated, by
the parties, least of all by Travelers, which
is not present to defend its interests.
Notwithstanding the assertion of the majority to the contrary, the net effect of its
holding is to afford Ivie a double recovery
of PIP payments at the unbargained for
.expense of Travelers. " In addition, it deprives Travelers of the benefit of its bargain struck with Ivie and increases its obligation from $44,000 to $51,394, by judicial
fiat.
1. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-1, et seq.
2. Utah, 592 P.2d 609 (1979).

I have no particular apprehension as to
the application of the new rule of law to
future cases since its practical, dollars and
cents effect would appear to be no different
than if the doctrine of subrogation were
adhered to. In a judicial proceeding, the
court will simply no longer make an award
for damages already compensated by PIP
payments, and, similarly, in negotiating a
settlement of a lawsuit, an insurer will no
doubt "short" his settlement offer by a sum
adequate to cover its reimbursement obligation for PIP payments advanced by the
insurer of the injured party.
On the other hand, applying the new rule
of law in the present case causes me considerable concern for it effects a highly
unjust and harsh result The majority
would be better advised to abide by the
so-called "Sunburst Doctrine" 4 and thereby
make the change in the law prospective
only.
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (supplemental
dissent):
I join in Justice Hall's dissent and would
affirm the decision of the trial court
The main objective of insurance is to
provide a fair and honest recoupment of
losses suffered, and not to "provide a basis
for parlaying the loss into a double recovery
for all or part of the damages thus suffered.
The purpose of the No-Fault Insurance
Act is to effectuate a more efficient method
of handling minor claims arising from automobile accidents which do not involve great
amounts of damages; and to provide a
means for the prompt payment of certain
minimal losses without regard to fault and
thus without litigation, in order to effectuate certain savings in the rising costs of
automobile accident insurance.1 It should
be realized that if the double recovery per4. Laid down in the case of Great Northern Ry.
Co. v. Sunburst Oil Co.t 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct
145, 77 L.£d. 360, cited in Rubalcava v. Gisse-
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mitted by the main opinion is allowed, it
could not do other than increase, rather
than decrease, the total costs of insuranceIt requires little reflection to see that the
majority decision results in an injustice to
defendant Travelers. In treating a similar
situation in the case of Transamerica Ins.
Co. v. Barnes* this Court stated that "If
the settlement were intended to include
plaintiffs prior medical expenses, two
drafts should have been issued, one to plain*
tiff and defendant jointly and one to defendant alone." * That is the exact procedure followed by Travelers in this instance.
It cannot fairly be questioned that the negotiations between Mrs. Ivie and Travelers
were made in awareness that Travelers was
obligated to reimburse Allstate for the
$7,394 PIP payments which Mrs. Ivie had
already received; nor that she agreed to
accept $44,000 from Travelers to discharge
its total liability. This is confirmed by two
facts: first, Travelers' policy limit was $50,000; and it would make no sense to agree
to pay $44,000, plus the obligation to reimburse Allstate for the $7,394 PIP payments,
which would thus exceed Travelers' policy
limits. Second, by the fact that Travelers
issued the two separate drafts, one for the
$7,394 payable to Allstate and Mrs. Ivie and
the other for $36,606 to Mrs. Ivie, just as
this Court directed in the Barnes case, supra.
Under the facts as they appear in this
case, it is discordant to my ideas of law and
justice to require Travelers to pay the $44,000 to satisfy the claims of Mrs. Ivie and of
Allstate, then also be required to pay the
$7,394 to Allstate to reimburse it for that
portion Allstate had already paid of Mrs.
Ivie's damages. That plainly and simply
results in injustice: it increases Travelers'
obligation by $7,394 more than it agreed to
pay; and it allows Mrs. Ivie double recovery
by awarding her that much more than" she
had agreed to accept.
There would seem to be no problem with
the proposition espoused in the main opinion if the facts had been different I* Al—

parties had negotiated their settlement
with an understanding that Travelers was
to reimburse Allstate for the PIP benefits it
had paid, and that any settlement arrived
at was in addition thereto, no unfairness or
injustice would result But that does not
appear to be the facts here. If such an
understanding is to be the condition of negotiations, it should be so understood by the
parties, and effective on only a prospective
basis by applying the "Sunburst Doctrine,"
referred to by Justice HalL
HALL, J., also concurs in the supplemental dissent of CROCKETT, C. J.
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ST, PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE,
Defendant and Respondent
No. 16080.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 8, 198a
Commercial automobile liability policy
insurer brought declaratory judgment action to determine extent of liability incurred by it and by comprehensive general
liability policy insurer arising out of the
death "of employee of construction company
and each party also sought declaration that
coverage afforded by policy of other was
primary coverage. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J.,
granted comprehensive policy insurer's motion for summary judgment and adjudged
that policy issued by plaintiff provided pri-
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It is now well established that the trial
court has power to summarily enforce on
motion a settlement agreement entered
into by the litigants while the litigation is
pending before it. Quite obviously, so
simple and speedy a remedy serves well
the policy favoring compromise, which in
turn has made a major contribution to its
popularity.
Yet it is apparent that the summary
procedure for enforcement of unperformed settlement contracts is not a panacea for the myriad types of problems
that may arise. The summary procedure
is admirably suited to situations where,
for example, a binding settlement bargain is conceded or shown, and the excuse
for nonperformance is comparatively unsubstantial. On the other hand, it is illsuited to situations presenting complex
factual issues related either to the formation or the consummation of the contract,
which only testimonial exploration in a
more plenary proceeding is apt to satisfactorily resolve. [Citations omitted.]
The case at hand is not one in which
complex factual issues are presented; here,
a "binding settlement bargain is conceded
or shown, and the excuse for nonperformance is comparatively unsubstantial."

Utah County, George E, Ballif, J., which
denied him right to recover certain benefits
under contract of no-fault insurance issued
in conformance with Automobile No-Fault
Insurance Act. The Supreme Court, Hall,
J., held that: (1) insured, who earned more
than $150 per week during period for which
he sought compensation but whose income
allegedly was 25% less than what it would
have been had the accident never occurred,
was not "disabled" for purposes of loss of
earnings benefits nor for purposes of household services benefits under the Act, and (2)
by entering into settlement agreement with
his tort-feasors, whereunder insured released him from all personal injury claims
as well as property damage, insured cut off
insurer's subrogation rights under the Act,
notwithstanding attempted "specific exclusion" relating to no-fault benefits; thus,
insured was foreclosed from seeking additional benefits from insurer.
Affirmed.

1. Insurance <§=»531.4
Under Automobile No-Fault Insurance
Act, an injured person will not be permitted
to recover from an insurance carrier over
and above what carrier has previously paid
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, HALL in benefits once he has successfully recovand STEWART, JJ., concur.
ered from his tort-feasor for personal injuries. U.C.A. 1953, 31-41-1 et seq.
2. Insurance <s=»531.4
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act
has no application to property damage
claims. U.C.A. 1953, 31-41-1 et seq.
Elmer G. JONES, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 15809.
Supreme Court of Utah.

3. Insurance <s=» 531.4
Term "disability" within meaning of
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act means
an inability to work as contrasted with
term "physical impairment," which generally refers to loss of bodily function. U.C.A.
1953,31-41-1 etseq.
See publication Words and Phrases
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compensation but whose income allegedly County, Utah, while on a sales trip to Caliwas 25% less than what it would have been fornia. He experienced little pain at the
had the accident never occurred, was not time of the accident and continued on his
"disabled" for purposes of loss of earnings sales trip. It was not until he returned
benefits nor for purposes of household serv- home to Orem, Utah, on February 21,1974,
ices benefits under Automobile No-Fault that he consulted one Dr. Jacobs, an orthoInsurance Act U.OA. 1953, 31 41~6(l)(b). pedic surgeon. He then absented himself
from his employment until March 10,1974,
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
when he returned to work and has worked
definitions.
continuously since that time. Shortly after
the accident, plaintiff applied for various
5. Insurance <s=>60L25
By° entering into settlement agreement no-fault benefits under his insurance policy.
with his tort-feasors, whereunder insured Defendant insurer paid the charges of Dr.
released them from all personal injury Jacobs, and other medical expenses totallclaims as well as property damage, insured ing $365.63. Defendant also paid plaintiff
cut off insurer's subrogation rights under $567.89 in disability benefits for the period
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, not- of February 21 through March 9,1974. 6n
withstanding attempted "specific exclusion" September 5, 1975 (approximately 18
relating to no-fault benefits; thus, insured months later), plaintiff presented an addiwas foreclosed from seeking additional ben- tional claim to defendant for $2,485.36 repefits from insurer. U.C.A. 1953, 31 41 1 resenting lost earnings from a reduction in
earning capacity based on a claim that he
et seq.
was partially disabled (25 percent) for a
period of 47 weeks following the injury.
6. Insurance <s=»60L2
Fact that insured entered into settle- Shortly thereafter, plaintiff claimed an adment with his tort-feasors whereby he re- ditional $4,380.00 for inability to perform
leased them from all claims for personal household services, the maximum allowable
injuries and property damage did not pre- under the Act At the same time as these
clude insurer from seeking reimbursement further claims for disability were made
from" tort-feasor's insurer. U.C.A. 1953, upon defendant, plaintiff also entered inio
settlement negotiations with his tortfeasors.
31-41-11.
Defendant refused to pay these subsequent
claims; however, plaintiff entered into a
D. John Mussleman, of Stott, Young & settlement agreement with his tortfeasors
Wilson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and on January 3, 1976. For the consideration
of $6,000.00, plaintiff released his tortappellant.
Raymond M. Berry, of Snow, Christensen feasors of any and all claims he may have
& Martineau, Salt Lake City, for defendant had against them for personal injury as
well as property damage.
and respondent.
On August 3, 1977, plaintiff filed a comHALL, Justice:
plaint against defendant for having refused
Plaintiff appeals from a summary judg- to pay the later disability claims, asserting
ment denying him the right to recoverben- that he had a legal right to compensation
efits under a contract of "no-fault" insur- for loss of gross income and reimbursement
ance issued in conformance with the Utah for his inability to perform household servAutomobile No-Fault Insurance Act,1 (here- ices.2 He sought punitive damages for deinafter "Act").
fendant's failtfre to pay.
After both parties moved for summary
On February 13, 1974, plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident in Kane judgment, the trial court ruled as follows:
1. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-1 et seq.

2. U.C.A.. 1953. 31-^l-6(IXb).
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It is the opinion of this Court that the
intent of the No-Fault Act was to provide
benefits to those sustaining less serious
injuries in automobile accidents, but to
allow those sustaining more serious injuries the right to proceed against the party
at fault without limitation as to amounts
recoverable, but that the person would
not be entitled to both recovery under the
No-Fault Act and a suit against and recovery from the tort feasor.
[1] On appeal, the parties choose not to
squarely address the basis of the trial
court's decision but focus instead on peripherally related matters. Basically the court's
ruling is correct. The whole tenor of the
Act is that an injured person will not be
permitted to recover from an insurance carrier (over and above what the carrier has
previously paid in benefits) once he has
successfully recovered from his tortfeasor
for personal injuries. Any other interpretation .would be to permit double damage
recovery.
[2] The Act mandates3 that every resident ^owner of a registered motor vehicle
maintain either insurance or other approved
security thereon.4 It is designed to totally
eliminate claims for injuries5 of lesser consequence which fail to meet a basic "threshold'! test set forth in the statute 6 and proyides for the payment of benefits by one's
own insurer without regard to fault.7
No-fault benefits are also available to
those who sustain greater injuries. This is
Sfceven though they remain free to pursue
aLtort claim as well.8 However, this does
noi entitle one to a double recovery for a
single loss since the statute specifically affords subrogation rights and arbitration be-

tween insurers whenever no-fault benefits
are paid.9
A fortiori, the legislative intent specifically expressed in the Act itself to '^possibly
stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings
in, the rising costs of automobile accident
insurance and to effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of handling the
greater bulk of the personal injury claims
that arise out of automobile accidents"10
negatives the contention that double recovery is permitted. Double recovery for a
single item of loss was never contemplated
by the legislature u and we will not permit
any type of automatic reward or "windfall"
to an injured plaintiff.12
Specific points raised on appeal concern
the validity of the disability claims plaintiff
made upon defendant in 1975. Plaintiff
argues that by wrongfully refusing to pay
the benefits sought, defendant had tortiously breached the insurance contract, thereby
giving rise to a claim for punitive damages.
Defendant counters with two main arguments: 1) that the refusal to pay the disability benefits was justified in that plaintiff was not "disabled"; and 2) that by
settling with his tortfeasors, plaintiff had
chosen his remedy and had cut off defendant's subrogation rights as provided by statute. With these contentions we agree.
[3,4] The benefits contemplated by the
Act are phrased in terms of "disability" not
in terms of "physical impairment." The
former is generally understood to mean the
inability to work, whereas the latter refers
to the loss of bodily function.13 Plaintiff
concedes that he was able to work during
the period for which compensation is sought

** U.C.A.. 1953, 31-41-4(1).

10. Supra, footnote 4.

^

11. See Compensation Systems and Utah's NoFault Statute, Keeton, 1973 Utah Law Review
383.

U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-2.

«• The act has absolutely no application to property damage claims. See U.C.A., 1953, 31-412.
*

U.C.A., 1953,31-41-9.

12. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., Utah,
559 P.2d 958 (1977).

7

* Supra, footnote 4.

$• Ibid.
s

- U.C.A.. 1953.31-41-11.

13. See 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation
§ 296.
D ^ « « Q-7
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but argues that his income was 25 percent
less than what it would have been had" the
accident never occurred. The Act limits
disability benefits for loss of earnings to a
maximum of $150 per week and plaintiff
admittedly earned more than $150 per week
during the entire time for which benefits
were claimed. He does not, therefore, fall
within the "disability" coverage. Likewise,
if not disabled for purposes of loss of earnings benefits, neither is he disabled for purposes of household services benefits. Indeed, the Act was never intended to give an
injured plaintiff a windfall or extra income
as a benefit for having had an accident.14
[5,6] Notwithstanding the foregoing
analysis, defendant's second argument is
dispositive of this appeal. As indicated snpra, in 1974 plaintiff received no-fault benefits totalling $933.52.15 In 1976, plaintiff
accepted $6,000.00 from his tortfeasors as
additional recovery and released them of
any further claims for personal injury and
property damage. Plaintiff asserts that the
specific exclusion in the release agreement
preserved any no-fault claims which may be
made against the tortfeasors. He also
makes various intimations that the recovery
from the tortfeasors is not the same as the
disability sought from the insurance carrier.
For example, in his brief on appeal, plaintiff suggests that the portion of the
$6,000.00 to be allocated for personal injury
should be determined by "a court" which
would then "offset" any insurance claim.
No such motion or other request for apportionment was ever made. Before the trial
court, plaintiff urged that he may well be
prohibited from suing his tortfeasors for his
injuries, (due to the "threshold" requirements discussed supra), and therefore the
14.

Supra, footnote 12.

15. The trial judge correctly ruled that any
rights defendant may have for reimbursement
for this amount from the tortfeasor's insurer
under U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-11 is unaffected by
the settlement and by this action.
16.

U.C.A., 1953. 31-41-11 provides as follows:
Subrogation rights and arbitration between
insurers.—(1) Every insurer authori:

$6,000.00 must have been tendered as a
release from only property damage liability.
We cannot adopt plaintiffs arguments.
Plaintiff accepted the $6,000.00 from his
tortfeasors as additional recovery in lieu of
any further insurance benefits to which he
might have been entitled- This agreement
expressly releases plaintiffs claim against
the tortfeasors for known and unknown
personal injuries as well as for property
damage arising from the accident As indicated supra, defendant insurer is subrogated, to the rights of plaintiff in asserting a
claim against the tortfeasors' insurers in
recovering benefits based upon liability.16
The rights to which the subrogee succeeds
can be no greater than those of the person
for whom he is substituted.17 By executing
the release, plaintiff discharged the tortfeasors of any and all liability, notwithstanding the attempted "specific exclusion"
relating to no-fault benefits. By so doing,
plaintiff has chosen his recovery and cannot
now successfully assert a claim against his
insurer.
The above discussion being dispositive of
the issue of the availability of further nofault benefits, defendant has not breached
its contractual obligations with plaintiff to
give rise to a claim for punitive damages.
The summary judgment is therefore affirmed. Costs to defendant.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur.
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agree as a condition to being allowed to continue to write insurance in the state of Utah:
(a) That where its insured is or would be
held legally liable for the personal injuries
sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under this act have been paid by
another insurer, including the state insurance
fund, it will reimburse such other insurer for
the payment of such benefits, but not in excess of the amount of damages so recoverable.
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the contract would be unconscionable.1
Nevertheless, the issue was not raised below, nor on this appeal. Consequently, I
concur in affirming the judgment.

Clarice DUPUIS (Heater), Plaintiff and
Appellant and Cross-Respondent,
v.
Edwin Cyrill NIELSON, Defendant and
Respondent and Cross-Appellant
No. 16865.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 21, 1981.
Driver of car, upon recovery against
driver of pickup in personal injury action
based on automobile accident, filed motion
for additur or new trial based on inadequate damages. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr.,
J., denied motion, and driver of car appealed. Pickup driver cross-appealed claiming
right of setoff, The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) evidence did not compel finding that reasonable persons would
have reached different measure of damages
which would have enabled court to grant
motion for additur, and (2) pickup driver
was not entitled to reduction of car driver's
award of general damages to offset nofault insurance payment for household service benefits.
Affirmed.
1. New Trial <s=> 161(1)
When damages are not so inadequate
as to indicate disregard of evidence by jury,
court is not empowered to entertain motion
for additur. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
59.
See Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243

2. New Trial
161(1)
Evidence, in personal injury action arising from automobile accident, including evidence that injured party was under stress
for reasons unrelated to accident, did not
compel finding that reasonable persons
would have reached different measure of
damages such as would empower court to
entertain motion for additur. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59.
3. Automobiles <s=*251.12
Basic principle of No-Fault Act is to
prevent double recovery by no-fault insured. U.C.A.1953, 31-41-1 et seq.
4. Automobiles <s=>251.17
Where jury award to car driver in personal injury action based on automobile accident did not include award for household
service benefits, pickup driver involved in
accident was not entitled to reduction of car
driver's award of general damages to offset
no-fault insurance payments made for
household service benefits. U.C.A.1953, 3141-11.
Samuel King and James E. Hawkes, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant and
cross-respondent.
Frank N. Karras, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent and cross-appellant.
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiff, upon recovering against defendant in a personal injury action, filed a
motion for an additur or new trial based on
inadequate damages. It is from the lower
court's denial of that motion that plaintiff
herein appeals.
The accident in which the alleged damages were sustained occurred when defendant was driving his pick-up truck and
struck the rear of plaintiffs car which had
stopped at an intersection for a red light.
A directed verdict on the issue of liability
was entered in favor of plaintiff at the
conclusion of all evidence.
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The jury awarded appellant $1,000 in
general damages; $686.73 in special medical
damages; and $100 for loss of earnings. In
support of her contention that the damages
were grossly inadequate, plaintiff refers to
the following evidence: She received medical treatment from two physicians, one
physical therapist, and one chiropractor.
She maintains that she was forced to leave
her employment a couple of months after
the accident in order to convalesce. At the
time of trial she was working with her
husband painting signs and was not able to
pursue her former employment as a bus
driver because of her injuries. She further
testified that she suffered continual headaches, pain when bending her neck, and
pain in performing simple tasks such as
opening jars and dressing herself.
Defendant, of course, argues that the
jury's award of damages was not inadequate. In support of the jury verdict, defendant points to the following evidence:
(1) Of all the doctors who allegedly had
treated plaintiff, only Dr. Thomas Soderberg was produced at trial, a doctor whom
she had visited on only a few occasions. No
physician testified that plaintiff could not
work because of injuries sustained in the
accident; the only evidence on this issue
was appellant's testimony. (2) Plaintiffs
testimony further disclosed that during the
period in question she was undergoing emotional problems arising from a divorce, she
had remarried, and her husband had experienced a heart attack. Defendant contends
that the above circumstances required
plaintiff to leave the area and that was the
reason for her quitting her job. (3) Medical
records demonstrated that plaintiff was under stress for reasons unrelated to the accident.

are not so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of the evidence by the jury, a court is
not empowered to entertain a motion for an
additur. Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs contention that the
award of damages is inadequate in light of
the evidence is without merit The evidence does not compel a finding that reasonable persons would have reached a different measure of damages. Jensen v. Eakins, Utah, 575 P.2d 179 (1978).
On a cross-appeal defendant claims a
right of set-off.1 Prior to trial, plaintiffs
own no-fault insurer paid plaintiff no-fault
benefits pursuant to §§ 31-41-1 et seq. of
the No-Fault Act. Defendant's insurer, in
accordance with § 31-41-11, reimbursed the
no-fault insurer in the sum of $494.09 for
medical expenses; $1,200 for loss of earnings; and $708 for loss of household services. As a result the trial court reduced the
judgment against defendant to reflect sums
received by plaintiff from her no-fault insurer for medical expenses and loss of earnings, leaving a balance due plaintiff of
$192.64 for special damages. The court refused to award any offset against the general damage part of the verdict for the $708
which defendant's insurer had paid the nofault insurer as reimbursement for household service benefits. Defendant contends
that the court erred in this refusal. We
disagree.
[3] Several cases recently decided by
this Court have dealt with the respective
rights of an injured party, the tortfeasor, a
no-fault insurer, and the tortfeasor's insurer. Street v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, Utah,
609 P.2d 1343 (1980); Allstate v. Jv/e, Utah,
606 P.2d 1197 (1980); Jones v. Transamerica
Ins. Co^ Utah, 592 ?J2d 609 (1979). These
cases are predicated upon the proposition
that a basic principle of the No-Fault Act is
to prevent double recovery by the no-fault
insured.

[1,2] It has been held that this Court
may order an additur or in the alternative a
new trial in appropriate circumstances. Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d
[4] To the extent that plaintiff would
826 (1958). However, when the damages receive double recovery of a particular type
1. Defendant's claim is misnamed. The concept
of a set-off does not apply to the instant circumstances, see Robison v. Robison, c

Transit Co., 46 Utah 426, 151 P. 49 (1915). The
rights claimed belong to defendant's insurer,
* ~~ defendant

WALKER v. STATE

Utah 687

Citeas,Utatf» 624R2d687

of damage, an adjustment of the judgment
vev \Ja\s> ^aa& ^^s» fe^TO^rafe. \LW*%N%T, t\>fe
judgment may only be reduced to the extent it specifically and identifiably included
special damages of the same types as those
for which no-fault benefits had previously
been received. This is consonant with the
basic procedure outlined in Allstate v. Ivie,
supra. Under Allstate a judgment for
damages may only reflect damages suffered
over and above those particular types of
damages reimbursed by the no-fault insurer. Defendant is not entitled to a reduction
of plaintiffs award of general damages to
offset no-fault insurance payments for different types or categories of damages. See
Transamerica Insurance Company v.
Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972);
see also Street v. Farmers Ins. Exchange,
supra, wherein a similar factual situation
arose and the same result was reached.
Also see Brophy v. Ogden Rapid Transit
Company, 46 Utah 426, 151 P. 49 (1915).
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.
HALL and CROCKETT,* JJ., and MAURICE HARDING, Retired District Judge,
concur.
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate
herein; HARDING, Retired District Judge,
sat.
WILKINS, J., heard the arguments but
resigned before the opinion was filed.

Willie Mae WALKER, aka Dell Walker
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

STATE of Utah, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 16705.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 23, 1981.
Defendant was convicted of unlawful
possession of controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, and following
her later discovery that prosecution was
made aware of and failed to disclose during
trial certain evidence favorable to her defense, she petitioned for writ of coram nobis
or in the alternative writ of habeas corpus.
Tne Tmr& district Zonti, %£ti Y ^ e Zomiiy,
Peter F. Leary, J., denied her petition, and
she appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan, C. J., held that: (1) prosecutor's action in failing to disclose contradicting testimony to plaintiff or court and his reliance
on false impression created by original testimony in both closing argument and summation to jury constituted prosecutorial
misconduct analogous to knowing use of
false testimony; (2) there existed reasonable likelihood that false impression fostered
by prosecutor could have affected judgment
of jury; and (3) prosecutor's actions deprived defendant of fair trial and constituted denial of due process.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Hall, J., dissented and filed opinion.
L Criminal Law <s=>706(2)
Any conviction obtained by knowing
use of false testimony is fundamentally unfair and totally incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice.
2. Constitutional Law <s=>268(9)
Conviction obtained through use of
false evidence known to be such by representatives of state must fall under due
process clause of Federal and State Constitutions if there is any reasonable likelihood
that such false testimony could have affect-

!

CROCKETT, Justice, concurred in this case bePanp 1 0 1
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number of cores. The court was justified in
its action but did not go far enough. We
feel the court also should have considered
the parties' course of performance and allowed defendant a reasonable time after
termination to recover cores from its late
1974 purchases. Our position is supported
by the Code, which provides, "[°]^ 'termination' all obligations which are still execute
ry on both sides are discharged but any
right based on prior breach or performance
survives:' 70A-2-106(3). Thus, under the
Code defendant's right to a reasonable time
to gather cores for turn-in is not destroyed
by termination of the parties' relationship.
We conclude, after termination, defendant was entitled to a reasonable time in
which to recover cores from its late 1974
purchases. We do not disturb the trial
court's amended holding allowing defendant to turn in 2,450 cores from purchases in
1975. We place an important qualification
on our holding, however. Although defendant is entitled to turn in enough usable
cores to cover his $4,807.40 debt, defendant
is not entitled to turn in cores for cash.
Throughout the course of their dealings the
parties operated on the basis that credit
^rather than cash would be allowed for core
rturn-ins.. It would be unjust for the court
to restructure their understanding at this
point. In summary, defendant should be
allowed a reasonable time to turn hT to
plaintiff, up to 6,410 usable cores/ This
figure includes the 2,450 cores the trial
court allowed defendant to turn in. Any
number short of 6,410 not turned in, at the
close of the reasonable time period, shall be
paid for in cash.
Remanded to the trial court for judgment
in accordance with this opinion.
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS and
STEWART, JJ., concur

Mildred A. STREET, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
The FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a corporation, and Preferred
Risk Mutual Insurance Company, a corporation, Defendants and Respondents.
No, 16109.
Supreme Court ot Utah.
March 28, 1980.

Insured brought action seeking order
compelling no-fault automobile insurer to
endorse and deliver draft issued by automobile liability insurer of tort-feasor, with
whom insured had entered into settlement
agreement, to insured, and insured, also
sought award of attorney fees of one third
of amount received on behalf of no-fault
insurer. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Maurice Harding, J., entered
judgment after granting insurer's motion to
dismiss, and appeal was taken. The Su-„
preme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1)
no-fault automobile insurer did not haveinterest in proceeds of settlement, which
concerned payments for inability to per-*
form household services, between its insured and third-party tort-feasor by virtue
of claimed right of subrogation pursuant to
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act,
and (2) remand was required to determine
factual issues concerning insured's entitlement to attornev fees.
Reversed and remanded.
Hall, J., concurred in part and dissentvi in part and filed opinion.

HALL J F concurs in the result.

(O
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1. Insurance <8=>60O5
No-fault automobile Insurer did not
have interest in proceeds of settlement,
i.:-u —earned payments for inability to
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sured and.third-party tort-feasor by virtue
of claimed right of subrogation pursuant to
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act.
U.OA.1953, 31-41-1 et seq., 31-416(l)(bXii).
2. Insurance <s=*601
General rule that subrogated insurance
carrier must pay its fair share of attorney
fees and costs if it has given notice and does
nothing to assist in prosecution of claim
applies in situation^ in which benefit is conferred upon insurer as result of mistake,
such as when there is in fact no subrogation
right in the insurer to any of sums obtained
in settlement.
3. Appeal and Error <s=> 1177(8)
In action in which insured sought reasonable attorney fees for benefit conferred
on no-fault automobile insurer as result of
settlement of action .against. third-party
tort-feasor, remand was required.to determine insured's entitlement to attorney-fees
where no factual findings were made as to
whether insurer in fact benefited, from in-,
sured's recovery to extent, that drafts was
allegedly endorsed and delivered to the insurer in amount representing reimbursement for medical-expenses,.lost wages and
property damage, and as to whether insured
did so in mistaken belief as to nature of
subrogation rights provided under norfault
insurance statutes. U.CA.1953, 31-41—ket
seq.

tue of arightof subrogation claimed pursuant to the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act See §§ 31-41-1 et seg., Utah
Code Ann. (1953), as amended. Plaintiff
also seeks an award of attorney's fees to be
paid out of any recovery Farmers Insurance
Exchange may obtain based on a right of
subrogation.
The district court dismissed plaintiffs
complaint to compel her no-fault insurer,
the defendant Farmers, to endorse a draft
made out jointly to plaintiff and Farmers
by Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company. Preferred Risk, the insurer of the
tortfeasor, tendered the draft in settlement
of plaintiffs claim. Plaintiff seeks reversal
of the lower court's dismissal and claims
that Farmers had no right by way of subrogation to share in the settlement amount.
The plaintiff, Mildred A. Street, was injured in a collision between her automobile
and one operated by Janet M. Clayton in
August 1975. Pursuant to the terms of
Street's no-fault insurance policy with
Farmers Exchange, Farmers paid Street
$10,132.47, of which $3,233.10 was for medical - expenses, $1,816.40 for lost wages,
$702.97 for property damage, and $4,380 for
inability to perform household services
(hereafter "loss of services").

.The payment for loss of services was
made in accordance with the insurance policy and as required by § 31-41^1)(bXiiX
which provides for payment to be made for
loss of services at the rate of $12 per day.
"in lieu, of reimbursement for expenses
which
would have been reasonably incurred
F. Alan Fletcher & Patrick J. Garver, of
Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City, for services that, but for. the injury, the
injured person would have performed for
for plaintiff and appellant..;.
hiss.household and* regardless of whether
-A. -Alma Nelson of Hanson & Garrett, •any of these expenses are actually^inFrank N. Karras, Salt. Lake City,-for de- curred." Street did not actually" incur' "exfendants and respondents.
penses for "loss of services," since substitute household services were provided voluntarily and without compensation by
STEWART, Justice:
The issue in this case" is whether a no- Street's neighbors, friends, and family
fault insurance carrier has an interest in • members.
the proceeds of a settlement betwe*™-'**«
03

£H^+» 3 damages exceeded the threshold
na />rvntm1 liner tnrt actions against a
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tortfeasor, see § 31-41-9, and she filed suit
against Ms, Clayton seeking general and
special damages for her injuries. This action was concluded by a settlement. Prior
to settlement of the tort action, Farmers
placed Street and the tortfeasor's insurer,
Preferred Risk, on notice of its claim to
subrogation for the amount Farmers paid
to Street
Farmers agreed to discount its subrogation claim by 20% in the event the parties to
the action entered into a settlement This
was based on the comparative negligence
ratio between plaintiff and tortfeasor which
plaintiff and Preferred Risk had agreed to.
It was agreed that plaintiff was 20% negligent and the tortfeasor, 80%.
The stipulation for dismissal and release
provided for a total payment of $14,000,
broken down as follows:
(1) Special damages of $7,256.14, representing $3,165.31 for medical expenses,
$2,480.45 for lost wages, and $610.38 for
property damages; and (2) General damages in the amount of $6,743.86. The stipulation between the parties contains the following language:
Plaintiffs hereby acknowledge such claim
and agree to pay Farmers Insurance
Group such amounts, not exceeding the
tabove itemization, which may be determined to be due and owing to Farmers
Insurance Group pursuant to its subrogation rights. In entering into this stipulation, however, plaintiffs do not concede
that Farmers Insurance Group's claim of
subrogation rights for payments made for
"services" is valid or that plaintiffs have
an obligation to repay to Farmers Insurance Group any amount paid by it pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-416(lXbXii), [U.C.A.], as set forth in the
Personal Injury Protection Endorsement
to plaintiffs' insurance policy.
Preferred Risk issued three drafts payable as follows:
1. A draft payable to Jack L. and Mildred A Street and Farmers Insurance

Itjl
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Group in the amount of $4,601.98 for medical expenses, lost wages, and property damape.
2. A draft payable to Jack L. and Mildred A. Street and Farmers Insurance
Group in the amount of $3,504 for "loss of
services.**
.1 A draft payable to Jack L. and Mildred A. Street and their attorneys in the
amount of $5,894.02, representing the balance of the settlement amount.
The Streets endorsed and delivered the
first draft to Farmers. The Streets refused
to endorse the second draft and claimed
that Farmers is not entitled to reimbursement for loss of services payments because
loss of services was not a recoverable damage item. Specifically, they claimed that
since this item could not have been recovered from the tortfeasor by way of damages, Farmers had no right of subrogation
as to i t
Plaintiff filed suit in district court seeking an order compelling Farmers to endorse
and deliver the second draft to the plaintiff
and to restrain Fanners and Preferred Risk
from arbitrating the reimbursement issue.
Plaintiff also sought an award of attorney's
fees of % of the amount received on behalf
of Farmers.
The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that a.
no-fault insurance carrier is entitled to reimbursement to the extent that the insured
recovered damages from the tortfeasor or,
Its insurance carrier, even though the
amount recovered did not include the type
of damages for which the no-faalt insurer
had made direct payments to the no-fault'
insured. Thus, according to the trial court's'
ruling, a no-fault insurer could collect out
of damages attributable to pain and suffering sums paid for an entirely different type
of damage, L e., loss of services payments to'
the insured.
[1J Farmers* claim for reimbursement
in this case cannot be sustained. Allstate
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Insurance Co. v. Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197
(1980), is dispositive. It holds that the Utah
No-Fault Insurance Act does not contemplate the granting of a right of subrogation
to a no-fault insurer in an action by the
no-fault insured against a third-party tortfeasor. The right of subrogation, as explained in Ivie. is a rigtitr fr% **» w w , i g ^ T>_
&n arbitration proceeding between insurance companies of the respective parties y
that double recovery can be avoided, unnecessary litigation made less likely, and the
inherent conflicts between the insured and
the insurer avoided.

[3] The resolution of plaintiffs claim
for attorney's fees must depend upon findings of fact to be made by the trial court.
Since the court dismissed plaintiffs complaint without taking evidence, no factual
findings were made as to whether Farmers
in fact benefited from Street's recovery to
the extent that the Streets allegedly endorsed and delivered a draft to Farmers in
the amount of $4,601.98, which represented
reimbursement for medical expenses, lost
wages, and property damage, and whether
plaintiff did so in a mistaken belief as to
the nature of the subrogation rights provided by the No-Fault Insurance Statute. If
such a benefit were conferred upon Farmers by the actions of the plaintiff, plaintiff
is entitled- to a reasonable attorney's fee
from Farmers to the extent that Farmers
benefited in the settlement secured by
plaintiff.

The plaintiff also contends that she" is
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee for
the benefit conferred on Farmers as a result of a settlement of her action against
the third-party tortfeasor. The general
rule is that a subrogated insurance carrier
must pay its fair share of attorney's fees
and costs if it has given notice and does
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
nothing to assist in the prosecution of the the lower court and remand the case to the
claim. Cedarholm v. State Farm Mutual trial court for further proceedings in accord
Insurance Companies, 81 Idaho 136, 338 with this opinion.
P.2d 93 (1959); ^ State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Clinton, 267 Or. 653, CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN and
518 P.2d 645 (1974); Iowa National Mutual WILKINS, JJ., concur.
Insurance Co. v. Huntley, 78 Wyo. 380, 328
P.2d 569 (1958); 44 AmJur^d Insurance.
HALL, Justice (concurring and dissent§ 1846 (1969); and Annot.2 A.L.R.3d 1441 ing):
(1965).
I agree that Farmers has no right^ of
subrogation.1 However, for that very rea[2] The problem in this- case is that
son (i. e., as a matter of law), it is * my
there 'was in fact no subrogation right in
opinion that plaintiff is not entitled to atFarmers to any of the sums" obtained in
torneys' fees.' * Simply' stated, I deem it
settlement, as we held in Ivie,-supra. Howwholly inappropriate to compensate plainever, if a benefit was conferred on Farmers
tiff for "protecting" a right of subrogation
as a result of a mistake, the general rule
when in fact no such right existed to be
which governs attorney's fees in a proper protected. Farmers' only right to reimsubrogation claim should be extended to the bursement of PIP payments is through
instant situation. Had Farmers been com- mandatory, binding arbitration,2 to which
pelled to collect from Preferred Risk under plaintiff is barred as a party.
the rule enunciated in Ivie, supra, it would
necessarily have incurred expenses. Equity
Furthermore, the judgment having been
and good conscience require that Farmers reversed, plaintiffs demand that Farmers
should not have a free ride from plaintiffs and Preferred Risk be restrained from arbiefforts if such be the case.
trating the reimbursement issue would ap1. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, Utah, 606 ?2d
1197 (1980).

2. Id., interpreting U.C.A., 1953. 31-41-11.
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pear to be revitalized. As indicated supra, arbitration. On remand, findings should be
it is my opinion that the arbitration is only made on this issue as well
between insurers and that plaintiff should
be precluded from participating in the pro^ivY_
ceeding in any way. At the very least, a
(o §^*|gjBER_^^factual question exists as to whether plainviz
~r-r^-^
tiff is entitled to. equitable relief as would
deprive, Farmers of its statutory right to

